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Abstract 
This research is aligned with identifying barriers throughout the alternative jet-fuel supply chain. 
Prices are analyzed in the market for tradable credits known as renewable identification numbers 
(RINs). The RIN market is a key policy instrument used in the implementation of the renewable 
fuel standard (RFS). The program is highly complex and drivers of RIN price are not always 
clear. RIN prices also exhibit multiple regimes where the price of nested RINs converge. 
Therefore, a smooth transition autoregressive model is employed to examine drivers of RIN price 
and to identify drivers of price regime change. Through research in the RIN market and 
renewable fuel standard, a common theme of policy uncertainty is identified in the literature.  
A two-variable real option model is utilized to examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the 
decision to invest in new production of second-generation biofuel. This represents the first 
attempt to isolate general market uncertainty from policy uncertainty in the biofuel producer’s 
optimal investment decision. RFS policy uncertainty adds to the aggregate uncertainty faced by 
the biofuel producer and may be impeding the original intentions of the policy program.  
Finally, an experimental biofuel feedstock and its potential to supply an alternative jet-fuel 
industry is considered. The experimental feedstock is known as pennycress, which produces an 
industrial oilseed.  Using a partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector, supply curves are 
simulated and its impacts on the agricultural sector are investigated. 
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Introduction 
Research studying the use of agriculture to produce energy began to arise in the early 1970’s. 
The impetus was through discoveries in technological processes while researching novel ways of 
converting coal to liquid fuel. Conversion of coal to a low-sulfur liquid fuel previously relied on 
the use of hydrogen under high pressures and temperatures, in the presence of a catalyst. The 
Bureau of Mines was interested in a novel system which did not rely on hydrogen. This lead 
Appell, Wender et al. (1969) to discover that low-rank coals could be converted to low-sulfur 
oils using carbon monoxide and water, a result even more effective than hydrogen reactions. 
Low-rank coals are those that are low in carbon content and have less energy content such as 
lignite and sub-bituminous coals. These coals are less mature in their formation. As time, heat 
and pressure increases, the energy content increases and so does the rank. So these low-rank 
coals are low in energy content in a similar way that organic matter is low in energy content. 
To understand why the reaction of coal to carbon monoxide and water was so effective, carbon 
monoxide plus water was reacted with several other model compounds to produce oil and 
compared to their respective reactions with hydrogen. Two of those model substances tested 
were cellulose and lignin, both primary components of plant material. The reaction and 
subsequent production of oil of cellulose and lignin with carbon monoxide and water was more 
rapid and complete than the reaction with hydrogen. Later, Appell, Miller et al. (1970) converted 
urban refuse, wood wastes, cellulosic wastes and sewage sludge to a low-sulfur oil by heating the 
substances under pressure with carbon monoxide and steam.  In addition to urban refuse, 
agricultural wasters, wood and sewage sludge Appell, Fu et al. (1971) further develop their 
conversion processes by producing oil from bovine manure and lignin. By this time the U.S. 
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Bureau of Mines had developed liquefaction, hydrogasification and pyrolysis processes to 
convert biomass into fuel (Steffgen 1974). 
The importance of this new literature was heightened with the 1973 oil embargo which caused 
fuel shortages and rapidly rising prices. Dugas (1973), provided an early techno-economic 
analysis of the yields and feasibility of producing energy from crops, trees and algae using 
bacterial fermentation, yeast fermentation and pyrolysis conversion processes. Szego and Kemp 
(1973), Steffgen (1974), Grantham and Ellis (1974) and Bassham (1976) , discuss the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of dedicated energy plantations and specially grown forests for 
energy. Grantham and Ellis (1974), found that standing timber, mill and logging residues may be 
used as fuel inside the logging industry, but that fueling a large share of national energy demands 
would be infeasible due to the vast land requirements necessary. 
As the research progressed and technological feasibility became established, the literature turned 
to the economic feasibility of biofuels. The early studies of economic feasibility ranged from 
regional studies to large comprehensive national analysis. 
In reaction to the 1973 oil embargo, President Richard Nixon announced Project Independence, 
with the goal of achieving energy self-sufficiency by 1980 (USDOE 2016). The Project 
Independence Task force conducted a macroeconomic assessment of competing demands on the 
nation’s production capacity through 1985, and of the methods by which investment spending by 
the private may be financed.  The task force estimated that if an accelerated plan were followed 
biomass could provide up to eight percent of the nation’s energy demands by year 2000 (Kelly 
and White 1974) and (Alich and Inman 1976). 
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Alich and Inman (1976), discuss the potential of biomass fired electricity generation power 
plants and provide a techno-economic analysis of direct biomass combustion, 
gasification/turbine generation and substitute natural gas production. The authors found costs for 
electricity generation via biomass combustion to be reasonable, but limited by transportation 
costs. Therefore power plants located near biomass supplies were found to be advantageous. 
Oursbourn, Lacewell et al. (1978), evaluate the collection and transportation costs of delivering 
agricultural residues to centrally located conversion facilities in Texas. High costs of collection 
and transportation lead the authors to conclude that conversion costs would need to be between 
32 and 36 percent the cost of natural gas for the use of crop residues to be feasible in replacing 
natural gas in Texas. However, the authors note several limitations to the study such as the 
exclusion of indirect costs, storage costs, crop yield variabilities and values of the crop residuals 
themselves.   
In 1979 the Office of Technology Assessment released an extensive study of alcohol based fuels 
from agricultural products titled Gasohol. The report examines the technical, economic, 
environmental and social factors related to the use of gasohol, a blend of one part ethanol and 
nine parts gasoline. One of the key findings of this study is that 1-2 billion gallons of ethanol 
could be produced each year with minimal impact on food and feed prices. The study noted that 
by the 1990’s ethanol might be competitively produced using cellulosic feedstocks such as crop 
residues and wood, having little impact on food prices. The study also found the choice of 
feedstock is the largest factor in determining the environmental impact of gasohol. Additionally, 
the expansion of ethanol production through the use of gasohol would result in intensive 
cultivation of new land to provide additional feedstocks. If corn is the chosen feedstock, the 
authors warn of significant increases in soil loss along with fertilizer and pesticide use. Other 
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feedstocks such as perennial grasses would have much less of an erosion effect. In addition, the 
authors of the study noted that investment in the production of ethanol would be limited by 
uncertainties in commodity prices, feedstock availability and conversion technology costs. The 
authors further noted that long term viability of an ethanol industry would be dependent on 
sustained market demand, and costs of converting cellulosic feedstocks. Large capital 
investments in cellulosic processes were found to be a major constraint in long term viability of 
the ethanol industry (USOAT 1979).  
From 1978 to 1986 ethanol fuel from biomass production increased from about 4 to 5 million 
gallons per year to about 850 million gallons per year. This increase in production was mostly 
driven by the Energy Tax Act of 1978 which provided gasoline blended with 10 percent ethanol 
an exemption from the federal gasoline excise tax and energy investment tax credits for 
equipment that converted biomass into ethanol (Zerbe 1988).  In a report by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, ethanol was found to be economically infeasible without massive government 
subsidies and the fuel ethanol industry would be terminated or sharply curtailed after 1992 when 
federal subsidies were scheduled to expire (USDA 1986). 
Since 1977 the USDOE had been supporting the development of woody biomass through the 
Short-Rotation Woody Crops Program (SRWCP). The aim of this program is to reduce 
uncertainty and risks associated with short-rotation intensive crops (SRIC) and move the 
technology closer to commercialization through the private sector. Perlack, Ranney et al. (1986), 
provide a review of the SRIC technology noting that adoption by the private sector would 
depend on future cost reductions and the prices of fossil fuels. Cost reductions in the form of 
technological and genetic advances along with reductions in harvest costs were noted as the two 
key potential drivers for commercialization. 
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Zerbe (1988), noted that producing ethanol from non-grain feedstock was possible, but 
production and research to improve conversion technologies were deterred by low oil prices. 
Imported oil prices peaked in 1980 at $98.02 per barrel before falling to $30.30 per barrel in 
1986, in February 2016 real dollars. Oil prices did not significantly increase until the year 2000 
when imported oil prices surpassed the 1986 low of $30.30 by averaging $38.40 in the year 2000 
(USDOE 2016).  A low oil price throughout this period was a major deterrent to private 
investment into non-grain biomass fuel production. However, this period of low oil price was not 
the only deterrent as conversion of non-grain biomass feedstocks such as woody biomass were 
typically found to be economically infeasible. Strauss, Blankenhorn et al. (1988), found the 
conversion of woody biomass to ethanol was not economically feasible due to a prohibitively 
high cost of woody biomass supply. 
The U.S. Department of Energy in 1983 established the Biofuels and Municipal Waste 
Technology Division (BMWT) to encourage the development of a biomass energy industry 
infrastructure, through the Regional Biomass Energy Program. The goal of the program was to 
identify and plan for regionally appropriate biomass technologies and to advance the production 
of biomass feedstocks and their conversion to fuels and energy by the private sector, including 
the conversion of municipal waste (Lailas 1989).  
Although public interest in alternative fuels waned during the 1980s after oil prices fell in 1986, 
the ethanol industry continued to grow at a moderate rate. In 1992 about 1 billion gallons of 
ethanol were produced, the industry being supported through a mix of Federal and State 
incentives. The Clean Air Act of 1990 gave rise to a market for oxygenates, creating a new 
market for ethanol. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 put forth a series of regulations and incentive 
programs involving fleet vehicle standards, alternative fuels, energy conservation and tax credits. 
6 
 
The Act established mandates for Federal fleet vehicles to run on alternative fuels such as 
electricity, ethanol and other biofuels. The Act also promoted adoption of alternative fuels 
among the fleet vehicles in the private sector and also established a program on the production 
and use of biodiesel (Shapouri and Duffield 1993). These two acts of legislations provided a 
significant boost and support to the biofuels industry and reignited the literature on the 
economics of producing crops as biomass energy feedstocks.  During this period a number of 
studies focused on regional cost-benefit analysis such as traditional farm budgeting (Reese, 
Aradhyula et al. 1993, Shapouri and Duffield 1993, Epplin 1996). A continued evolution in the 
literature resulted in the incorporation of enterprise budgeting and partial equilibrium analysis of 
the agricultural sector, along with geographic information system-based modeling (English, 
Menard et al. 2000, Graham, English et al. 2000, Ugarte, Walsh et al. 2000, Ugarte and Ray 
2000, Walsh, Daniel et al. 2003). 
In 2005, the ethanol industry received a major increase in support. The Energy Policy Act of 
2005 established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requiring the use of biofuels such as 
ethanol and biodiesel in the U.S. automotive fuel supply. The RFS mandated that ethanol 
production increase from the 4 billion gallon level of 2006 to 7.5 billion gallons per year by 2012 
(Markel, Clark et al. 2014).  The Act also created a renewable energy research budget of over 
$2.2 billion through year 2009.  
The Energy Independence Security Act (EISA) of 2007 enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard 
Two (RFS2). The new RFS2, (RFS from here out) included blending mandates for diesel and 
gasoline, and created new categories of renewable fuel and GHG performance thresholds for 
each category. The volumes of renewable fuels to be blended into transportation fuel were 
expanded from 7.5 billion gallons per year by 2012 to 36 billion gallons per year by 2022. The 
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RFS is implemented by requiring refiners that produce gasoline or diesel fuel in the United 
States and anyone who imports gasoline or diesel fuel into the United States, to meet Renewable 
Volume Requirements (RVOs).  Compliance with RVOs is shown by submitting a tradable 
credit for every gallon of renewable fuel blended with gasoline or diesel. Those credits are 
known as renewable identification numbers (RINs). RINs are obtained by blending renewable 
fuel or by purchasing them on a secondary market. Expanding the blend mandate and 
establishing tradable credits called RINs, created downstream market effects and a new 
established market. The RIN program is the subject of much debate and ongoing research. 
Understanding the behavior of RIN prices and how these prices effect firm-level investment 
decisions is critically important and thus the subject of a majority of this research.  
This research is composed of three parts. In chapter one, historical RIN price behavior and 
drivers of RIN price are examined. Historical RIN prices have been volatile, exhibiting large 
upward and downward spikes. Determining how the volatility impacts investment decisions is 
the subject of chapter two. Finally, the research concludes with chapter three, a study of 
economic feasibility for an experimental feedstock and its impact on agricultural markets. 
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Chapter I: Thresholds and Regime Change in the Market for Renewable 
Identification Numbers 
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Chapter I: Abstract 
This paper examines potential nonlinearities in RIN price and applies nonlinear time-series 
techniques to model historical RIN prices. The central hypothesis is that RIN prices are nonlinear 
and the behavior of RIN prices fall under at least two regimes. Current vintage RIN prices are 
used to capture immediate reflexes to price drivers. A smooth transition autoregressive model is 
applied to address nonlinearities and test for the most significant transition variable. This type of 
model is well suited to handling nonlinearity and regime changes, such as those, which occur 
with RFS revisions.  
Throughout their history, RIN prices have exhibited periods of a coupling behavior where 
biomass-based diesel D4 RINs and conventional renewable D6 RINs converge in price. The 
coupling of the RIN prices suggests biodiesel to be the marginal fuel used in overcoming the 
blend wall. Thus over-complying with the biodiesel mandates. During these periods, the ratio of 
D6/D4 is near, or equal to one. In other periods, the value of the ratio falls towards zero, 
suggesting at least two regimes. Examining drivers of regime change in RIN prices, and their 
ratio, provides important insight into a complex policy program known as the RIN market.  
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1.1. Introduction 
Tradable credits known as Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) are a key policy instrument 
used in the implementation of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). Producers and importers of 
gasoline and/or diesel (referred to obligated parties) are obligated to blend a mandated 
percentage of biofuel into their product supplied. Obligated parties show compliance with the 
law by submitting one RIN for every gallon of biofuel blended. Therefore, the price of the credit 
represents the marginal cost of complying with the law. Understanding the drivers of RIN price 
and their past behavior is therefore critically important to the sustainability of the RFS program 
and its effect on the Nation’s energy industry. A central hypothesis in this study is that RIN 
prices exhibit nonlinear behavior governed by at least two price regimes. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesized that the regime switching behavior is driven by the implied-ethanol mandate’s 
proximity to the ethanol blend wall.  
A number of studies and reports have examined RIN price fundamentals, developing a 
theoretical framework of the core value in RIN price. Thompson, Meyer et al. (2009) discuss 
core RIN values, and the hierarchal nature of RIN values. To demonstrate the core value of 
RINs, Thompson, Meyer et al. (2010) use complementary slackness equations, and supply-and-
use tables to simulate RIN price. McPhail, Westcott et al. (2011), provide a conceptual model of 
RIN prices and discuss the factors affecting RIN price.  The program is administered by setting 
an overall mandate and three submandates, resulting in four RIN types representing the four fuel 
categories. Of these four RIN types, only two were produced in significant numbers in the early 
years of the program. Those two RINs include conventional renewable (i.e. ethanol) RINs and 
biomass-based biodiesel RINs. Due to the hierarchical nested structure of the mandates, biodiesel 
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RINs should always be worth at least as much as ethanol RINs1. Therefore, the relationship 
between these two RIN prices has been an important indicator of the current state of the RIN 
market, since the two began trading. Thompson, Meyer et al. (2011) provide an early discussion 
of this relationship. At the time of writing, historical RIN data were not publicly available. 
However, the authors note that when biodiesel RIN price is greater than ethanol RIN price, the 
overall mandate is less binding than the biodiesel mandate.  When the overall mandate is more 
binding than the biodiesel mandate, obligated parties are indifferent between using ethanol or 
biodiesel RINs to show compliance, causing their prices to converge. Due to the lack of 
historical data, the authors simulate RIN prices using a partial-equilibrium model. Through 
forward looking simulation results, the authors find that ethanol RIN prices remain relatively low 
while advanced and biodiesel RIN prices remain relatively high. Indicating the advanced and 
biodiesel mandates were the most difficult to satisfy. However, results partly depend on an 
expansion of 85% ethanol-blended gasoline (E85) consumption, thus overcoming the blend wall. 
At the time of their study, biodiesel RINs traded well above the price of ethanol RINs. However, 
the prices did indeed converge shortly after regulators proposed a significant strengthening of the 
overall mandate in 2013. With the availability of historical data, researchers have begun 
analyzing observed RIN price behavior. Whistance and Thompson (2014) examine RIN price 
behavior to determine if prices follow the nested-hierarchy expectations. Lade, Lin et al. (2015), 
show that prices reflect current and expected marginal compliance costs, along with expected 
RFS mandates.2 As discussed in Lade, Lin et al. (2015), the coupling of ethanol and biodiesel 
                                                 
 
1For simplicity, this category can be thought of as the ethanol category. However, readers should be aware that other 
fuels could satisfy the requirements of this category, such as the case with butanol. 
2(Lade, Lin et al. 2015) find RIN prices to be non-stationary. However, the authors find no evidence of cointegration 
among RIN types or energy price series. 
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RINs suggests that the industry expectation was for biodiesel to be the marginal fuel pushing the 
industry beyond the blend wall and thus overcomplying with the biodiesel mandates. Expansion 
of the E85 market has not occurred for a number of reasons, leaving obligated parties with two 
methods of overcoming the blend wall. Either they overcomply with the biodiesel mandate, or 
they reduce production and imports, thereby reducing their renewable volume obligations. 
Market expectations about the ability to meet an overall mandate beyond the blend wall, and the 
aforementioned change in RIN price behavior, lead to potential nonlinearities in RIN price. Due 
to the nested structure of the submandates, biomass-based diesel RINs should always be worth at 
least as much as the ethanol RINs. Therefore, the ratio of ethanol RIN price over biomass-based 
diesel RIN price should never exceed one. When this ratio is equal to one, or near one, this 
indicates that biodiesel is the marginal fuel of compliance (Irwin 2016). Meaning that, the market 
cannot absorb any more production of ethanol, forcing obligated parties to overcomply with the 
biodiesel mandate in order to generate enough RINs to meet the overall mandate. As the value of 
the ratio decreases, market participants are signaling their expectations are that the blend wall 
has been overcome, or is no longer binding due to decreased demand in gasoline and diesel. The 
value of this ratio can thus be broken into two or more regimes. Supposing there are only two 
regimes, the blend wall may be binding in the regime where the ratio is close to one and non-
binding when the ratio is close to zero. However, there could be three regimes. In a third regime, 
the blend wall may be binding, but circumvented by reductions in gasoline and diesel production. 
Alternatively, perhaps the blend wall has been circumvented by increased blends of biodiesel, 
generating a sufficient surplus of biodiesel RINs to meet the implied ethanol mandate. 
The ratio of ethanol RIN price over biodiesel RIN price is analyzed to examine potential 
nonlinearities and drivers of potential regime change. Following this, individual ethanol and 
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biodiesel RIN prices are examined for potential nonlinearity and regime change. Smooth 
transition autoregressive models are applied to the individual prices and to the ratio of prices. 
These types of models are well suited to handling nonlinearities and regime changes, such as 
those, which occur with RFS revisions. In this framework, it is also possible to test for the most 
significant transition variable in determining regime change. A candidate set of transition 
variables are considered, including a variable, which represents the implied weekly ethanol 
mandate. This variable is constructed by taking the product of the fractional ethanol mandate and 
weekly gasoline and diesel supplies.3 It thus approximates the volume of ethanol blended on a 
weekly basis, excluding cellulosic ethanol and other advanced ethanol use (Good and Irwin 
2015). 
1.2. Renewable Identification Numbers 
The RFS, established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), requires refiners that produce 
gasoline or diesel fuel in the United States and anyone who imports gasoline or diesel fuel into 
the United States (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2014) to meet four different renewable 
volume requirements (RVOs):  (i) total renewable fuel,  (ii) advanced biofuel, (iii) biomass-
based diesel, and (iv) advanced cellulosic biofuel.4 The RVOs are based on the ratio of 
                                                 
 
3 The RFS does not explicitly mandate ethanol. Therefore, the fractional ethanol mandate is implied as the annual 
percentage standard for total renewables minus the annual percentage standard of advanced biofuel (Irwin and Good 
2015). The percentages are set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and determined on an annual basis 
with revisions possible to occur year to year. The weekly product supplied for gasoline and diesel are provided by 
the U.S. Energy Information Association. Weekly product supplied is an approximation of weekly consumption as it 
measures the disappearance from primary sources such as refiners, blenders and distribution terminals (USDOE EIA 
2016). 
4 For example, the RFS mandated that ethanol production increase from the 4 billion gallons of ethanol produced in 
2006 to 7.5 billion gallons per year by 2012. Two years later the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA) amended the RFS to include (i) blending requirements for diesel as well as gasoline, (ii) an increase in the 
volume of renewable fuel required to be blended into transportation fuel, (iii) new categories of renewable fuel with 
separate minimum volume requirements for each category, and (iv) lifecycle greenhouse gas performance threshold 
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renewable fuels to all non-renewable gasoline and diesel fuels, and may be amended from year-
to-year. For example, the EPA set the 2016 annual percentage standard for total renewable fuel 
at 9.63%, advanced biofuel at 1.88%, biomass-based diesel at 1.49% and cellulosic biofuel at 
0.059%.5 These annual percentage standards are based on mandated annual volume requirements 
and projected annual consumption of gasoline and diesel. 
Obligated parties demonstrate compliance with RVOs using a tracking system developed by the 
EPA. In this system, every gallon qualifying as a renewable fuel produced or imported is 
assigned a RIN. The type of RIN generated depends on the type of renewable fuel being 
produced, feedstock and production process. To qualify as a renewable fuel under the RFS, the 
fuel’s lifecycle GHG emissions must be less than the lifecycle GHG emissions of the 2005 
baseline average gasoline or diesel fuel that it replaces. How much less, depends upon the 
category of biofuel. Table 1 summarizes RIN types, D-codes, and the primary fuel types that 
qualify under the corresponding categories.6  
A qualifying feedstock is tracked through its processing at the biofuel plant and a RIN is attached 
to that batch of biofuel. The RIN must not be separated from the renewable fuel as it moves 
through the distribution system, and is transferred along with the renewable fuel as ownership 
changes. Once the renewable is blended into a conventional fuel, the RIN is separated and used 
                                                 
 
standards requiring the renewable fuel used to satisfy the RFS emit fewer greenhouse gases (GHG) than the 
petroleum-based fuel it replaces (Yacobucci 2012). 
5 These minimum requirements translate to a total renewable fuel percentage standard for 2013 of 9.74% (since the 
16.55 billion gallons of renewable fuel represented 9.74% of all fuel volume), an advanced biofuel percentage 
standard of 1.52%, a biomass-based diesel percentage standard of 1.13% and a cellulosic biofuel percentage 
standard of 0.004% (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2013). 
6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016), provides a full listing of approved pathways and detailed fuel 
types. 
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for compliance by obligated parties, or it may be traded as a stand-alone commodity (McPhail et 
al 2011).   
1.2.1. RIN Pricing 
The fundamental value, also known as the core value of a RIN, is determined by the gap between 
the cost of supplying biofuel, and the price at which blenders are willing to pay for biofuel at 
mandated quantities. If there is no gap between the cost of supplying biofuel at the mandated 
quantity and the price blenders are willing to pay for RFS2-mandated quantities, then the market 
would be in equilibrium and there would be no need for the RIN markets. RIN credits subsidize 
the biofuel market by providing an incentive for the market to trade at quantities greater than the 
market equilibrium when the mandate is not in place. When the mandate is binding, RIN prices 
are positive. When the mandate is non-binding, RIN prices are zero. A non-binding mandate 
implies renewable fuel production levels in equilibrium are greater than RFS mandated 
requirements, rendering the mandate superfluous. Conversely, a binding mandate implies 
renewable fuel production levels in equilibrium are lower than RFS mandated requirements, 
necessitating the market for RINs. A binding mandate is necessary for a strong RIN market.  
Figure 1 illustrates the core value of a RIN in ethanol markets (panel (a)) and biodiesel markets 
(panel (b)). Both figures follow conventions found throughout the literature, with the distinction 
between the two markets being made at the slope of the respective demand curves. Demand for 
biodiesel is horizontal and thus perfectly elastic for prices of biodiesel equal to conventional 
diesel. Biodiesel is not constrained by a blend wall, and has an energy content 93%-99% of 
conventional low-sulfur diesel. Higher blends of biodiesel have less potential to inflict damage 
on engines and current infrastructure. Blends of 20% biodiesel are common in transportation 
fuels. Higher blends or even 100% biodiesel transportation fuels are compatible with a large 
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portion of vehicles built since 1994 (AFDC 2016). Thus, biodiesel is often modeled as a near 
perfect substitute for conventional fuel, resulting in perfectly elastic demand for prices equal to 
conventional diesel. Ethanol is constrained by the blend wall and has an energy content 73-83% 
of gasoline. Higher blends of ethanol have damaging effects on vehicle engines. Many 
automobiles manufactured today cannot handle blends of ethanol exceeding ten percent. Some 
manufacturers offer vehicles, known as Flex-Fuel vehicles, which can handle up to 85% ethanol 
blends. However, demand for the flex-fuel variety has been relatively low. For these reasons, the 
ethanol market is often modeled as having a downward sloping demand curve as in panel (a) of 
Figure 1. 
The nested nature of the submandates means that biofuels, which qualify for multiple RIN 
categories, have a higher value. Therefore, an advanced biofuel RIN will be worth at least as 
much as a conventional biofuel RIN because advanced biofuel RINs count towards both the 
advanced biofuel RVO and the ethanol RVOs. Similarly, biodiesel D4 RINs will be worth at 
least as much as D5 advanced biofuel RINs because they count towards the biodiesel RVO, the 
advanced biofuel RVO or the ethanol RVO (Figure 2). How much of a premium exists for D4 
over D5 and D6 depends on the relative levels of advanced mandates versus conventional 
mandates and market equilibriums. However, due to this nested structure and aside from 
temporary trading anomalies, RIN prices satisfy 
𝑅𝐷3, 𝑅𝐷4 ≥ 𝑅𝐷5 ≥ 𝑅𝐷6⁡. 
Beyond the core value, RINs also have a time value, or a speculative component. RINs can be 
held for up to two years and applied towards 20% of future renewable volume obligations. 
Therefore, the observed price of a RIN can be represented as⁡𝑅 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
(Irwin 2014). As discussed above, the core value is represented by the gap between the biofuel 
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supply price and the conventional fuel price, plus the value of the blender’s tax credit, for years 
when the credit is available. This gap, plus the blender’s tax credit is known as the blend margin 
and is synonymous with the core value of the RIN.  
Hence, the 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (𝑃𝑏 − 𝑃) + 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
′𝑠⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and the observed price of a 
RIN⁡(𝑅) can be rewritten as  
𝑅 = [(𝑃𝑏 − 𝑃) + 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
′𝑠⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡] + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. 7 
The core value is the largest component of observed RIN prices and a simple linear regression, 
with no constant, results in⁡𝑅2⁡of 0.8660. This indicates that about 86% of the variation in 
observed RIN price is explained by the blend margin and blender tax credit.  
Because RINs are bankable, an obligated party can accrue surplus RINs during periods of low 
compliance cost, to hedge against future costlier periods. This characteristic adds to the time-
value in a RIN. However, market expectations also provide a time value to the RIN. 
Non-obligated parties may participate in the RIN market by trading RINs much like any other 
commodity. If speculators anticipate an increase or decrease in RIN prices, they may buy or sell 
excess RINs, further increasing or decreasing RIN prices. An example of a non-obligated party is 
a producer or importer with an output of less than 75,000 barrels per day, or producers or 
importers of jet fuel and other fuels not falling under the umbrella of the RFS. The price of 
imports also affects RIN prices by causing a shift in the domestic supply of renewable fuels. 
Increases in crude oil prices also create stronger demand for alternative fuels, further 
                                                 
 
7 In the years, 2011, 2013 and 2016 biodiesel blenders were eligible to receive a tax credit of $1.00 for every gallon 
of biofuel blended. Biodiesel RINs are multiplied by 1.5 to convert prices to ethanol equivalent values (Irwin 
2014).For example, one gallon of biodiesel generates 1.5 D4 biodiesel RINs. 
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incentivizing blending with biofuels and thereby reducing RIN value. Increased costs of 
feedstock production reduce feedstock supply and increase RIN value, while decreases in 
feedstock production costs increase feedstock supply and negatively affect the value of RINs. 
Blender tax credits incentivize blending with more biofuels, increasing biofuel demand and 
potentially causing a decrease in RIN price. Despite this, uncertainty about renewed availability 
of tax credits can counteract and lead to increased RIN price. In addition, market expectations 
about the future stringency of the policy can affect the time value of a RIN. In fact, uncertainty 
regarding RFS policy has been shown to have a significant effect on RIN price, a topic that will 
be revisited in the following chapter. 
1.3. Data 
RIN price data is provided by EcoEngineers, a provider of daily and historical RIN price.8 Data 
ranges from January 6 2010 to April 15 2016 for D4, D5 and D6 RIN credits. To examine the 
movements of these three RIN credits over time and in relation to each other, it is useful to plot 
them together against time.  Ethanol RINs began trading in April of 2008, biodiesel RINs began 
trading in September of 2009 and advanced biofuel RINs began trading in January of 2011 
(AGMRC 2015). Data in this study begins in January of 2010 when biodiesel RINs and ethanol 
RINs were trading at similar prices. The two prices diverged with biodiesel RINs trading at a 
premium over ethanol RINs between 2010 and 2013. The three RIN prices began to converge 
following jumps in D6 RIN value, which began in early 2013. On January 2, the first trading day 
                                                 
 
8EcoEngineers provides comprehensive compliance management, market data, and facility planning and project 
development services for biofuel companies operating under US regulations. All price indices utilize volume-
weighted averages either in the calculation of the index or as a component of the calculation of the Index. Weighted 
averages are utilized in an effort to minimize any trading anomalies or distress trading activity that might otherwise 
distort the data sample (EcoEngineers 2012). 
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of 2013, the price of a D6 ethanol RIN was just seven cents. Over the next 41 trading days, D6 
RIN price jumped from seven cents to 74 cents per RIN. 
By March 4 2013, the D4 premium was just five cents and on December 5 2013 ethanol RINs 
eliminate the biodiesel RIN premium. The D4 premium over D5 advanced biofuel RINs 
narrowed in October of 2012 when D4 is priced just eight cents over D5 on October 11 2013. 
Between the start of D5 trading in January of 2011 and October 10 2012, the average D4 
premium was $0.57. This premium is to be expected from the nested nature of the RIN credits. 
The average D4 premium over D6, between January 6 2010 and March 4 2013, is $0.8758. The 
D4 premium over D5 from March 4 2013 to December 21 2015 averages $0.0306, while the D4 
premium over D6 during the same period averages $0.1218. The convergence pattern is strongest 
between March 4 2012 and December 31 2014. The total spread is the sum of the individual 
spread between D4 and D6 and the spread between D4 and D5. During this period of strong 
convergence, the mean total spread is $0.1068.  
The first trading day of 2015, January 2, is responsible for a significant departure from the strong 
convergence pattern. On this day, D4 RIN prices increase by more than 10 cents per RIN, 
signaling the beginning of a weakly convergent pattern.  From this point, the convergence is 
much weaker with the total spread between the three RIN prices calculated to be a mean of 
$0.2435. The weakly convergent period is mostly attributable to diverging D6 ethanol RIN price, 
as D4 and D5 RINs continue to track each other in trading price.  
Since D5 advanced biofuel RINs are lower and upper bound by ethanol and biodiesel RINs, they 
are excluded from the analysis. The focus turns to individual price of ethanol and biodiesel RINs, 
and the ratio of these two RIN prices. The ratio of D6/D4 RIN price is utilized to examine the 
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convergence of ethanol and biodiesel RIN price. If this ratio exhibits nonlinearity, it may signal 
important regime changing behavior in the underlying data generating process.  
1.4. Nonlinearity in RIN price 
1.4.1 Visually inspecting for nonlinearity 
One method of identifying nonlinearity in a time series⁡𝑌𝑡 ⁡ is to examine the joint distribution of 
𝑌𝑡⁡and 𝑌𝑡−1⁡or 𝑌𝑡−𝑠⁡⁡where⁡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. If the time series 𝑌𝑡 ⁡and 𝑌𝑡−𝑠⁡ are not jointly normal, there is 
evidence of nonlinearity. The Wold decomposition shows that the best linear predictor is the best 
one-step-ahead predictor if and only if innovation terms⁡𝑒𝑡⁡satisfy the martingale condition. The 
martingale condition states that the conditional mean of ⁡𝑒𝑡⁡given⁡𝑒𝑡−𝑠 is identically equal to zero 
and this condition holds when⁡𝑒𝑡⁡is a sequence of independent, identically distributed random 
variables with zero mean. Conversely, when the martingale condition fails, a nonlinear predictor 
will be the best one-step-ahead predictor. Given the Wold decomposition, the best linear 
predictor is approximated by finite ARIMA models. In linear ARIMA models, the errors are 
assumed independent and identically normally distributed.  The normal error assumption implies 
the time series is also normally distributed and thus any two sets of time series are jointly 
normal. Therefore, nonlinearity can be identified by finding a non-normal joint distribution of 
𝑌𝑡⁡and⁡𝑌𝑡−𝑠⁡. To perform this task, a scatter diagram of 𝑌𝑡 ⁡against⁡𝑌𝑡−𝑠⁡is plotted (Cryer and Chan 
2008).  
In this case 𝑌𝑡⁡represents the first-differenced ratio of D6 over D4 RIN price.
9 To aid in the 
visualization, a nonparametric nearest neighbor regression is fit to the data in each scatter plot. 
                                                 
 
9The same procedure is later carried out for the individual prices although the figure is not presented to reduce 
redundancy.  
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The nearest neighbor method fits a locally weighted polynomial regression. Each nearest 
neighbor regression is specified as a first-degree polynomial using 30% of the sample to 
calculate the bandwidth and local (Tricube) weighting. By weighting the observations, those 
points furthest from the local regression point are weighted less. Therefore the weighted 
regression minimizes the weighted sum of squared residuals providing a locally weighted 
scatterplot smoothing (Lowess) technique (Cleveland and Loader 1996). By fitting the nearest 
neighbor regression, the nonlinearity can be visually observed (Figure 6).  
Figure 7 illustrates the historical price ratio in levels. From this figure, it appears the ratio is in at 
least two regimes, with a possible third regime. The transition between the first and second 
regime occurs abruptly, while the second transition appears to occur smoothly. Figure 8 
illustrates the bi-modal distribution of the price ratio in levels. The presence of multiple modes is 
another visual indication of nonlinearity in the price ratio. 
The price ratio in levels is nonstationary and integrated of order one. Therefore, the first-
difference is applied to generate a stationary time series. By examining the stationary first-
differenced ratio, one can see the possibility of a third regime occurring in 2014 and beyond 
(Figure 9).  
1.4.2 Testing for Nonlinearity 
Beyond visual inspection, empirical tests provide further evidence of nonlinearity. Two 
particular tests have gained in popularity over the years, the test for quadratic nonlinearity, (Tsay 
1986), and a Tukey non-additive type test for nonlinearity (Keenan 1985).  
Keenan’s test for nonlinearity is based upon a general form of nonlinear stationary time series 
models that are known as Volterra expansions (Cryer and Chan 2008).  Volterra expansions take 
the form 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛼𝜇𝜀𝑡−𝜇
∞
𝜇=−∞
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝜇𝑣𝜀𝑡−𝜇𝜀𝑡−𝑣
∞
𝑣=−∞
∞
𝜇=−∞
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝜇𝑣𝑤𝜀𝑡−𝜇𝜀𝑡−𝑣𝜀𝑡−𝑤
∞
𝑤=−∞
∞
𝑣=−∞
∞
𝜇=−∞
+⋯ 
where⁡{⁡𝜀𝑡, −∞ < 𝑡 < ∞⁡} is a strictly stationary process, assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with a zero mean.  The right hand side terms in the expansion include an 
intercept, linear, quadratic and cubic terms. However, the test of linearity is equivalent to a test 
of no multiplicative terms. Therefore, the null hypothesis tests whether or not higher order 
expansion terms vanish. 
Keenan (1985), provides a three step process to estimate the test for nonlinearity. 
i. Regress⁡𝑌𝑡⁡on {1, 𝑌𝑡−1,⁡𝑌𝑡−2, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝}⁡where⁡⁡𝑝⁡is a predetermined lag order. Obtain the 
fitted values⁡𝑌?̂? , predicted residuals⁡?̂?𝑡 for 𝑡 = 𝑝 + 1, … , 𝑛 and calculate the sum of 
squared residuals⁡?̂?𝑡
2
. 
ii. Regress 𝑌?̂?
2
⁡on⁡{1, 𝑌𝑡−1,⁡𝑌𝑡−2, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝} and obtain the predicted residuals⁡𝜖?̂?⁡for⁡𝑡 = 𝑝 +
1, … , 𝑛. 
iii. Regress⁡?̂?𝑡⁡on⁡∈̂𝑡 with no intercept for⁡𝑡 = 𝑝 + 1,… , 𝑛. This allows the user to obtain⁡?̂? =
?̂?0√∑ 𝜖?̂?
2𝑛
𝑡=𝑝+1 ⁡⁡where ⁡?̂?0⁡is the regression coefficient. 
Keenan’s test statistic is thus 
?̂? =
?̂?2(𝑛 − 2𝑝 − 2)
?̂?𝑡
2 − ?̂?2
 
Under the null hypothesis of linearity ⁡?̂?⁡approximately follows an F-distribution with degrees of 
freedom 1 and⁡𝑛 − 2𝑝 − 2. Keenan’s test is equivalent to testing that the coefficient⁡?̂? = 0 in the 
regression model 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + exp{𝜂 (∑𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
)
2
} + 𝜀𝑡. 
If the coefficient⁡⁡𝜂⁡equals zero, then exp(0) = 1 and the model simply becomes an AR (p). 
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Tsay (1986), extended Keenan’s test improving the power of the test to account for more general 
nonlinear terms.  These more general terms are accounted for by 
replacing⁡⁡exp {𝜂(∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )
2
}⁡with  
exp⁡{𝛿1,1𝑌𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿1,2𝑌𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−2 +⋯𝛿1,𝑝𝑌𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−𝑝 +⋯ 
+𝛿2,2𝑌𝑡−2
2 + 𝛿2,3𝑌𝑡−2𝑌𝑡−3 +⋯𝛿2,𝑝𝑌𝑡−2𝑌𝑡−𝑝 +⋯ 
𝛿𝑝−1,𝑝−1𝑌𝑡−𝑝+1
2 + 𝛿𝑝−1,𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝+1𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛿𝑝,𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝
2 }⁡. 
The null hypothesis in Tsay’s test is that all coefficient terms 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 are equal to zero. The test 
statistic follows an F-distribution and thus an F-test that all 𝛿𝑖,𝑗′𝑠 equal zero, tests the null 
hypothesis that the true process is linear. The null hypothesis of linearity, in the fist-differenced 
D6/D4 price ratio of lag-order two, is rejected with p-values of 0.0126 and 0.0811 in the Tsay 
and Keenan tests respectively.10 In the following section, additional tests of linearity are carried 
out against a specific alternative. 
1.5. Thresholds in the RIN Market 
As D6 and D4 RIN prices converge, the price ratio nears unity and prices exhibit a coupling 
patter. A central hypothesis in this paper is that the coupling patterns observed in the RIN market 
are brought about by some proximity to the ethanol blend wall. In other words, there is some 
unobservable threshold, that when crossed, brings about a change in the behavior of the RIN 
market. Therefore, a key variable in this paper is the fractional ethanol mandate multiplied by 
weekly product supplied of gasoline and diesel. This is referred to as weekly ethanol mandate. 
Weekly product supplied is an approximation of weekly consumption because it measures the 
                                                 
 
10Similarly, the null the hypothesis of linearity in the individual D4 and D6 RIN price is rejected under both the Tsay 
and Keenan. The table of results is presented in the chapter appendix. 
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disappearance of gasoline and diesel from primary sources such as refiners, blenders and 
distribution terminals (USDOE EIA 2016). The ethanol blend wall is generally thought to be ten 
percent of gasoline consumption. The weekly ethanol mandate approximates the volume of 
ethanol blended on a weekly basis, excluding cellulosic ethanol and other advanced ethanol use. 
Where this observed data lies in relation to some unobserved threshold is presumed to trigger 
regime changes in the ratio of D6/D4 RIN price and in the individual D6 RIN price. 
Prices for D4 biodiesel RINs are driven primarily by biodiesel blend margins and other market 
forces unrelated to the ethanol blend wall (Irwin 2014). Therefore, the primary threshold variable 
is not expected to be the weekly ethanol mandates. Rather, it is hypothesized that regime changes 
in D4 RIN prices are triggered by endogenous factors to the D4 RIN market. Therefore, the key 
threshold variable is expected to be lagged values of D4 RIN price.  
1.5.1 Model Selection for D6/D4 Price Ratio 
The first step in building a nonlinear model is to specify a linear model to form a starting point 
for further analysis. The proposed linear model for the D6/D4 RIN price ratio is one of lagged 
dependent variables, and two exogenous variables including, ethanol blend margins, and 
biodiesel blend margins. Ethanol blend margins are defined as the difference between ethanol 
price and gasoline price, and applicable blender tax credits for the periods when such tax 
incentives were in effect. Therefore, the blend margins are composed of three explanatory 
variables including ethanol price, gasoline price and the value of blender tax credits. Similarly, 
the biodiesel blend margins are composed of three explanatory variables to include the biodiesel 
price, conventional diesel price and biodiesel-blender tax credits. The blend margins 
approximate the core value of RINs as depicted in Figure 1. When blending mandates are pushed 
beyond the blend wall, ethanol RINs should be in high demand and in fact, there may be a deficit 
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of available D6 RINs to fulfill the ethanol mandate. If that is the case, the deficit may be made 
up by submitting D4 RINs, as discussed earlier. In this state of the world, D6 RIN prices ought to 
be driven to their ceiling, which is defined by the floor of D5 and D4 RIN prices. Recall that 
since D5 RIN prices are bounded by D6 and D4 RINs, they are excluded from the analysis.  
First, the optimal lag length of the price ratio is determined using an iterative process where the 
optimal lag is chosen to minimize a suite of information criteria such as Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) and Bozdogan’s Information Complexity Criteria (ICOMP). Based on the results, 
the optimal lag length for the D6/D4 RIN price ratio is determined to be lag-order one. This step 
is then carried out on the individual prices and a lag-order of one is found to minimize the AIC 
and ICOMP for both of the individual price series (Table 2).  
Next, the linear AR (1) model is estimated via ordinary least squares for the price ratio and the 
individual prices. From the linear model, the first lag of the dependent variable is highly 
significant and the biodiesel blend margin are highly significant. Ethanol blend margins are not 
found to be statistically significant but remain in the model as this result may change in a 
nonlinear specification under different regimes.  
Before proceeding with any model selection the residuals are examined for possible serial 
correlation and unspecified heteroskedasticity. The presence of heteroskedasticity is likely to 
have a significant effect on inference and thus model selection results. A LM-type test is carried 
out by regressing the squared residuals on explanatory variables to identify any possible 
heteroskedasticity dependent upon the model’s regressors. However, the presence of serial 
correlation will invalidate any test of heteroskedasticity so a Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation is performed first. The null hypothesis is of no serial correlation in residuals up to a 
specified lag order. In this case, tests are carried out for second-order serial correlation. 
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Results in Table 3 indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation in the price ratio. Therefore, a LM-type test of heteroskedasticity is carried out on the 
residuals of the linear model. 
Table 4 reports the test results of the LM-type test of heteroskedasticity. Results strongly indicate 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected. However when performing a test of 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis is rejected with confidence. 
Therefore, Newey-West corrected standard errors are specified. 
The proposed model for the RIN price ratio is a smooth transition autoregressive model with 
exogenous variables.  The proposed transition variable is the weekly ethanol mandate as defined 
earlier. Log transforming the weekly ethanol mandate ensures stationarity. This model will be 
tested against a competing STAR model, where the transition variable is the endogenous lagged 
dependent variable. Furthermore, this model is compared to a threshold autoregressive (TAR) 
and self-exciting threshold autoregressive (SETAR) which is estimated in the next section.  
1.5.2 Estimation of SETAR and TAR models 
The two-regime threshold autoregressive model is defined as  
𝑌𝑡 = {
𝑋′𝛿1 + 𝛽1,1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝1,1𝑌𝑡−𝑝1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡, 𝑖𝑓⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ≤ 𝑟⁡
𝑋′𝛿2 + 𝛽1,2𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝2,1𝑌𝑡−𝑝2 + 𝜎2𝜀𝑡, 𝑖𝑓⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑 > 𝑟
}. 
The autoregressive lag orders of the two sub models are not necessarily identical and are thus 
labeled as⁡𝑝1⁡and⁡𝑝2. Exogenous variables make up the⁡𝑋⁡vector and the coefficient 𝛿𝑗varies 
among regimes. Extending the two-regime model to any⁡𝑚⁡regimes is done by further 
partitioning the thresholds so that⁡𝑟0 < 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 < ⋯𝑟𝑚−1 < 𝑟𝑚⁡. The location of⁡⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡in relation 
to the thresholds will determine the sub models. For example, a four-regime threshold 
autoregressive model is represented as the piecewise regression of 
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𝑌𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑋′𝛿4 + 𝛽1,4𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝4,4𝑌𝑡−𝑝4 + 𝜎4𝜀𝑡, 𝑟3 ≤⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡
𝑋′𝛿3+⁡𝛽1,3𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝3,3𝑌𝑡−𝑝3 + 𝜎3𝜀𝑡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑟2 ≤⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑 < 𝑟3⁡
𝑋′𝛿2 + 𝛽1,2𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝2,2𝑌𝑡−𝑝2 + 𝜎2𝜀𝑡, 𝑟1 ≤ 𝑍𝑡−𝑑 < 𝑟2⁡
𝑋′𝛿1 + 𝛽1,1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝1,1𝑌𝑡−𝑝1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑 < 𝑟1 }
 
 
 
 
. 
An indicator function 𝐼𝑗(𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡, 𝑟𝑗) where⁡𝑗 = 1,2,3, …𝑚, takes the value of 1 if the expression is 
true and zero if false, is used to combine the piecewise regression. Therefore, the above 
piecewise regression of four regimes can be combined into a single nonlinear regression of 
𝑌𝑡 = {(𝑋
′𝛿1 + 𝛽𝑝1,1𝑌𝑡−𝑝1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡)𝐼1(𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡, 𝑟1) + (𝑋
′𝛿2 + 𝛽𝑝2,2𝑌𝑡−𝑝2 + 𝜎2𝜀𝑡)𝐼2(𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡, 𝑟1, 𝑟2)
+ (𝑋′𝛿3 + 𝛽𝑝3,3𝑌𝑡−𝑝3 + 𝜎3𝜀𝑡)𝐼3(𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡, 𝑟2, 𝑟3) + (𝑋
′𝛿4 + 𝛽𝑝4,4𝑌𝑡−𝑝4
+ 𝜎4𝜀𝑡)𝐼4(𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡, 𝑟3)}. 
The identity of the specification is determined by the threshold variable⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑. If⁡⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡is the d-th 
lagged dependent variable then the model is a self-exciting threshold autoregressive (SETAR) 
model. If⁡⁡𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡is some other exogenous variable then the model becomes the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model. 
The problem is therefore to estimate the coefficients⁡𝛿𝑗 ⁡, 𝛽𝑝𝑗,𝑗 and the threshold values⁡𝑟𝑗. To do 
so nonlinear least squares is performed to minimize the sum of squares objective function. The 
least square estimator⁡⁡𝜃 = (𝛿𝑗 ⁡, ?̂?𝑝𝑗,𝑗, ?̂?𝑗)⁡solves the minimization problem 
𝜃 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛⁡∑{𝑌𝑡 − (𝑋
′𝛿1 + 𝛽𝑝1,1𝑌𝑡−𝑝1)𝐼1(𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡, 𝑟1) − ⋯− (𝑋
′𝛿4
𝑛
𝑡=1
+ 𝛽𝑝4,4𝑌𝑡−𝑝4)𝐼4(𝑍𝑡−𝑑⁡, 𝑟3)}
2
⁡. 
This model will be tested against the competing SETAR model, where the threshold variable is 
the endogenous lagged dependent variable. First, the best fitting threshold delay parameter is 
chosen for the exogenous transition variable⁡𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡−𝑑 . The delay parameter is 
allowed to vary from one to five while specifying the model and choosing the delay parameter, 
which minimizes the sum of, squared residual (SSR). While setting the maximum number of 
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possible regimes to four, the delay parameter, which minimizes the SSR, is 𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡−2 
with a SSR of 0.328225.  
In the SETAR model, the threshold variable is the endogenous lagged dependent variable. 
Before testing the TAR model against the SETAR model, the best fitting delay parameter for 
lagged values of D6 are found by minimizing the SSR of the SETAR model. The delay 
parameter is allowed to vary from one to five, while specifying the model and choosing the delay 
parameter, which minimizes the SSR. Again, the maximum number of regimes is set to four and 
the models are iteratively estimated, capturing the SSR for each specification. In this case, the 
best fitting threshold variable for the SETAR model is found to be⁡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−4⁡with a SSR of 
0.347404. 
Next, the number of thresholds for each model is determined. Visual inspection of Figure 6 
indicates there are possibly three regimes in the price ratio series, but not likely to exceed three. 
However it is possible there are less than three regimes and to determine this, a sequential 
estimation of the number of thresholds and the associated threshold values is performed (Bai and 
Perron 1998). 
To do so, each model is specified with the established delay parameters. The model, which 
minimizes the sum of squared residuals, is deemed the best fitting model for the RIN price ratio. 
Results indicate the TAR outperforms the SETAR with respective SSRs of 0.355751 and 
0.379480. Therefore, the exogenous threshold variable of weekly ethanol mandate outperforms 
endogenous lagged values of the dependent variable and the TAR model is deemed the most 
appropriate. 
The model of choice for D6/D4 RIN price ratio is  
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𝑌𝑡 = {(𝑋
′𝛿1 + 𝛽𝑝1,1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡)𝐼1(𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡< ⁡ 𝑟1) + (𝑋
′𝛿2 + 𝛽𝑝2,2𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡)𝐼2(𝑟1 ≤ 𝑍𝑡−𝑑 ⁡)} 
𝑋 = vector⁡of⁡exogenous⁡variables 
𝑍𝑡−𝑑 = logarithm⁡of⁡weekly⁡ethanol⁡mandates 
𝑟1 = threshold⁡values⁡where⁡ 
𝐼𝑚 = indicator⁡variable⁡equal⁡to⁡one⁡if⁡the⁡argument⁡is⁡true,where⁡𝑚 = 1: 2 
𝑌𝑡−1 = lagged⁡dependent⁡variable⁡ 
The model is estimated assuming a lag order of one in each regime. The vector of exogenous 
variables includes ethanol blend margins, and biodiesel blend margins, which are both first 
differenced to ensure stationarity. Next, a smooth transition autoregressive model is applied to 
the RIN price ratio and fit will be compared to the TAR model. 
1.6. Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model 
The smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model is represented by the equation 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜶
′𝒙𝑡 + 𝜽
′𝒙𝑡𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) + 𝑢𝑡  
where, 𝒙𝑡 = (1, 𝑦𝑡−1, … 𝑦𝑡−𝑝; ⁡𝑥1𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑘𝑡)′⁡, 𝜶 = (𝛼0, 𝛼1, … 𝛼𝑚)′ , 𝜽 = (𝜃0, 𝜽1
′ ) = (𝜃0, 𝜃1, … 𝜃𝑚) 
and 𝑢𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑(0, 𝜎
2). The function⁡𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)⁡, identifies transition thresholds, 𝑧𝑡⁡is a transition 
variable, ⁡𝛾⁡and⁡𝑐⁡are slope and location parameters respectively. The transition function is a 
continuous function between zero and one, assumed to take a logistic form of⁡𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) =
⁡[1 + exp{−𝛾(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑐)}]
−1⁡ so that the model is also known as the logistic STAR or LSTAR. As 
𝑧𝑡⁡increases, the logistic function changes monotonically from zero to one. The STAR model 
with a logistic transition function is a regime-switching model, where the transition from one 
regime to the next can be smooth or abrupt, and the regime that occurs at time ⁡𝑡⁡is determined 
by⁡𝑧𝑡. The size of the slope parameter⁡𝛾 determines the speed at which the transition occurs. 
Large values indicate the regime change is quick and the STAR model nests the TAR model. 
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1.6.1 Linearity testing against the LSTAR model 
Given a specific nonlinear alternative to the linear model, Lagrange Multiplier tests can be 
calculated which are optimal in terms of power against that nonlinearity (Granger and Terasvirta 
1993). This test has power against both LSTAR and ESTAR models. The following steps can be 
taken to calculate these LM type tests. 
1. Regress 𝑦𝑡 on 𝑥𝑡 and compute the residuals ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑎
′𝑥𝑡 and 𝑆𝑆𝑅0 = ∑ ?̂?𝑡
2⁡ 
2. If the transition variable is known to be ⁡𝑧𝑡𝑑⁡compute the auxiliary regression of ?̂?𝑡=𝛽
′𝒙𝑡 +
∑ (𝜑𝑑𝑗𝑧𝑡𝑑𝑥𝑡𝑗 +𝜓𝑑𝑗𝑧𝑡𝑑
2 𝑥𝑡𝑗 + 𝜅𝑑𝑗𝑧𝑡𝑑
3 𝑥𝑡𝑗) + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1 ⁡ and obtain the SSR 
3. Calculate the statistic 𝐿𝑀 =
𝑇(𝑆𝑆𝑅0−𝑆𝑆𝑅)
𝑆𝑆𝑅0
  
The null hypothesis is thus 𝜑𝑑𝑗 = 𝜓𝑑𝑗 = 𝜅𝑑𝑗 = 0 and the LM statistic has an asymptotic 𝜒
2(3𝑝) 
where 𝑝⁡is the number of parameters. Performing the above test on D6/D4 RIN price ratio, 
results in LM-test statistics of 58.257 with a p-value of 0.0000, rejecting the null hypothesis of 
linearity against the alternative LSTAR nonlinear model. 
1.6.2 Testing the significance of the transition variable 
The auxiliary regression used in testing for linearity may be used to select the best transition 
variable and written more succinctly as  
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝛽0
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡𝑑 + 𝛽2
′𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡𝑑
2 + 𝛽3
′𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡𝑑
3 + 𝜂𝑡 ⁡. (1) 
When the correct transition variable is selected, the auxiliary regression is indeed the 
appropriately specified auxiliary regression against the true nonlinear alternative. An incorrect 
transition variable would render it misspecified (Granger and Terasvirta 1993). If linearity is 
rejected for several candidate transition variables, then the transition variable with the smallest p-
value or the largest test statistic is selected. In this procedure, the same candidate transition 
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variables used in TAR and SETAR models are considered here for the STAR models. Namely, 
this includes the logarithm of the weekly ethanol mandate (ln (ethmandate)), and lagged values 
of the dependent variable. 
1.6.3 Estimation of the STAR Model 
Estimation is performed with non-linear least squares using a Gauss-Newton optimization 
procedure with Marquardt iteration steps. The log-likelihood function is constructed under the 
assumption of normality and is thus represented as 
ln(𝑙) = −
1
2
ln(2𝜋) − ln(𝜎) −
1
2
(
𝑦𝑡 − 𝜶
′𝒙𝑡 − 𝜽
′𝒙𝑡𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)
𝜎
)
⁡2
⁡ 
In the LSTAR model, the function 𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)⁡is normalized in the exponential function by the 
standard deviation of the transition variable⁡?̂?(𝑧𝑡). Doing so rescales the slope parameter of the 
transition function⁡𝛾 since its value could be much larger than other parameters. To be clear the 
transition function takes the form 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) = ⁡ [1 + exp{−𝛾(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑐)/?̂?(𝑧𝑡)}]
−1⁡. 
Based on Table 7, the LSTAR is estimated for the D6/D4 RIN price ratio while specifying the 
second lag of weekly ethanol obligations. Starting values for the optimization procedure are 
chosen randomly using a normal random number generator, which generates a vector of starting 
values using a random draw from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and variance of one. 
The model is specified with the same explanatory variables as the linear and TAR models so that 
a direct comparison of goodness of fit can be made.  
Newey-West Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) standard errors are estimated 
to correct for any possible unspecified heteroskedasticity. Although heteroskedasticity was not 
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found under LM-type tests, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected against an 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity alternative. While ARCH does not invalidate least 
squares inference, there could be a loss of efficiency, which may lead to spurious rejection of a 
null hypothesis in later model diagnostics. Therefore, HAC standard errors are estimated in an 
attempt to correct for any loss of efficiency.  
Table 8 reports the estimation results of the STAR model applied to the D6/D4 price ratio. A 
relatively large value for the smoothness parameter⁡𝛾⁡indicates the regime switch may be a quick 
transition rather than a smooth one. However, large values of ⁡𝛾⁡are not of significant concern.  
As⁡𝛾 ⁡→ ∞⁡the transition function⁡⁡𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)⁡ becomes steep, which means the transition is fast.  
The threshold variable⁡?̂?⁡is estimated to be 0.0854. To evaluate this threshold value, it is 
necessary to ensure it falls within the observed distribution of the transition 
variable⁡ln(𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡−2. The minimum and maximum of the observed transition variable is 
-0.1421 and 0.1141 respectively, so the estimated threshold value falls towards the upper limits 
of the distribution, but well within the upper bound.  
The linear model dominates when the transition function is equal to zero. During this regime, 
only the lagged dependent variable of 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−1 is statistically significant. Ethanol blend 
margins and biodiesel blend margins are not significant in this regime. When the transition 
function takes on values greater than zero, the ethanol blend margin is significant at the 5% level 
and the biodiesel blend margin is highly significant at the 1% level. This indicates that a regime 
change, driven by the volume of weekly ethanol blended, results in a state of the world where 
blend margins are significant in explaining the value of the D6/D4 price ratio. In this state, the 
magnitude of the respective coefficients are partly determined by the value of the transition 
function. The sign of the coefficients in ethanol and biodiesel blend margins are in line with 
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expectations. As the ethanol blend margin increases, the core value of D6 ethanol RINs is 
expected to increase. Being in the numerator of the ratio, this naturally increases the value of the 
ratio. As biodiesel blend margins increase, the value of D4 RINs are expected to increase, 
thereby decreasing the value of the ratio. 
Figure 10 indicates the transition function for the RIN price ratio is largely clustered around zero. 
However, it also indicates that the transition function takes on values between zero and one, 
illustrating the smoothness of the transition between regimes. The transition function can take on 
any value between zero and one. Therefore, the STAR model can be thought of as a continuum 
of regimes, represented by as many regimes, as unique values taken on by the transition function. 
Hence, the TAR model is nested and a special case of the STAR model. To compare the overall 
goodness of fit between the linear, TAR and STAR models, the SSR, R-squared and AIC are 
evaluated. 
Table 9, indicates that both the STAR and TAR models provide a superior fit over the linear 
model. Based on the criteria it would appear that STAR models provide a better fit over TAR 
models for the D6/D4 price ratio. As noted, the TAR model is nested within the STAR model 
and thus it is not surprising that the overall goodness of fit is similar in magnitude.  
1.6.4 STAR Model Diagnostics 
In order to test the adequacy of the model, two tests are carried out. First, a test of remaining 
nonlinearity is conducted and second, a test of parameter constancy. These two tests aid in 
determining if the model is adequate in describing the behavior of the price ratio. Furthermore, 
the residuals of the model are inspected and tested for remaining autocorrelation. Eitrheim and 
Teräsvirta (1996), propose a LM-type test for remaining autocorrelation by estimating the 
auxiliary regression 
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 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝜋
𝜕𝐹(𝑦𝑡)
𝜕𝜓
+∑?̂?𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
+ 𝜈𝑡 (1) 
where ⁡
𝜕𝐹(𝑦𝑡)
𝜕𝜓
⁡is the partial derivative of {𝜶′𝒙𝑡 + 𝜽
′𝒙𝑡𝐺(𝑧𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)} with respect to all parameters 
from the STAR specification. The LM-test statistic can be calculated as⁡𝑇𝑅2 with an asymptotic 
chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, which in 
this case is equal to 𝑞. The test of second-order serial correlation is carried out, resulting in a 
test-statistic of 6.948486 and a p-value of .030985. Given that the p-value is less than five 
percent, a test for third-order serial correlation is carried out. This test results in a LM-test 
statistic of 7.314276 and a resulting p-value of 0.065258 Therefore, results indicate there is no 
remaining autocorrelation in the residuals up to the third lag. 
The test for remaining nonlinearity is performed in a similar manner. In this test, the lagged 
residuals from (1) are replaced by interacting the explanatory variables with the transition 
variable. Therefore, the auxiliary regression takes the form of  
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝜋
𝜕𝐹(𝑦𝑡)
𝜕𝜓
+ 𝛽1𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡−𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡𝑧
2
𝑡−𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑡𝑧
3
𝑡−𝑑 + 𝜈𝑡⁡. (2) 
The LM-test statistic is calculated so that⁡𝐿𝑀 = 𝑇𝑅2⁡ with an asymptotic chi-squared distribution 
and degrees of freedom equal to 3𝑝⁡(Eitrheim and Teräsvirta 1996). Using this method, the LM-
test statistic is calculated to be 22.09, which results in a p-value of 0.9667, indicating a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity.  
Finally, a test of parameter constancy is performed where the null hypothesis is that parameters 
do not vary over time. This test closely resembles the test for nonlinearity with the exception 
that⁡𝑧𝑡−𝑑 in equation (2) is replaced with a time-trend variable 𝑡 (Dijk, Teräsvirta et al. 2002). 
Therefore, the auxiliary regression in the test for parameter constancy becomes 
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 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝜋
𝜕𝐹(𝑦𝑡)
𝜕𝜓
+ 𝛽1𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑡𝑡
3 + 𝜈𝑡⁡. (3) 
The null hypothesis is that 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0 and the LM-test statistic can be calculated as 
𝑇𝑅2⁡with an asymptotic chi-squared distribution and 3𝑝⁡degrees of freedom. Carrying out this 
test on the D6/D4 RIN price ratio, results in a test-statistic of 16.38 and a resulting p-value of 
0.9979, strongly suggesting a failure to reject the null hypothesis that parameters do not vary 
over time. 
Comparing in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasts to actual values also indicates the STAR 
model is a suitable fit for the D6/D4 price ratio. Figure 11 compares the fitted values of the 
STAR model to actual values and provides a comparison against the linear model. Despite the 
improvement in goodness of fit for in-sample estimation, the STAR model performs poorly in 
out-of-sample forecasts, compared to the linear model. Out-of-sample forecasts result in a mean 
squared error of 0.0028 and 0.0010, for the STAR model and linear model respectively. The 
linear model also minimizes the mean absolute error with an MAE score of 0.0339, compared to 
an MAE of 0.0498 for the STAR model. However, this is perhaps not at all surprising. It is well 
documented in forecasting literature that linear models often outperform nonlinear models during 
out-of-sample forecasts (De Gooijer and Kumar 1992, Tiao and Tsay 1994, Brooks 1997, 
Clements and Hendry 1998, Stock and Watson 1998, Franses and Van Dijk 2000, Teräsvirta 
2006). The linear model might provide a better forecast for a number of reasons, even though the 
nonlinear model more accurately describes the true nature of the data. For example, it is very 
possible that nonlinearity does not show up in the forecast period, despite being truly present in 
the estimation period. Alternatively, perhaps, a regime switch has occurred near the in-sample 
and out-of-sample boundary. Hence, out-of-sample forecasts provide a useful comparison against 
competing linear models, but should not necessarily be the benchmark to determine the most 
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appropriate fit. That determination is best made through visual inspection, testing for general 
nonlinearity, testing for specific nonlinearity, evaluation of nonlinear parameters, in-sample 
goodness of fit, and tests of misspecification. All of which have done here, and indicate the true 
data generating process behind the RIN price ratio is nonlinear. 
1.6.5 An application to individual RIN prices 
Applying a STAR model to the individual prices is used to determine if individual prices are 
nonlinear and this allows for the testing of the most significant transition variable in each price. 
The same processes of visual inspection, testing for general nonlinearity, testing for specific 
nonlinearity, evaluation of nonlinear parameters, in-sample goodness of fit, and tests of 
misspecification are applied to individual prices.  
In each case, the optimal AR (p) process is chosen by scoring the information criteria, including 
the AIC score and the consistent ICOMP. In both cases of D6 and D4 RIN price, the optimal 
autoregressive process is found to be of lag-order one (Table 2). Therefore, a linear model is 
fitted to both RIN prices with right-hand side variables including a lagged dependent variable, 
the respective blend margins and a current period cross-price variable. To be clear, the 
explanatory variables for D6 RIN price are the first lag of D6 price, the weekly ethanol blend 
margins and the current period price of D4 RINs. The explanatory variables for D4 RIN price are 
the first lag of D4 price, the weekly biodiesel blend margins and the current period price of D6 
RINs. Recall, the blend margins are composed of three explanatory variables including biofuel 
price, conventional fuel price and the value of blender tax credits. The blend margins thus 
represent the theoretical core value of a RIN’s price. Results of the linear models are presented in 
Table 11 and Table 12. 
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Next, the two individual RIN prices are tested for linearity against the specific LSTAR 
alternative. Testing for nonlinearity and the most significant transition variable is done through 
specifying the auxiliary regression in equation (1). Performing the linearity test on D6 and D4, 
results in LM-test statistics of 46.044 and 43.231 for p-values of 0.0000 in both cases, rejecting 
the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative LSTAR nonlinear model.  
Several candidate transition variables are proposed and the procedure is carried out iteratively. 
The candidate variable which is significantly associated with regime change is chosen to be the 
transition variable which best determines the switching behavior. If all candidate variables are 
statistically significant, then the variable with the smallest p-value or the largest test statistic is 
chosen as the most appropriate transition variable. While carrying out this test for D4 RIN price, 
the candidate variables are own lagged price, lagged price of D6 RINs and weekly ethanol 
mandates. Results indicate the own lagged price of D4 RIN with a delay parameter of one is the 
most significant transition variable for D4 RIN prices (Table 14). All candidate transition 
variables are significant with a p-value of 0.0000. However, the first lagged own price of D4 
RINs is the most significant as indicated with the largest F-statistic of 63.032. This result is in 
line with expectations for D4 RIN price regime change. When the ethanol blend wall is binding, 
obligated parties can circumvent the blend wall by over complying with the biodiesel mandate, 
thus generating excess D4 RINs, which can then be submitted towards meeting the implied 
ethanol mandate. Therefore, weekly ethanol mandates are thought to trigger regime change in D6 
RIN prices, and the ratio of D6/D4 RIN price. However, the most appropriate transition variable 
for D4 RIN price is expected to be endogenous lagged own prices. 
Identifying the most significant transition variable in D6 RIN price is carried out in the same 
manner. In this case, the most significant transition variable is expected to be exogenous and 
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specifically thought to be the weekly ethanol mandate. However, candidate variables are also 
tested including lagged price of D4 RINs and the endogenous lagged own price of D6 RINs. The 
test is carried out by iteration, just as is the case with D4 RINs and the RIN price ratio. Test 
results indicate the logarithm of weekly ethanol mandates, with a delay parameter of four, is the 
most significant transition variable for D6 RIN prices with an F-statistic of 68.316. The next 
most significant transition variable is the endogenous own price of D6 RIN with a delay 
parameter of three and an F-statistic of 55.328 while the first lag of D4 RIN price is found to 
have an F-statistic of 31.056 (Table 15). To summarize, regime change in the price ratio is best 
determined by the weekly ethanol mandate with a delay parameter of two lags. Regime change in 
D4 RIN price is best determined endogenously by D4 RIN price with a delay parameter of one 
lag. The regime in D6 RIN price is best determined by the weekly ethanol mandate with a delay 
parameter of four lags. 
With strong evidence of nonlinearity in the individual RIN prices and the most significant 
transition variables determined, a STAR model is now fitted to each of the individual D6 and D4 
RIN prices. Estimation is performed with non-linear least squares while specifying the transition 
function to be of the logistic form just as in the case of the price ratio. Estimation results of the 
D4 STAR model are presented in Table 16. The threshold variable⁡?̂?⁡is estimated to be -
0.097921, which is within the range of the transition variable⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝐷4𝑡−1.  The values of the 
transition function are plotted, to evaluate the transition function and determine if the regime 
switch occurs smoothly or rapidly. 
Figure 12, indicates the transition function for D4 STAR model takes on many values and the 
regime changes occur smoothly. While a SETAR model is not explicitly ruled out, it does not 
appear the transition occurs abruptly. In any case, the SETAR model is nested within and is a 
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special case of the STAR model. Table 17 compares the goodness of fit for the linear model and 
STAR model. Based on an examination of the criteria in this table, the nonlinear model provides 
a better fit for D4 RIN price.  
Model diagnostics are performed for the D4 STAR model to test for remaining autocorrelation in 
the residuals, any remaining nonlinearity and the data is tested for parameter constancy. The tests 
are carried out in the same manner as in section 1.6.4 by specifying the auxiliary regressions of 
equations (1), (2), and (3). When testing for any remaining nonlinearity, test results indicate a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity with a p-value of 0.4001. The 
test for parameter constancy is carried out by specifying the null hypothesis of no time varying 
parameters and results in a p-value of 0.6048, indicating a failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
Results strongly suggest the STAR model is an adequate fit for D4 RIN prices in terms of 
remaining linearity and parameter constancy. However, test results indicate there may be 
evidence of remaining autocorrelation. A p-value of 0.0495 indicates a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to the third lag, at the 99% confidence level. However, the 
null is rejected at the 95% confidence level (Table 10).  Despite this, the model provides a good 
fit for in-sample observations and out-of-sample forecasts (Figure 13). In comparison with the 
linear model, the STAR model does not provide a large improvement when minimizing the mean 
absolute error and the mean squared error. Out-of-sample forecasts for the STAR model result in 
a MAE of 0.0266 while the linear model results in a MAE of 0.0249. Evaluating the MSE also 
indicates the STAR model shows little improvement over the linear model with MSE scores of 
0.0012 and 0.0013. While the STAR model may provide a superior fit for in-sample 
observations, out-of-sample forecasts are less promising. 
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Evaluation of the D6 STAR model is carried out in the same way as with the D4 STAR model. 
First, the threshold parameter is checked to ensure the estimated value falls in the range of actual 
values. With an estimated value of 0.040806, the threshold parameter does indeed fall in the 
range of the minimum and maximum values of⁡ln⁡(𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡−4. Next, the transition 
function is plotted to examine the distribution and smoothness. Figure 14 illustrates the transition 
is not quite as smooth as exhibited in D4 RIN price. This is also evidenced by the relatively large 
value of gamma in the STAR model estimation results (Table 18). Recall, that as gamma goes to 
infinity, the transition becomes abrupt and the value of the transition function will only take on 
two values, zero and one. For D6 RIN price, the regime change is indeed a smooth transition, 
albeit not as smooth as in D4 RIN price.  
Routine diagnostics are performed for the D6 STAR model, testing for parameter constancy and 
any remaining autocorrelation and nonlinearity. In all three cases, test results indicate a failure to 
reject the null hypotheses, thus concluding that the STAR model is adequate (Table 10). The 
goodness of fit is evaluated by comparing the sum of squared residuals, R-squared and AIC. The 
STAR model outperforms the linear model while comparing SSR and R-squared. However, AIC 
is minimized for the linear model with an AIC of -0.7916, compared to an AIC of -0.7450 in the 
STAR model. This indicates that while the STAR model provides a better fit, it also adds more 
complexity than is perhaps necessary. However, the D6 STAR model significantly outperforms 
the linear model during out-of-sample forecasts. The MAE, MSE and mean absolute percentage 
error (MAPE) are minimized under the STAR model. The STAR model results in a MAE, MSE 
and MAPE of 0.0003, 0.0097, and 99.21% respectively. The same scores for the linear model are 
0.0020, 0.0287, and 296.02%. This improvement in out-of-sample prediction can be visually 
observed in the plot of fitted values for in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts in Figure 15. 
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1.7. Conclusion 
The market for renewable identification numbers (RINs) is complex and constantly evolving. 
Understanding the behavior of the RINs can provide important insights into an industry, which 
may be critical to long term energy independence. Federal regulation, which determines annual 
renewable volume obligations, is often uncertain year to year, causing market participants, 
obligated parties and other agents to adapt their behaviors to the changing regulations. It is the 
behavior of these agents, which is reflected in the multiple regimes, and structural breaks of the 
RIN price. 
Nonlinearities in the RIN market are examined by fitting threshold autoregressive and smooth 
transition autoregressive models to historical RIN data. Theoretical RIN price is primarily driven 
by the core value of the RIN, which is determined by the gap between the price of the biofuel 
and conventional fuel, also known as the blend margin. Therefore, ethanol and biodiesel blend 
margin variables are introduced as exogenous variables.  
It is believed that coupling patterns observed in the RIN market are brought about by some 
proximity to the ethanol blend wall. In other words, there is some unobservable threshold, that 
when crossed, brings about a change in the behavior of the RIN market. Therefore, a key 
variable in this paper is the implied weekly ethanol mandate. This variable is constructed by 
taking the product of the fractional ethanol mandate and weekly gasoline and diesel supplies. 
This variable approximates the volume of ethanol blended on a weekly basis, excluding 
cellulosic ethanol and other advanced ethanol us and is found to be the most significant transition 
variable for D6 RIN price regime changes and regime change in the D6/D4 price ratio.  
In regards to D4 RIN price, past values of D4 RIN price are found to be the most significant 
variable in determining regime change, indicating the process is self-exciting. This is in line with 
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expectations. The ethanol blend wall represents a challenge to producers and importers, which 
are obligated to meet annual blend mandates. Therefore, obligated parties are over complying 
with the biodiesel mandate to generate D4 biodiesel RINs that can be submitted for compliance 
with the overall mandate. 
RIN prices are found to exhibit nonlinearity and regime changing behavior. STAR models are 
capable of taking on smooth transitions and abrupt transitions, making them well suited to model 
RIN prices.   
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1. A. Appendix 
1. A.1. Tables 
Table 1: RIN type by D-code and production pathway 
Fuel (D Code) 
Reduction 
in GHG 
emissions 
Equivalence 
Value Fuel Type 
Cellulosic 
Biofuel (D3) 
60% 
1.7 Cellulosic ethanol, Renewable CNG/LNG, Naphtha, 
Renewable Gasoline 
Cellulosic Diesel 
(D7) 
60% 1.7 
Cellulosic diesel, Renewable Jet Fuel 
Biomass-Based 
Diesel (D4) 
50% 1.5 
Biodiesel, Renewable Diesel, Jet Fuels, etc. 
Advanced 
Biofuel (D5) 
50% 1.3 
Sugarcane ethanol, Renewable Heating oil, etc. 
Renewable Fuel 
(D6) 
20% 1 
Corn ethanol, etc. 
 
 
Table 2: Optimal lag lengths of price ratio and individual prices 
  Ratio of D6/D4 D4 RINs D6 RINs 
LAG AIC CICOMP AIC CICOMP AIC CICOMP 
1 -1267.46 -1250.34 -4920.12 -4903.60 -1267.46 -1250.34 
2 -1265.54 -1243.56 -4918.65 -4895.81 -1265.54 -1243.56 
3 -1264.36 -1237.53 -4925.84 -4896.66 -1264.36 -1237.53 
4 -1262.38 -1230.68 -4925.37 -4889.86 -1262.38 -1230.68 
5 -1263.18 -1226.64 -4924.45 -4882.60 -1263.18 -1226.64 
6 -1263.17 -1221.77 -4930.00 -4881.82 -1263.17 -1221.77 
7 -1264.27 -1218.01 -4928.84 -4874.33 -1264.27 -1218.01 
 
 
Table 3: Test of serial correlation in D6/D4 RIN price 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
          
F-statistic 0.466909    Prob. F(1,300) 0.6274 
Obs*R-squared 0.946436    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6230 
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 305   
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Table 4: Test of heteroskedasticity in D6/D4 RIN price ratio 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
          
F-statistic 0.762505    Prob. F(3,301) 0.5159 
Obs*R-squared 2.300430    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.5124 
Scaled explained SS 17.24378    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.0006 
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 305   
 
 
Table 5: Tsay and Keenan tests for nonlinearity in D6/D4 price ratio 
First-differenced Ratio   
Test   AR(p)  F-stat  p-value  
Tsay  2  3.667  0.0126  
Keenan   2  3.060  0.0811  
 
 
Table 6: Linear model of D6/D4 RIN price ratio 
Dependent Variable: DRATIO   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 305   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.001167 0.002097 0.556537 0.5783 
DRATIO(-1) 0.289536 0.055945 5.175386 0.0000 
DETHMRGN -0.002343 0.016280 -0.143932 0.8857 
DBDMRGN -0.041172 0.016989 -2.423412 0.0160 
     
     
R-squared 0.096347    Mean dependent var 0.001853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087340    S.D. dependent var 0.038250 
S.E. of regression 0.036541    Akaike info criterion -3.767712 
Sum squared resid 0.401918    Schwarz criterion -3.718921 
Log likelihood 578.5761    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.748197 
F-statistic 10.69744    Durbin-Watson stat 1.870313 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Table 7: Test for most significant transition variable of D6/D4 price ratio 
Transition variable tests for D6/D4 price ratio 
H0: The transition variable is not significant  
      
      
Transition variable (STR) F-statistic P-value 
Transition variable 
(STR) F-statistic P-value 
            
ln(ethmandate) (-1)  11.250  0.000 dratio(-1)  43.420  0.000 
ln(ethmandate) (-2) 62.432  0.000 dratio(-2)  19.547  0.000 
ln(ethmandate) (-3) 26.188  0.000 dratio(-3)  49.249  0.000 
ln(ethmandate) (-4) 36.263  0.000 dratio(-4)  27.493  0.000 
ln(ethmandate) (-5)  6.854  0.000 dratio(-5)  24.132  0.000 
      
      
 
 
Table 8: D6/D4 Price ratio STAR estimation results 
Dependent Variable: DRATIO   
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps) 
Included observations: 298 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance using observed Hessian (Bartlett 
kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 6.0000) 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CONSTANT 0.001871 0.002086 0.897097 0.3704 
DRATIO(-1) 0.168714 0.092607 1.821836 0.0695 
DETHMRGN -0.007861 0.011365 -0.691614 0.4897 
DBDMRGN -0.014684 0.018220 -0.805907 0.4210 
CONSTANT’ -0.016779 0.018797 -0.892617 0.3728 
DRATIO(-1)’ 3.494861 0.932627 3.747331 0.0002 
DETHMRGN’ 0.330626 0.160887 2.055019 0.0408 
DBDMRGN’ -0.237419 0.088252 -2.690237 0.0076 
GAMMA 3.373670 1.349258 2.500389 0.0130 
THRESHOLD 0.085397 0.005899 14.47766 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.222721    Mean dependent var 0.001813 
Adjusted R-squared 0.198431    S.D. dependent var 0.038679 
S.E. of regression 0.034630    Akaike info criterion -3.855238 
Sum squared resid 0.345371    Schwarz criterion -3.731174 
Log likelihood 584.4305    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.805576 
F-statistic 9.169255    Durbin-Watson stat 1.859915 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 9: Linear, TAR and STAR model comparison for D6/D4 RIN price ratio 
       
Linear model versus TAR and STAR model for D6/D4 RIN price ratio 
       Linear Model  TAR  STAR   
R-squared 0.095417    R-squared 0.199361    R-squared  0.222721 
SSR 0.402332    SSR 0.355751    SSR 0.345371 
AIC -3.773241    AIC -3.839051    AIC -3.855238 
        
 
Table 10: Test results of model diagnostics for RIN price ratio and individual RIN price 
Model Diagnostics for D6/D4 Price ratio and Individual RIN Price 
Test D6/D4 Ratio D4 D6 
Remaining Autocorrelation 
(3rd-order) 
7.314276 
(0.062528) 
7.833062 
(0.049591) 
6.104918 
(0.106616) 
Remaining Nonlinearity 22.09043 
(0.966723) 
28.21173 
(0.400120) 
49.09835 
(0.071486) 
Parameter Constancy 16.38977 
(0.997944) 
33.15026 
(0.604858) 
25.12394 
(0.912921) 
p-values in parenthesis    
 
 
Table 11: Linear model of D4 RIN price 
Dependent Variable: LRD4   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 278   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.002357 0.005044 0.467340 0.6406 
LRD4(-1) 0.186963 0.053949 3.465526 0.0006 
DBDMRGN 0.011621 0.043803 0.265311 0.7910 
LRD6 0.169851 0.028613 5.936199 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.149724    Mean dependent var 0.005477 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140414    S.D. dependent var 0.090343 
S.E. of regression 0.083760    Akaike info criterion -2.107427 
Sum squared resid 1.922334    Schwarz criterion -2.055231 
Log likelihood 296.9324    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.086486 
F-statistic 16.08272    Durbin-Watson stat 1.846363 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
47 
 
Table 12: Linear model of D6 RIN price 
Dependent Variable: LRD6   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 276   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.007532 0.009776 0.770487 0.4417 
LRD6(-1) 0.127664 0.051907 2.459478 0.0145 
DETHMRGN -0.069348 0.074549 -0.930230 0.3531 
LRD4 0.611461 0.108522 5.634451 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.136228    Mean dependent var 0.012578 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126701    S.D. dependent var 0.173044 
S.E. of regression 0.161711    Akaike info criterion -0.791630 
Sum squared resid 7.112886    Schwarz criterion -0.739161 
Log likelihood 113.2450    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.770575 
F-statistic 14.29932    Durbin-Watson stat 1.911318 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
 
 
Table 13: Tsay and Keenan tests for nonlinearity of Individual RIN prices 
Log-differenced D4   Log-differenced D6 
Test   AR(p)*  F-stat  p-value  Test   AR(p)
*  F-stat  p-value 
Tsay  1  6.98  0.0086  Tsay  1  8.0260  0.0049 
Keenan   1  6.22  0.0132  Keenan   1  7.8965  0.0053 
*AR (p) lag orders are estimated by fitting an autoregressive model, choosing the lag order, which minimizes Akaike’s information criteria 
(AIC). 
 
Table 14: Tests of most significant transition variable for D4 RIN price 
Transition variable tests for D4 RINs 
H0: The transition variable is not significant  
      
      
Transition variable F-statistic Transition variable F-statistic Transition variable F-statistic 
      
      
ln(ethmandate) (-1)  33.514 LRD6(-1) 18.167 LRD4(-1)  63.032++ 
ln(ethmandate) (-2) 28.779 LRD6(-2) 6.938 LRD4(-2)  27.403 
ln(ethmandate) (-3) 17.021 LRD6(-3) 12.099 LRD4(-3)  48.390 
ln(ethmandate) (-4) 53.035++ LRD6(-4) 16.162 LRD4(-4)  24.156 
ln(ethmandate) (-5)  28.019 LRD6(-5) 22.298++ LRD4(-5)  16.236 
      
      ++
Indicates the largest test statistic for each candidate transition variable 
48 
 
Table 15: Tests of most significant transition variable for D6 RIN price 
Transition variable tests for D6 RINs 
H0: The transition variable is not significant  
      
      
Transition variable F-statistic Transition variable F-statistic Transition variable F-statistic 
      
      
ln(ethmandate) (-1)  11.623 LRD6(-1) 19.671 LRD4(-1)  31.056++ 
ln(ethmandate) (-2) 17.534 LRD6(-2) 15.486 LRD4(-2)  11.854 
ln(ethmandate) (-3) 26.876 LRD6(-3) 55.328++ LRD4(-3)  4.268 
ln(ethmandate) (-4) 68.316++ LRD6(-4) 20.829 LRD4(-4)  11.696 
ln(ethmandate) (-5)  15.622 LRD6(-5) 34.132 LRD4(-5)  13.351 
      
      ++
Indicates the largest test statistic for each candidate transition variable 
 
Table 16: D4 STAR estimation results 
Dependent Variable: LRD4   
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps) 
Included observations: 278   
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
CONSTANT -0.187345 0.102947 -1.819825 0.0699 
LRD4(-1) -0.546776 0.304523 -1.795513 0.0737 
DBDMRGN 0.487435 0.264419 1.843418 0.0664 
LRD6 0.037521 0.141266 0.265605 0.7907 
CONSTANT’ 0.223762 0.125983 1.776128 0.0768 
LRD4(-1)’ 0.542918 0.306883 1.769137 0.0780 
DBDMRGN’ -0.589890 0.299760 -1.967878 0.0501 
LRD6’ 0.128052 0.162057 0.790166 0.4301 
GAMMA 1.677048 0.989303 1.695181 0.0912 
THRESHOLD -0.097921 0.048294 -2.027586 0.0436 
          
R-squared 0.211009    Mean dependent var 0.005477 
Adjusted R-squared 0.184513    S.D. dependent var 0.090343 
S.E. of regression 0.081584    Akaike info criterion -2.139068 
Sum squared resid 1.783778    Schwarz criterion -2.008578 
Log likelihood 307.3304    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.086716 
F-statistic 7.963811    Durbin-Watson stat 1.988792 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 17: D4 linear and STAR model comparison 
Linear model versus STAR model for D4 RIN price 
Linear Model  STAR Model 
R-squared 0.149046 R-squared     0.211009 
SSR 1.923866 SSR 1.783778 
AIC -2.113824 AIC -2.139068 
 
Table 18: D6 STAR estimation results 
Dependent Variable: LRD6   
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps) 
Included observations: 271 after adjustments  
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
CONSTANT 0.008584 0.014224 0.603507 0.5467 
LRD6(-1) 0.135789 0.099643 1.362748 0.1741 
DETHMRGN -0.062937 0.071172 -0.884292 0.3774 
LRD4 0.500049 0.299988 1.666896 0.0967 
CONSTANT’ -0.003813 0.023466 -0.162481 0.8711 
LRD6’ -0.106844 0.125396 -0.852057 0.3950 
DETHMRGN’ -0.071836 0.155464 -0.462076 0.6444 
LRD4’ 0.622346 0.316253 1.967878 0.0501 
GAMMA 113.6799 420.2773 0.270488 0.7870 
THRESHOLD 0.040806 0.012567 3.247034 0.0013 
          
R-squared 0.150090    Mean dependent var 0.012770 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120783    S.D. dependent var 0.174606 
S.E. of regression 0.163722    Akaike info criterion -0.745096 
Sum squared resid 6.996049    Schwarz criterion -0.612176 
Log likelihood 110.9604    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.691727 
F-statistic 5.121266    Durbin-Watson stat 1.917909 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
          
 
 
Table 19: D6 linear and STAR model comparison 
Linear model versus STAR model for D6 RIN price 
Linear Model  STAR Model 
R-squared 0.136228 R-squared     0.150090 
SSR 7.112886 SSR 6.996049 
AIC -0.791630 AIC -0.745096 
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1. A.2 Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Core value of a RIN in ethanol (a) and biodiesel markets (b) 
 
 
Figure 2: Nested structure of RINs (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2016) 
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Figure 3: Historical RIN prices 
 
 
Figure 4: Coupled RIN prices 
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Figure 5: Decoupled RIN prices 
53 
 
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
1
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
2
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
3
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
5
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DRATIO
D
R
A
T
IO
_
6
 
Figure 6: First-differenced Ratio of D6/D4 lag plots 
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Figure 7: Historical Ratio of D6/D4 RIN prices 
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Figure 8: Kernel density plot to illustrate bi-modal distribution 
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Figure 9: First-differenced ratio D6/D4 RIN prices 
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Figure 10: Evaluation of the transition function for D6/D4 RIN price ratio 
 
 
Figure 11: Fitted values compared to actual values of ∆(𝐷6/𝐷4) for the STAR model and the 
linear model 
 
 
Figure 12: Evaluation of D4 Transition Function 
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Figure 13: Fitted values compared to actual values of ∆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐷4) price for the STAR model and 
the linear model 
 
 
Figure 14: Evaluation of D6 Transition Function 
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Figure 15: Fitted values compared to actual values of ∆𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐷6) price for the STAR model and 
the linear model 
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Chapter II: Renewable Fuel Standard Uncertainty and Tax Incentive Effects 
in the Optimal Investment Decisions of Second-Generation Biofuel Producers 
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Chapter II: Abstract 
Investment in the production of advanced biofuel has been encouraged by the federal regulation, 
which enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). However, investments and production of 
advanced biofuel has been lower than expected in recent years, leading regulators to reduce 
required volumes of advanced biofuel (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2015). 
Real option analysis is used to help explain why uncertainty has reduced investment in advanced 
biofuel and eroded the requirements put forth by USEPA. This study examines the effect of 
uncertainty and irreversibility on a second-generation biofuel investment while considering the 
volatility of Renewable Identification Number (RIN) price, conventional fuel price and their 
correlations by applying a two stochastic variable approach. Producers of renewable fuel face an 
output price, which can be decomposed into the price of conventional fuel, plus the price of 
applicable RINs. Therefore, the firm is subject to uncertainty in both markets. Results have 
important policy implications, as uncertainties in the RIN market, created to encourage biofuel 
production, may be counteracting intended policy design.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was enacted to encourage investment in the production of 
advanced biofuel. However, production has been lower than expected in recent years.  One 
potential explanation is that investors are hesitant to enter the biofuel market due to the 
unpredictability of conventional fuel markets which make the revenues and costs associated with 
biofuel production uncertain (Schmit, Luo, and Conrad 2011; McCarty and Sesmero 2014).  
However, uncertainty in the RFS itself has also been cited as one reason biofuel production has 
fallen short of expectations (Stock 2015). Regulators annually revise the RFS based on 
production capacity and projected demand. The annual announcement itself creates inherent 
uncertainty in the market. However, annual announcements have been delayed for up to 18 
months in some years. In addition, regulators unexpectedly reduce required volumes of advanced 
biofuel when production is lower than expected (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2015).  
Blender tax credits provide another source of policy uncertainty (Irwin 2016). Blenders have 
been eligible for tax credits since 2005. However, policymakers have unexpectedly let these 
policies expire, only to subsequently reinstatement them some years later. These unexpected 
adjustments to biofuel policy add a second source of uncertainty to the biofuel-market entry 
decision.  This paper represents the first attempt to isolate the effect of market and policy 
uncertainty in the decision to invest in biofuel production.      
Potential entrants to the biofuel market must make irreversible investments in exchange for an 
uncertain stream of profits. This combination of uncertainty and irreversibility generate an 
incentive for a potential entrant to delay market entry to wait for updated information (Dixit 
1989). This incentive is known as an option value and leads to prices, which trigger entry (exit) 
that are greater (less) than would be expected using traditional discounted cash flow methods. 
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Schmit, Luo et al. (2011), solve for optimal entry and exit trigger prices for a firm producing 
ethanol from corn, a first-generation biofuel. First-generation biofuels are produced from sugars 
such as those found in corn or sugar cane. The authors use a two-variable model to account for 
uncertainty in biofuel demand and operating costs. Their results indicate the two-variable model 
outperforms a one variable model in predicting industry expansion by including the individual 
components and their correlations as opposed to a simpler measure of aggregate uncertainty. 
McCarty and Sesmero (2014), have conducted a real options analysis on the effect of 
conventional fuel price uncertainty in the investment of second-generation biofuel production.11 
Due to limitations in price data for second-generation biofuels, the authors assume prices will 
follow those of the gasoline market. The authors contribute to the literature by applying the 
methodology to a specific production pathway, which results in a second-generation biofuel 
known as bio-gasoline. Their results indicate trigger prices to be approximately 72% higher than 
traditional break-even prices.  
Potential entrants to the market for second-generation biofuels are influenced by the observed 
price of both conventional fuel and the price of tradable credits, known as a renewable 
identification number. RINs trade on the open market and provide price support in the 
production of renewable fuels.12 The price of the RIN will be reflected in the price of the biofuel.   
The uncertain nature of RFS policy materializes in highly volatile RIN prices. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to revise the annual RFS based on 
                                                 
 
11 When originally conceived, the RFS targeted second-generation biofuels to account for 16 billion of the total 36-
billion-gallon goal for 2022. Second generation biofuels are produced from non-food feedstocks, and thus do not 
have direct impacts on commodity food prices and are more environmentally friendly (Babcock 2015). 
12 McPhail, Westcott et al. (2011), provide a comprehensive review of the RIN market and theoretical RIN price. 
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projected demand and production capacities. There is precedent for these revisions. The EPA 
first reduced cellulosic mandates then issued cellulosic waiver credits in each year from 2010 to 
2014 and did not finalize 2014 mandates until 2015. A report from the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) highlighted uncertainty as the single underlying theme of the cellulosic mandate 
(Bracmort 2015). Meyer and Thompson (2012), show that cellulosic waivers introduce 
uncertainty into both the feedstock and biofuel markets.  Major revisions in annual RFS 
obligations have been associated with sharp movements in RIN price. Lade, Lin et al. (2015), 
find that RFS policy shocks in 2013 led to sharp declines in RIN price, creating burdens for 
producers of renewable fuel, particularly for producers of advanced biofuel and biodiesel.  
This study provides a real options framework to separate and analyze the effect of biofuel policy 
uncertainty in the form of highly volatile RIN price. By applying a two stochastic variable real 
options approach, the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility on a second-generation biofuel 
investment is examined while considering the volatility of RIN price, conventional fuel price and 
their correlations. Previous studies have not included both conventional fuel price and RIN price 
as two sources of uncertainty faced by the firm. 
The addition of the RIN market certainly encourages investment, but the uncertainty associated 
with RIN price limits the effectiveness of the RIN program. This analysis shows that large 
uncertainties in the RIN market has significant effects on the firm’s investment and operation 
decisions. Investment incentives such as bonus depreciation allowances and producer tax credits 
work to counteract uncertainty effects, but their efficacy is limited by the aggregate uncertainty 
faced by the firm. 
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2.2. The Fundamentals of Biodiesel RIN Price 
To form a basic idea of how a RIN price is determined, suppose the market for biodiesel is 
represented in Figure 16 (Irwin (2014) & Stock (2015)). Biodiesel demand is perfectly elastic for 
biodiesel prices equal to conventional diesel prices, since the two are near perfect substitutes. 
Therefore, the demand price for biodiesel is assumed equal to the price of conventional 
diesel⁡(𝑃). These characteristics are also found in the market for other second-generation 
biofuels that are drop-in ready and have no blend wall.13 Since the biodiesel market is well 
established, it serves as a guide throughout. 
When the market is in equilibrium without any mandates, the equilibrium quantity supplied and 
consumed is given by⁡𝑄𝑒𝑞. Under the RFS, mandated quantities of biofuel must be blended into 
the nation’s fuel supply. When the mandated quantity is greater than equilibrium quantity 
demanded, the mandate is said to be binding and will lead to a biodiesel supply price⁡(𝑃𝑏), which 
is greater than demand price⁡(𝑃).   This creates a gap between the willingness to pay for biofuel 
and the marginal cost of supplying biofuel at the mandated quantities. RIN prices bridge this gap 
and ensure the mandate is met. This gap represents the core (intrinsic) value of the RIN.  
An increase in the price of conventional fuel will cause an upward shift in the demand for 
biofuel, which would decrease the core value of RINs as depicted in Figure 17.  
Similarly, shifts in the biodiesel supply curve will affect the core value of RINs. Policy shocks 
also affect the core value of RINs. For example, blender tax credits will cause an upward shift in 
                                                 
 
13 The market for ethanol is not characterized by a horizontal demand curve due to the ethanol blend wall. 
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biofuel demand (Figure 18) and shifts in the mandate will affect the core value of the RIN 
(Figure 19).  
As discussed in 1.2.1, RIN price is composed of a core value and a time value. The core value is 
determined by the blend margin. Departures from the blend margin indicate the presence of a 
time-value, which is influenced by factors outside the conventional fuel and biofuel prices. The 
time value is unknown a priori but can be found by taking the difference of the observed RIN 
price and the core value so that 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑅 − [(𝑃𝑏 − 𝑃) + 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
′𝑠⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡]. 
As, Irwin (2014) pointed out, the time-value reflects market expectations which are influenced 
by policy uncertainties. Policy uncertainty in annual mandates and the uncertain renewal of a 
blender tax credit, create incentives to bank RINs in periods where it is economical to do so. For 
example, if aggressive mandates are expected in the future periods, which increase the cost of 
compliance, demand in the current period may ramp up to take advantage of the relatively low 
cost current period. Similarly, if market participants expect the blender tax credit to be removed 
in the next period, demand for the biofuel and thus applicable RINs, will surge in the current low 
cost period. The policy uncertainties that influence the time value further add to the stochastic 
nature of RIN prices. 
Figure 20 illustrates the differences between D4 biodiesel RIN prices and biodiesel blend 
margins. The vertical grey dotted lines represent EPA proposal for revisions and the vertical 
black solid lines represent EPA final rulemaking for the subsequent year’s annual mandate. Each 
year the RFS mandates are to be announced no later than November 30, however, the EPA has 
consistently been late. The proposal for 2011 mandates included a 28% increase in annual 
percentage standards for advanced biofuels. A biodiesel blender’s tax credit was also re-
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introduced in 2011, after it previously was allowed to expire on December 31, 2009. The 
biodiesel blender’s tax credit was first implemented in 2005, but lawmakers have allowed the 
policy to expire in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2015. Each year the tax credit is set to expire on 
December 31, leaving the market uncertain as to whether it will be granted an extension or 
allowed to expire. 
The blender’s tax credit shifts demand for biodiesel and creates an additional incentive to acquire 
surplus RINs, which can be rolled over to the following year after the tax credit has expired. 
Recall that RINs may be saved and applied toward future mandates for up to two years. Only 
20% of an obligated party’s mandate can be met with vintage RINs, but when the tax credit is 
active, blenders are able to exceed their current year mandates at a discounted cost to apply 
surplus RINs in costlier future periods. 
In July of 2011, EPA proposed significant increases in annual percentage standards and in 
December of 2011, EPA finalized those standards, which resulted in a 15% increase in total 
renewable percentage standards, a 55% increase in advanced biofuel and a 32% increase in 
biodiesel percentage standards for 2012. The blender’s tax credit was allowed to expire in 2012, 
yet Figure 20 illustrates there is still significant departure from the blend margin during the first 
half of 2012. In fact, D4 RIN prices were on average $0.34 higher than the blend margin until 
June of 2012, indicating the policy shock of an upward revision in RFS mandates had a lingering 
effect on RIN price through the first half of 2012. 
The blender tax credit was reinstated in early January of 2013 and roughly coincided with the 
announcement of proposed RFS volumes for 2013, about 36 weeks late. Nearly eight months 
later the EPA finalized the RFS volumes for 2013, which happened to coincide with sharp 
declines in RIN price. The finalized RFS volumes did not differ from the proposed volumes. By 
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examining the data, it becomes clear the sharp down turn in RIN price in the summer of 2013 
had more to do with a sharp decline in the price of biodiesel. 
Through 2014 and the first half 2015, Figure 20 illustrates that D4 RIN prices closely followed 
the blend margin until the early summer of 2015 During this time there were no RFS revisions 
and the blender tax credit was not in effect. It was not until June of 2015 that EPA first proposed 
the RFS volumes for 2014, 2015 and 2016. The 2015 mandates were nearly identical to 2014 and 
not surprisingly, D4 RIN prices departed from the blend margin, but this time, fell below the 
blend margin, indicating the market expected an oversupply of RINs in 2015. 
The biodiesel blender’s tax credit was reinstated once again in 2016, and the 2016 RFS volumes 
were finalized in December of 2015. For 2016, the final total renewable percentage standard 
grew by more than 11% from 2014 to 2016 while the biodiesel percentage standard increased 
16.5%. These aggressive mandates and reinstatement of tax credits led to RIN prices, which 
began trending upward while blend margins remained relatively flat. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that RFS policy and blender tax incentive uncertainties are 
additional sources of stochasticity that contribute to RIN price volatility, in addition to stochastic 
influences through conventional fuel price. This necessitates the use of a two-variable real-option 
model, which captures the uncertainties faced in both the conventional fuel market and the RIN 
market. The two-variable model is also superior in its ability to isolate market uncertainties and 
policy uncertainties. Therefore, one can hold conventional fuel volatilities constant while varying 
RIN volatilities to examine the effects of reduced policy uncertainty. 
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2.3. A Model of Optimal Entry Into and Exit From the Biofuel Market 
Producers of renewable fuel face an output price, which is composed of the price of conventional 
fuel, plus the price of applicable RINs, as discussed in the previous section. . Therefore, the firm 
producing renewable fuel decides to enter the market based on conditions observed in both the 
conventional fuel markets and the RIN market and, the firm is subject to uncertainty in both 
markets.  
Should an inactive firm decide to enter the market for renewable fuel the firm will incur an initial 
cost of investment, which is sunk. For example, investment in the production of a biofuel 
requires a large capital investment to build a new production facility including, newly 
constructed structures, storage tanks, boilers, crushing and other industrial equipment. An active 
firm has the option to either continue operation or exit operations by incurring an additional sunk 
cost. 
Given the option to delay, the firm’s decision to enter or exit is impacted by the irreversibility 
and uncertain nature of the investment. The plant can be in two different states, inactive⁡(𝑖 = 0) 
or active (𝑖 = 1). In an inactive state, the firm incurs no costs since the investment has not yet 
been initiated and therefore the building of the plant has not begun. The firm must decide when 
to switch from the inactive state where⁡𝑖 = 0 to the active state where⁡𝑖 = 1 by choosing⁡𝑡1. 
When the firm decides to become active it incurs the one-time sunk cost,⁡𝑘, to enter the market 
and pays a stream of operating costs⁡𝑤, in exchange for a stream of revenue⁡𝑃 + 𝑅 , assuming 
quantity is normalized to one. Operating costs⁡⁡𝑤, consist of the feedstock costs, transportation of 
that feedstock to the conversion facility and conversion costs. The biofuel producer’s output 
price is the price of conventional fuel,⁡𝑃, plus the RIN price,⁡𝑅. The conventional fuel could be 
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gasoline, diesel or jet fuel, depending on the advanced biofuel produced. Similarly, the type of 
biofuel, production pathways, and feedstocks dictates the particular RIN type.  
An active plant has the option to exit the market with a one-time payment. Once active, the firm 
must decide when to switch states from active where⁡𝑖 = 1 to inactive where⁡𝑖 = 0 by 
choosing⁡𝑡0. The payment to exit may be positive if the sunk costs⁡(𝑘), incurred from exit exceed 
any salvage values⁡(𝑠), from the sale of capital on a secondary market, or negative if the salvage 
value of remaining capital exceeds any sunk costs. For example, when⁡𝑠 ≤ 𝑘 the one-time 
payment to exit the market is positive. The firm’s flow of payments in each state is represented 
as 
𝜋𝑖=0,1(𝑃, 𝑅) {
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡the⁡firm⁡is⁡inactive⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑖 = 0
𝑃 + 𝑅 − 𝑤⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡the⁡firm⁡is⁡active⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑖 = 1
⁡. 
Given the discount rate⁡𝛿, the firm’s optimal entry and exit decision satisfies  
 
𝑉0(𝑃0, 𝑅0) = max
𝑡1
𝐸0 {∫ 𝜋0(𝑃(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡))𝑒
−𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +⁡ [(𝑉1(𝑃(𝑡1), 𝑅(𝑡1)) − 𝑘)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡1]
𝑡1
0
} (2) 
 
𝑉1(𝑃0, 𝑅0) = max
𝑡0
𝐸0 {∫ 𝜋1(𝑃(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡))𝑒
−𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +⁡[(𝑉0(𝑃(𝑡0), 𝑅(𝑡0)) − 𝑠)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡0]
𝑡0
0
} (3) 
subject to⁡𝑑𝑃, 𝑑𝑅⁡and 𝑃(0) = 𝑃0, and⁡𝑅(0) = 𝑅0. 
The firm chooses the optimal time to enter or exit the market to maximize the expected net 
present value of the firm’s investment option. The trigger prices which induce the firm to enter 
or exit are thus implicitly defined and represented as 𝑃ℎ ⁡and⁡𝑃𝑙 ⁡respectively. 
2.3.1 Market Dynamics 
The price of a gallon of conventional fuel, 𝑃,⁡follows a generalized Ito process such that the 
change in price 
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 𝑑𝑃 =⁡𝛼𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡ (4) 
 where 𝛼𝑝(𝑃)⁡is the deterministic trend in the price process and 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)⁡represents the 
instantaneous standard deviation.  The trend changes over the time increment⁡𝑑𝑡⁡. The change 
in⁡𝑧𝑝⁡, 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡, follows a Wiener process such that ⁡𝑑𝑧𝑝 =⁡𝜀𝑡√𝑑𝑡⁡ where, 𝜀𝑡⁡is a normally distributed 
random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. Furthermore 𝜀𝑡⁡is serially 
uncorrelated so that 𝐸(𝜀𝑡, 𝜀𝑠) = 0⁡⁡∀⁡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠⁡and thus the values of 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡for any two different 
intervals of time are independent, following a Markov process with independent increments. It is 
also assumed that the discount rate ⁡𝛿⁡is greater than the drift rate⁡𝛼𝑝, which indeed must hold 
otherwise investment would never be optimal, as the growth rate would outpace the discount 
rate. Hence, it would always be possible to do better by waiting longer. 
The price at which RINs are traded is determined on a secondary market and prices have 
exhibited high degrees of volatility throughout RIN history. One primary cause of RIN price 
volatility is uncertainty in annual RFS obligations and uncertainty in blender tax credit renewal. 
This uncertainty is captured by assuming RINs follow a stochastic process. In this case, RIN 
prices are assumed to follow a generalized Ito process, just as is the case for the price of 
conventional gasoline. 
 𝑑𝑅 = ⁡𝛼𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑧𝑅⁡ (5) 
where 𝛼𝑟(𝑅)⁡is the deterministic trend in the price process, 𝜎𝑟(𝑅)⁡represents the standard 
deviation and the same assumptions of equation (4) apply. The two stochastic processes are 
potentially correlated in their Wiener processes such that⁡𝐸[𝑑𝑧𝑃𝑑𝑧𝑅] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑡𝑃, 𝜀𝑡𝑅]𝑑𝑡 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝑧𝑃, 𝑑𝑧𝑅)/√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑑𝑧𝑃)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑑𝑧𝑅) = 𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡. 
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2.3.2 The Firm’s Decision to Enter 
The idle firm has expected net present value denoted as⁡𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅). Since the firm is inactive in 
this state, ⁡𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) represents the value of the option to enter the market. Over the range of 
prices 𝑃⁡and 𝑅⁡ where it is optimal for an idle firm to remain idle, the asset of the investment 
opportunity must be willingly held. Since there are no operating profits being generated, the only 
return is the expected return from the option value⁡𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)]𝑑𝑡
−1.This is also referred to as 
the capital appreciation, of the firm’s asset as prices increase, where in this case, the asset is the 
firm’s option to enter the market. 
The required return from the investment is represented by the function⁡𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)and the no-
arbitrage condition of efficient markets sets these two returns equal. 
 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) = 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)]𝑑𝑡
−1 (4) 
Under the efficient markets theorem, equation (4) must hold and implicitly defines the entry 
trigger prices for conventional fuel and RINs. Equation (4) essentially says that over an 
infinitesimal period⁡𝑑𝑡, the total expected return on the investment opportunity is equal to its 
expected rate of capital appreciation and facilitates the evaluation of the affect that changes in 
output price have on the value of an inactive firm.  
Using Ito’s Lemma 𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)⁡is expanded using a Taylor series expansion. It is assumed 
that⁡𝑃⁡and 𝑅⁡ are both continuous-time stochastic processes as represented by equation (4) and 
(5). Consider that the function 𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)⁡is at least twice differentiable in⁡𝑃⁡and⁡𝑅. Total 
differentiation of 𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅)⁡to higher-order terms, and making the necessary substitutions yields  
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𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) = ⁡
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑧⁡ +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑧
+
1
2
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑃2
(𝜎𝑝(𝑃))
2
𝑑𝑡 +
1
2
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑅2
(𝜎𝑟(𝑅))
2
𝑑𝑡
+
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑅))𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡 
(6) 
Now, substituting equation (6) into equation (4) the following is obtained 
 
𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) = 𝐸𝑡 [
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑧𝑝 ⁡+
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑡
+
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑧𝑅 +
1
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃2
(𝜎𝑝(𝑃))
2
𝑑𝑡 +
1
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑅2
(𝜎𝑟(𝑅))
2
𝑑𝑡
+
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝜌𝑝𝑟)𝑑𝑡] 𝑑𝑡
−1. 
(7) 
Given that 𝐸(𝑑𝑧) = 0⁡the middle terms 
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑧𝑝 =
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝑑𝑧𝑟 = 0⁡and equation becomes 
the second-order homogenous partial differential equation 
 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝜕
2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜌𝑝𝑟) +
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃2
+
𝜎𝑟(𝑅)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑅2
+
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃)
+
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟(𝑅) − 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) = 0 
(8) 
2.3.3. The Firm’s Decision to Exit 
The value of the active firm is denoted as⁡𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅), which is the expected discounted value of the 
active firm’s net earnings plus their option to exit. Over the range of prices 𝑃⁡and⁡𝑅, where it is 
optimal for an active firm to remain active, the firm is earning⁡(𝑃 + 𝑅 − 𝑤). The active firm 
receives a dividend equal to the flow of profits they earn while active in the market 
(𝑃 + 𝑅 − 𝑤)⁡and capital gains arise from the expected future appreciation of the firm. Similar to 
equation (5), efficiency in markets requires   
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 𝛿𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) = (𝑃 + 𝑅 − 𝑤) + 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅)]𝑑𝑡
−1. (9) 
Applying Ito’s Lemma to expand⁡𝑑𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) and following similar procedures as in equations 
(6)-(8) results in the second-order non-homogenous partial differential equation 
 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑅)𝜕
2𝑉1
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜌𝑝𝑟) +
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉1
𝜕𝑃2
+
𝜎𝑟(𝑅)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉1
𝜕𝑅2
+
𝜕𝑉1
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃)
+
𝜕𝑉1
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟(𝑅) − 𝛿𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) = 𝑤 − 𝑃 − 𝑅. 
(10) 
Solving (8) and (10) will implicitly define the prices, which trigger the firm to enter and exit the 
market respectively. Partial differential equations such as (8) and (10) often require the use of 
numerical techniques to approximate a solution. In this case, analytical solutions are possible if 
one is willing to make rather strong assumptions regarding the operating cost⁡(𝑤).14 Although 
operating costs are certainly a function of conventional fuel price, it is not likely to be linear in 
nature. Such a strong assumption would be prohibitive with little gain, particularly in light of the 
fact that numerical techniques have been developed to overcome the challenges associated with 
partial differential equations. For example, Brekke and Øksendal (1994) developed the method 
of variational inequalities for solving optimal entry and exit models where no closed form 
solution can be found. This will be revisited in section 2.4.3. 
2.4. An Application to a Second-generation Biofuel Investment 
To demonstrate the influence of market and policy uncertainty, the paper focuses on producers of 
second-generation biofuels that generate biodiesel D4 RINs. The four RVOs are nested within 
each other so that fuels with higher GHG reductions can be used to meet the standards for a 
                                                 
 
14 If⁡𝑤, is a linear function of conventional fuel then (8) and (10) may be transformed into an ordinary differential 
equation, consisting of one stochastic variable which is a ratio of RIN price over conventional fuel price. One can 
then solve for the ratio of prices, which induce the firm to enter or exit the market. 
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lower GHG reduction. For example, cellulosic biofuels with a lifecycle greenhouse-gas emission 
that results in a 60% reduction from the baseline can be submitted for the cellulosic biofuel 
category, the biomass-based diesel category, the advanced category or the conventional 
renewable fuel category. Therefore, the cellulosic D7 and D3 RINs are worth at least as much as 
D4, D5, and D6 RINs.  Similarly, fuels in the biomass-based diesel D4 category are worth at 
least as much as D5 and D6 RINs. However, production of cellulosic biofuel has not been in 
significant quantity. As of March 10 2016, the total RIN count was 2,842 million. Of that, only 
14.75 million were D3 RINs and zero D7 RINs were generated. Therefore, historical data for D3 
and D7 RIN price is lacking and thus D4 RIN prices are evaluated in this study. 
2.4.1 Estimating Stochastic Price Processes 
Two parameters are estimated for each geometric Brownian motion, the drift rate⁡𝛼, and the 
standard deviation⁡⁡𝜎. Next, the covariance of the two stochastic processes⁡𝜌𝑝𝑟  is estimated. 
Data on conventional fuel price is obtained from the Energy Information Association and RIN 
price data is obtained from EcoEngineers, a provider of daily and historical RIN data.  
To estimate the stochastic processes, the assumption that the two prices follow a geometric 
Brownian motion (GBM) it tested. Recall, the change in⁡𝑧⁡, 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡, follows a Wiener process such 
that ⁡𝑑𝑧 = ⁡ 𝜀𝑡√𝑑𝑡⁡ where, 𝜀𝑡⁡is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of unity. Since the variance of 𝜀𝑡⁡is one, the variance of 𝑑𝑧 = (√𝑑𝑡)
2
∗
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑡] = 𝑑𝑡⁡and the Wiener process is normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance 
of⁡⁡𝑑𝑡 = 𝑡𝑘 − 𝑡𝑘−1⁡. The Wiener process implies ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 and ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 are independent of 
autoregressive lags and normally distributed. To examine the independence or potential lack 
thereof, the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation are plotted for both the transformed series 
of conventional fuel price⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 ⁡ and RIN price⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡. 
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Based on Figure 21, it does not appear that independence is tenable for⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡. This implies ∈𝑅𝑡is 
not white noise in⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = 𝜑1∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−1 +∈𝑅𝑡. Therefore, additional lags are added to the 
specification until⁡∈𝑅𝑡⁡becomes white noise in⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 +∈𝑅𝑡, where (𝑝) is the 
lag order   
A Portmanteau test for white noise is used to determine that the third lag produces white noise in 
the residual term. Given that⁡∈𝑅𝑡⁡is white noise, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is 
specified to verify the process is a unit root and thus satisfies GBM properties. By simply 
including an additional term of⁡𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−1  and a constant term, one can test for a unit root using 
Case II of the Augmented Dickey Fuller such that 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−1 +∑𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
+∈𝑅𝑡 . 
The null hypothesis in Case II is that⁡𝛾1 = 0 . After conducting the ADF test under Case II a p-
value of 0.5763 is obtained, signaling a failure to reject the null hypothesis and thus reaching a 
conclusion that the series is indeed unit root.  This implies the estimated autoregression includes 
a constant term, but the true process follows a unit root with no drift. The result is consistent with 
GBM, but the sensitivity of such tests to null specification motivates a second test. 
Based on an examination of D4 RIN price time series in Figure 20, the data appear to have a 
non-zero intercept and follow a time trend. Therefore, Case IV of the ADF test is specified such 
that 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−1+𝛾2𝑡 +∑𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
+∈𝑅𝑡 . 
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In Case IV, the null hypothesis is that⁡𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 and 𝛾0 is allowed to be any value. In this 
case, test results are even stronger in failing to reject the null with a p-value of 0.9957. D4 RIN 
prices are thus appropriately modeled as a GBM. Therefore, drift and variance parameters can be 
deduced from the regression of 
⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐 +∑𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
+∈𝑅𝑡 
Recall that 𝜇𝑟 = (𝛼𝑟 −
1
2
𝜎𝑟
2) such that,⁡Δ𝑙𝑛𝑅(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑑𝑧⁡ and⁡⁡Δ𝑙𝑛𝑅(𝑡) = (𝛼𝑟 −
1
2
𝜎𝑟
2)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑑𝑧. If 𝑑𝑡 = 1 then 𝐸[Δ𝑙𝑛𝑅(𝑡)] = 𝜇𝑟⁡and taking the expectation of both sides of the 
above regression 
𝐸[∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡] = 𝐸 [𝑐 +∑𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
+∈𝑅𝑡]⁡ 
results in⁡𝜇𝑟 = 𝑐 + 𝜇𝑟 ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 . Therefore,⁡𝜇𝑟 =
𝑐
1−∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
= (𝛼𝑟 −
1
2
𝜎𝑟
2) and the standard 
deviation can be read directly from the regression results root mean squared error (Schmit, Luo 
et al. 2011). OLS results indicate the constant⁡𝑐⁡is not statistically different from zero. Therefore 
(?̂?𝑟 −
1
2
?̂?𝑟
2) is set equal to zero and the drift parameter is solved for by plugging the root mean 
squared error in for⁡?̂?𝑟. 
(?̂?𝑟 −
1
2
?̂?𝑟
2) = 0 
?̂?𝑟 =
1
2
?̂?𝑟
2 
?̂?𝑟 =
1
2
(0.04793)2 = 0.0011486 
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Recall that 𝑑𝑡⁡was set to equal one, therefore the drift and variance parameters are annualized 
following the convention of converting 1-day parameters to h-day parameters. This requires 
scaling by a factor of⁡√ℎ⁡ resulting in a drift rate of ⁡?̂?𝑟 = 0.0011486 ∗ √252 = 0.0182⁡and a 
standard deviation of⁡?̂?𝑟 = 0.04793 ∗ √252 = 0.7608.  
This same process is carried out for the drift and standard deviation of conventional fuel price. 
By examining the correlogram (Figure 22) of⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 it appears that, independence is tenable.  
To formally test for independence a Portmanteau white noise test is conducted with the null 
hypothesis that white noise is present in the residuals⁡∈𝑃𝑡⁡of⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝜑1∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1 +∈𝑃𝑡. The 
Portmanteau Q-test statistic is 43.079, resulting in a p-value of 0.3411, signaling a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis.   
Based on an examination of diesel price against time (Figure 23), the data appear to have a non-
zero intercept and time trend. So an ADF test of Case IV is specified such that 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1+𝛾2𝑡 +∈𝑃𝑡 . 
The null hypothesis in Case IV is that⁡𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 and 𝛾0⁡is allowed to take any value. The 
above ADF test with zero lags produces a p-value of 0.7915 signaling a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root. Variations of the Case IV ADF test with additional lags are also tested 
and results signal a failure to reject the null hypothesis in all cases. 
To obtain the drift and variance parameters an OLS regression of ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜑1∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1 +
∈𝑃𝑡⁡is conducted just as was the case for D4 RIN price. Once again, the constant term is not 
statistically different from zero. Reading the root mean squared error directly from the OLS 
results and plugging into the expression for the mean, the drift rate is found to be 
77 
 
?̂?𝑝 =
1
2
(0.01844)2 = 0.00017. 
With a 1-day drift rate of 0.00017, the annual drift rate becomes⁡?̂?𝑝 = 0.00017 ∗ √252 =
.0026986⁡and the annual standard deviation becomes?̂?𝑝 = 0.01844 ∗ √252 = 0.2927. 
Next, the correlation coefficient of conventional fuel price and D4 RIN price is obtained by 
estimating the correlation between the residuals of the fitted OLS regressions on ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡⁡and 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡. Theory suggests RIN prices are negatively correlated with conventional fuel price. As the 
price of conventional fuel increases, substitution effects take hold and shift the demand for 
alternative fuels, which in turn causes a decrease in the price of RINs (Figure 17). This negative 
relationship between RIN price and conventional fuel price is borne out in the data as evidenced 
by the estimated correlation of -0.0129. 
2.4.2 Cost Parameters 
Cost parameters are based on the production of a green-diesel using purchased pennycress seed, 
which is crushed by the biorefinery to extract the oil. Typically, a techno-economic analysis is 
required to estimate cost parameters of a production pathway.15 Due to the detailed and 
specialized information required to conduct a TEA, cost parameters are sourced from previous 
literature. Two primary cost parameters utilized in this study are operating costs and capital costs 
(initial investment cost). The cost associated with producing renewable fuel depends on the 
                                                 
 
15 Techno-economic analysis is a method used to assess the technical and economic performance of a particular 
production pathway  (Brown and Brown 2013).  TEA’s represent a simplified version of commercial scale projects, 
that allows the biorefinery’s production pathway to be evaluated for feasibility. The primary method of developing a 
TEA is through a detailed process model.  Performance information is collected on the technologies under 
consideration. Appropriate production scenarios are identified and the process model is designed using process-
engineering software. Based on the process design, capital investments are determined and a discounted cash flow 
analysis is performed. This allows the investment and production cost of a biorefinery to be determined. 
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technological process selected by the firm. One such technological process that shows 
considerable promise is a Green Fuel Technology capable of producing three different types of 
alternative fuel through the conversion of eight or more different feedstocks. A firm deciding to 
invest will employ this technology to produce the most profitable alternative fuel. Presumably, 
this would imply that the firm produces the alternative fuel, which generates the most valuable 
RIN. Of the three types of RINs under consideration in this study, D4 Biodiesel RINs have the 
greatest value due to the nested structure of RINs discussed in section 4.16  D4 RINs are 
generated through the production of biodiesel, green-diesel and renewable jet fuel. Firms 
employing the Green Fuel Technology are able to produce either of these fuels. Producers and 
importers of conventional fuel are required to submit a specified number of RINs each year 
based on their annual production (or import) of conventional fuel. Therefore, the Renewable Fuel 
Standard supports demand for either biodiesel or green-diesel. On the other hand, producers and 
importers of conventional jet fuel are not obligated to submit RINs.  
Green-diesel is a second-generation alternative fuel that can be blended at any proportion with 
conventional diesel. Chemically, green-diesel is identical to conventional petroleum based diesel, 
so there is no blend limit. Vehicles can operate on 100% green-diesel without any engine 
modifications. It requires no changes to infrastructure and it has a higher cetane rating than 
conventional diesel (UOP 2016). A promising feedstock for this conversion technology is 
                                                 
 
16 Based on this nested structure cellulosic biofuel (D3) and cellulosic diesel (D7) RINs are more valuable than 
biodiesel D4 RINs. However, D3 and D7 RINs are not considered in this study due to a lack of significant historical 
production and thus lacking historical data. The first year D3 and D7 RINs were generated was 2012, but of the 
15,306,658,432 total RINs generated in 2012, only 21,810 (0.0001425%) of those were D3 or D7 RINs. In 2015 the 
total RIN count, including D3, D4, D5, D6 and D7 was 17,908,121,504 RINs. Of the 17.9 billion 2015 RINs, D3 
and D7 RINs made up just 141,557,292, or 0.7905%. As of March 10, 2016 the total RIN count was 2,842,575,051 
and only 14,755,743 D3 RINs and zero D7 RINs were generated. 
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pennycress oil. Pennycress is a non-food, winter annual cover crop that produces high quality oil 
seeds. As a winter cover crop, it does not displace any land for food crops, and it provides all the 
soil benefits associated with other cover crops. Additionally the high quality oil seed has 
potential to generate significant farm revenue for land normally left fallow (Moser et al. 2009).   
English, Menard et al. (2016), provide a thorough review of operating and capital costs for a 
variety of production pathways, including green fuel production pathways. The authors examine 
four different conversion processes: 1) hydro-processing of seed crush or purchased oils, 2) 
pyrolysis to hydro-processing, 3) gasification and 4) pyrolysis of biomass. Since pennycress is 
the chosen feedstock under consideration for this study, cost parameters represent the hydro 
processing of pennycress oil, resulting from onsite crushing of pennycress seed.  
Based on a conversion facility, which demands 96.3 million pounds of pennycress oil, with a 
production capacity of 13 million gallons, the capital costs are estimated to be $3.93 per gallon. 
Operating costs are based on feedstock production, transportation and conversion costs and are 
estimated to be $4.35 per gallon (English, Menard et al. 2016). The following table summarizes 
the cost parameters and their source. 
2.4.3 Numerical Methods 
This section relies on a function approximation and collocation method to solve the firm’s 
problem of optimal entry and exit timing. Fackler (2008), provides a general approach and 
MATLAB implementation which is applied to the optimal entry and exit problem of second-
generation biofuel producers. 
The firm’s problem in (2) and (3) can be written more succinctly as 
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 𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) = max{𝜋𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) + ⁡𝐸[(𝑑𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅))] 𝑑𝑡
−1, 𝑉𝑗(𝑃, 𝑅) − 𝐶𝑖𝑗} (11) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗, is the cost of switching states between active or inactive. Brekke and Øksendal 
(1994), showed that (11) can be expressed as a set of variational inequalities as long as the value 
functions 𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) and 𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) are stochastically complete which corresponds to the high 
contact condition of optimal stopping. First note that (11) implies that 
⁡𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) ≥ 𝜋𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) + ⁡𝐸[(𝑑𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅))]𝑑𝑡
−1 
 and 
𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) ≥ 𝑉𝑗(𝑃, 𝑅) − 𝐶𝑖𝑗 . 
Apply Ito’s lemma to⁡𝐸[(𝑑𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅))]𝑑𝑡
−1⁡as in (6) and (7) the firm’s decision to enter can be 
represented as 
𝜎𝑝𝜎𝑟𝜕
2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑃𝑅) +
𝜎𝑝
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃2
𝑃2 +
𝜎𝑟
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑅2
𝑅2 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝𝑃 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟𝑅 = 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅). 
Combining this with the value matching condition 
 
𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) = 𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) − 𝑘, 
the optimal value function thus satisfies the conditions, 
 
 𝜎𝑝𝜎𝑟𝜕
2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
(𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑃𝑅) +
𝜎𝑝
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃2
𝑃2 +
𝜎𝑟
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑅2
𝑅2 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝𝑃 +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑅
𝛼𝑟𝑅 ≤ 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) 
(12) 
and   
 𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑅) ≥ 𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑅) − 𝑘. (13) 
One of these two conditions must hold with equality at each point in the state space. Whichever 
of these two hold with equality determines the optimal firm decision. The left hand side of 
condition (12) is the expected return the firm will gain from delaying investment. The right hand 
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side of condition (12) is the firm’s required return to continue delayed investment. If condition 
(12) holds with inequality the expected returns from delaying, fall short of the firm’s required 
return to remain inactive through continued to delay. A similar story holds true for condition 
(13). The left hand side of condition (13) is the expected present value of delaying investment 
and the right hand side is the expected present value for the active firm, minus the cost to enter 
the market. In other words, condition (13) simply compares the expected payoffs between the 
inactive firm and the active firm. The switching point occurs when condition (13) holds with 
equality. So if the value matching condition holds with strict equality such that⁡𝑉0(𝑟𝐻) =
𝑉1(𝑟𝐻) − 𝑘, then the optimal firm decision is to invest the sunk cost⁡𝑘⁡and enter the market.  
To find the optimal value function in each state, suppose the firm’s value function 𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅)⁡, 
where 𝑖 = 0,1, can be approximated by⁡𝜙(𝑃, 𝑅)𝜃𝑖⁡where⁡𝜙(∙)⁡⁡represents a family of 𝑛-basis 
functions and⁡𝜃𝑖 ⁡is an 𝑛-vector of approximating coefficients. The approximating coefficients are 
then fixed by requiring 𝜙(𝑃, 𝑅)𝜃𝑖 to satisfy the Bellman equation at n-collocation nodes. The 
collocation nodes are simply points along the real number line between the upper and lower 
limits. 
The approximate differential operator is defined as 
𝛽𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) = ⁡𝛿𝑉𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) − 𝛼𝑟𝑅
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑅
− 𝛼𝑝𝑃
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑃
− (𝑅)2
𝜎𝑟
2
2
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑅2
− (𝑃)2
𝜎𝑝
2
2
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑃2
− (𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑃𝑅)
𝜎𝑝𝜎𝑟𝜕
2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑅
. 
The set of 𝑛-basis functions for a family of approximating functions form the⁡𝑛×𝑛 matrix 
represented by⁡Φ⁡and⁡Β⁡represents⁡𝑛×𝑛⁡matrix of⁡𝛽𝑖(𝑃, 𝑅) evaluated at 𝑛-nodal points (Fackler 
2008).  
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The problem is written as an extended vertical linear complementary problem (EVLCP) as 
developed by Gowda and Sznajder (1994).17 To solve the EVLCP, a smoothing Newton 
algorithm is employed while specifying the family of approximating solutions to be a piecewise 
linear function using upwind finite differences to approximate first and second order 
differentiation. Piecewise linear functions are most appropriate for entry and exit problems 
because of the inherent discontinuities in the second derivative of the value function where it 
becomes optimal for the firm to switch states from idle to active, or from active to idle. The 
approximation state space spans a wide range of possible prices. The lower bound is set to $0.00 
and the upper bound is set to $20 per gallon for both conventional fuel and RIN price.18 Between 
each lower and upper bound, 100 nodes are specified, so that the matrices of nodal points for 
both conventional fuel price and RIN price are both⁡100×100.19      
2.5. Results 
In a single parameter model, break-even entry price is defined as⁡
𝑊ℎ
𝛿−𝛼𝑝
≥
𝑤
𝛿
+ 𝑘⁡where parameters 
are as previously defined. The price which triggers investment in this single variable break-even 
analysis is⁡⁡
𝑊ℎ
0.10−0.0027
≥
4.35
0.10
+ 3.93⁡or that 𝑊ℎ ≥ $4.62⁡per gallon. Similarly, the single variable 
break-even exit price is defined as⁡
𝑊𝑙
𝛿−𝛼𝑝
≤
𝑤
𝛿
+ 𝑠 →
𝑊𝑙
0.10−0.0027
≤
3.38
0.10
+ 0.9825 or that⁡𝑊𝑙 ≤
$4.33.  
                                                 
 
17 Interested readers should also refer to (Fackler 2008).  
18 An important choice in specifying the model is the choice of lower and upper limits on the approximation interval 
and the number of nodal points. If the interval is too wide, a large number of node points will be required to obtain 
accurate solutions. Conversely if the approximation interval is too narrow, such that the process starts near an 
optimal switching point, the solutions may be inaccurate (Fackler 2008). 
 
19 Therefore 𝑀1⁡and⁡𝑀2 are each 10,000×10,000 matrices, while⁡𝑞1⁡and⁡𝑞2⁡are each⁡10,000×1⁡matrices. 
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In a two variable model, break-even entry price is defined as⁡
𝑊ℎ
𝛿−𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑝
≥
𝑤
𝛿
+ 𝑘⁡where the output 
price is now a composite of both the conventional fuel price and D4 RIN price, as is the case 
under a binding RIN market. Using the drift rate for both D4 RIN and conventional diesel price, 
the two-variable break-even prices which triggers investment is⁡
𝑊ℎ
0.10−0.0027−0.0182
≥
4.35
0.10
+
3.93⁡or that⁡𝑊ℎ ≥ $3.75. Two-variable break-even exit price is defined as
𝑊𝑙
𝛿−𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑝
≤
𝑤
𝛿
+ 𝑠 and 
is calculated to be $3.52 per gallon. Therefore, when uncertainty and irreversibility are not 
considered, RIN prices reduce the entry price and reduce the gap between the entry and exit 
prices. From this perspective, RIN markets are accomplishing the goals set forth by policy 
makers. However, RIN markets have been highly volatile since their inception. The volatility in 
RIN markets exacerbates the volatility already present in the market for transportation fuels, and 
entering into production of biofuels requires significant capital investment, which is at least 
partially irreversible. The trigger price, which induces investment, is significantly larger when 
uncertainty and irreversibility is considered. Before examining the results of the real options 
approach using two stochastic variables, the trigger prices under a single variable real option 
analysis are examined. 
In the absence of a RIN market, firms would face a single output price. Using this rational a real 
option analysis with a single stochastic variable is performed using the same parameters from 
conventional diesel to represent the parameters of a drop-in ready alternative, and the same cost 
parameters found for the production pathway discussed earlier, which also represents the 
production pathway of a drop-in ready alternative.  
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2.5.1 Results of the Single Stochastic Variable Case 
Assuming the above parameters, the single stochastic variable case shows that uncertainty 
increases the price required for a firm to enter the market. Furthermore, the price, which induces 
the firm to exit the market, decreases under uncertainty, creating a gap between the entry and exit 
price that is larger than under the break-even analysis. This gap represents hysteresis in the 
market, which is a zone of inaction for the firm. The greater the uncertainty the firm is subject to, 
the larger this hysteresis effect becomes. In this case, the entry price is found to be $5.31 per 
gallon and the exit price is found to be $3.79 per gallon. Recall that the break-even entry (exit) 
price was found to be $4.62 ($4.33) per gallon.  
2.5.2 Results of the Two-Stochastic Variable Case 
In the two-variable case, the firm is subject to uncertainty in both conventional fuel price and 
RIN price.  
Figure 24 traces out the combination of conventional fuel price and RIN price, which triggers 
entry and exit actions.  For combinations of conventional fuel price and RIN price above the 
entry threshold, a firm will choose to enter the market. For combinations below the exit 
threshold, firms will choose to exit the market.  
The downward slope of the threshold curves reflect the fact that a decline in conventional fuel 
price must correspond with an increase in RIN price to satisfy the threshold. As lower 
conventional fuel prices prevail, higher RIN prices are required to trigger firm entry and lower 
RIN prices are required to trigger firm exit. 
Combinations between these two thresholds represent a zone of inaction. In this zone, a firm 
currently inactive will remain inactive and a firm currently active will remain active. This zone 
of inaction is wider than traditional economic theory would suggest. For example, it is well 
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known in economic theory that a shutdown price occurs when price falls below average variable 
cost. In reality, firms will often remain in business even after the price falls below average 
variable cost. In fact, this may be the optimal decision based on the chance that prices return to 
previous levels. In other words, the firm’s optimal decision is dependent on the path of prices in 
previous periods. This path dependency is an example of economic hysteresis, and so the zone of 
inaction is known as the hysteresis region. 
Notice the zone of inaction widens with lower conventional fuel price and higher RIN price. In 
other words, the ratio of relative prices is not constant over the entire range of prices. For 
example, if RIN prices are $0.00, the entry and exit thresholds are found to be $6.67 and $3.43 
respectively. This implies that if RIN prices are zero, firms would require a conventional fuel 
price of $6.67 per gallon to enter the market. Conversely, firms would exit the market if 
conventional fuel price fell to $3.43 per gallon. The narrowest range between the entry curve and 
the exit curve occur where 𝑃 + 𝑅 = $6.46⁡for the entry trigger and 𝑃 + 𝑅 = $3.43 for the exit 
trigger. In this case, the narrowest range of inaction occurs when RIN prices (𝑅) are $0.60 per 
gallon, resulting in a conventional fuel price⁡(𝑃), which triggers entry of $5.86 for a combined 
minimum entry price threshold⁡(𝑃 + 𝑅) of $6.46. This entry price threshold is satisfied for a 
number of combinations of⁡𝑃 + 𝑅. For example, if conventional fuel prices are $5.25 per gallon 
the RIN price that would induce the firm to enter the market is found to be $1.21 resulting in a 
combined output price of $6.46 per gallon. The same is true for exit price thresholds. If 
conventional fuel price were to fall to $2.83, a RIN price of $0.60 would induce the firm to 
abandon operations and exit the market. Supposing RIN price is $1.21 under a more binding 
mandate, the corresponding conventional fuel price, which triggers exit, is found to be $2.22.  
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Notice in Figure 24 that the slopes of the entry and exit threshold curves are not constant. 
Intuitively this result seems logical. RIN prices are substantially more volatile than conventional 
fuel price, so with less price support in the form of conventional fuel price, an even higher RIN 
price is required to overcome the price uncertainty. It is helpful to compare Figure 24 to the case 
of a perfectly certain RIN price. Assume RIN price still grows at the annualized rate of 0.0182 
found in section 2.4.1, but the variance parameter is set to zero. Figure 25 demonstrates that the 
non-constant slopes in Figure 24 are attributable to differing volatilities.  
When variance parameters for conventional fuel and RIN prices are set to zero, the slope of the 
entry threshold is constant. The exit threshold is non-constant as conventional fuel price declines 
which is attributable to the negative correlation and larger growth rate of RIN price.20  
To illustrate an advantage of the two stochastic variable model, results are compared to entry and 
exit trigger prices assuming RIN prices are zero (single-variable model) and assuming entry and 
exit if determined by a discounted cash flow approach (break-even analysis) as described in 
section 2.5. In the single variable model, RIN price is assumed zero so that the firm’s marginal 
revenue is determined solely by conventional fuel price similar to methodology in (McCarty and 
Sesmero 2014). This indeed is the case under a non-binding RFS mandate or in the case where 
RIN markets cease to exist. 
The entry trigger price when both conventional fuel price and RIN price are stochastic is 
substantially larger than the threshold predicted under the one-variable real option model and the 
traditional break-even analysis models. Similarly, the exit trigger price is lower than the exit 
                                                 
 
20 This is easily confirmed by setting the growth rate of both prices to be equal. 
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price predicted in the one-variable and break-even models. Accounting for the aggregate 
volatility and correlations between conventional fuel price and RIN price exacerbates the 
uncertainty effect. 
The addition of the RIN market encourages investment, but the uncertainty associated with RIN 
price limits the effectiveness of the program. Figure 26 illustrates how the threshold curves shift 
and flatten when RIN price volatility is varied from lower to higher levels of volatility. The 
ability to hold one price volatility constant while varying the other is an advantage of the two-
variable model. Doing so illustrates how individual volatilities can affect the firm’s investment 
decision over the range of prices, which satisfy the entry and exit threshold curves. One can also 
see, in Figure 26, the zone of inaction widens as RIN volatility increases. 
Entry and exit threshold curves pivot in opposite directions with increases in volatility. This 
occurs because increases in uncertainty increase the value of preserving the option to invest in 
future periods, thus increasing the threshold to enter the market, and increase the expected value 
of ongoing operations, resulting in a lower threshold to abandon operations. Similar intuition 
applies when varying conventional fuel price volatility while holding RIN price volatility 
constant (Figure 27). However, in this case, the intercepts along the vertical access account for 
much of the variation when conventional fuel price volatility is varied. Increasing conventional 
fuel price volatility causes the entry threshold curve to steepen while the exit threshold curve 
flattens. 
While entry and exit thresholds are affected by varying volatilities and their correlations, they are 
most sensitive to changes in the firms cost structure. Varying the firm’s capital cost,⁡𝑘, one can 
see that a smaller capital cost of $1 per gallon will narrow the range of inaction. Because the firm 
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is modeled to have a capital salvage value equal to 25%, the effect of varying capital cost is most 
largely seen in varying entry thresholds (Figure 28).  
Firm operating cost has perhaps the largest effect on entry and exit thresholds, shifting both the 
entry and exit threshold curves upwards with increasing operating costs. Figure 29 illustrates 
how the two threshold curves shift with decreasing and increasing operating cost. If operating 
costs are reduced to $2 per gallon, the minimum entry trigger price is found to be $3.64 per 
gallon while the maximum exit trigger is found to be $1.62 per gallon. 
Investigating how volatility and cost parameters affect the firm’s investment decision leads to 
interesting implications for policy makers whom wish to incentivize production of biofuels. The 
RIN market was established to provide a flexible way of complying with the renewable fuel 
standard. However, this analysis has shown that large uncertainties in the RIN market has 
significant effects on the firm’s investment and operation decisions. Policymakers wishing to 
counteract the uncertainty effects have various tools at their disposal, namely tax credits and 
bonus depreciation allowances. 
2.5.3 Tax Incentives 
Producers of second-generation biofuel may qualify for two policy incentives that encourage 
investment, beyond the price support provided by RINs.21 The first incentive is a tax credit of 
$1.01 for every qualifying gallon of second-generation biofuel produced. The second incentive 
                                                 
 
21 To be eligible, second-generation biofuel producers must be registered with the IRS where second-generation 
biofuel is defined as any liquid fuel produced from lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter on a renewable or 
recurring basis. Renewable sources of lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter include dedicated energy crops and 
trees, wood and wood residues, plants, grasses, agricultural residues, fibers, animal wastes and other waste 
materials, including solid municipal solid waste (H.R. 110-627 2008) 
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provides a 50% depreciation allowance to recover a portion of the cost of qualifying production 
property. The depreciation allowance may only be claimed during the first year of operations 
such that it takes the form of a bonus depreciation allowance. Bonus depreciation allowances 
accelerate the depreciation of qualified property, lowering the cost of capital required for 
investment in those assets and increasing cash flow to the firm making the investment (Guenther 
2015). Claiming the bonus depreciation, lowers the firm’s depreciable basis by 50%, thereby 
lowering annual depreciation costs and increasing cash flow.22 
Based on IRS property requirements, a second-generation biofuel producer may elect to deduct 
half of the firm’s capital conversion costs including components of refining, packaging, crushing 
and plant infrastructure such as the boiler, cooling tower and fire protection. Capital 
transportation costs are not included in this depreciation allowance. Assuming a 13-million-
gallon production, the depreciation allowance reduces the per gallon capital costs from $3.93 to 
$1.97 per gallon. Following a straight-line depreciation method, the operating costs are also 
adjusted to account for the reduction in ongoing depreciation costs.  
Second-generation biofuel producers also qualify for a $1.01 tax credit for each gallon produced. 
This results in a operating credit of $13,130,000, thereby reducing per gallon operating costs by 
$1.01. However, the operating costs are also reduced by the difference in per unit depreciation 
costs that results from the depreciation allowance. With no depreciation allowance, the firm’s 
                                                 
 
22 Firms can take a 50% special depreciation allowance for qualified second-generation biofuel plant property. To 
qualify for the depreciation allowance, the property must meet the following requirements. (i)The property is used in 
the United States solely to produce second-generation biofuel. (ii)The original use of the property must begin with 
you after December 20, 2006. (iii) Property must have been acquired by purchase after December 20, 2006, with no 
binding written contract for acquisition in effect before December 21, 2006. (iv) The property must be placed in 
service for use in trade or business or for the production of income before January 1, 2017.  
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ongoing depreciation costs are $3,409,002 or $0.26 per gallon. After adjusting for the 
depreciation allowance the ongoing per unit depreciation costs are $0.13 per gallon. Therefore, 
the total reduction in operating costs is $1.14, resulting in a new operating cost of $3.21 per 
gallon. 
Under the subsidized capital and operating costs, the firm’s break-even entry and exit prices are 
found, using the same approach as previously shown, to be $3.32 and $3.17 respectively. 
However, when accounting for the annualized growth rate of RIN prices, the two-variable break-
even entry and exit prices are found to be $2.70 and $2.58 respectively. The break-even entry 
and exit prices do not account for the uncertainty in conventional fuel price, RIN price and their 
correlation as previously discussed. To account for these uncertainties, the subsidized capital and 
operating costs are analyzed in the two-variable real option framework.  
 Figure 30 illustrates the policy effects on the firm’s optimal entry and exit trigger prices. Here it 
can be seen that the depreciation allowance and tax credit partially counteract the uncertainty 
effects of the RIN market.  
The subsidized entry trigger of $4.65 is close to the single variable break-even entry price of 
$4.61. However, the upside of RIN price uncertainty still exists in the form of a lower exit 
trigger. The subsidized exit trigger price of $2.63 is approximately $1.70 lower than the single 
variable break-even exit price.  
The policy incentives do indeed lower the entry and exit thresholds and partially counteract RIN 
price uncertainty effects. It appears then; the two policy incentives are important tools to 
incentivize investment in second-generation biofuels, particularly in the face of highly volatile 
RIN markets. However, the policy effect is not enough to put the entry and exit trigger prices on 
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par with the two-variable break-even model. To reach parity with the two-variable break-even 
result, policymakers would need to increase the depreciation allowance and the per unit tax 
credit. Presumably a per unit tax credit is costlier as the credits may be claimed for as long as the 
policy is active. Whereas the depreciation allowance can only be claimed in the first year of 
operations. Therefore, policymakers ought to be interested in the least costly mix of these two 
incentives to reach the desired policy effect. Finding the least costly mix of policy incentives 
would imply that the tax credit should be minimized so that in conjunction with the depreciation 
allowance just satisfies the desired policy effect. To approach the entry price of $3.75 in Table 
26 policymakers could cease the depreciation incentive and institute a per unit tax credit of $2.20 
which would result in an unchanged capital cost of $3.93 and a subsidized operating cost of 
$2.15 per gallon. This scenario would result in an entry trigger price of $3.83 in the two-variable 
real option model. However, the same result is reached with an alternative mix of policy 
incentives. By increasing the depreciation allowance to 60% and the tax credit to $1.44 per 
gallon, the subsidized capital and operating costs become $1.58 and $2.75 respectively. Under 
this mix of policy incentives, the two-variable real option model again predicts an entry trigger 
price of $3.83 per gallon.  
Analyzing the efficiency and equity effects of the tax credit and depreciation allowance is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, under the assumption that capital is fixed in the short 
term, tax incentives are likely to divert capital away from more productive uses toward the tax 
favored uses (Guenther 2015). Whether or not the welfare benefits outweigh the potential losses 
associated with the capital diversion remains a topic for future studies. This study provides a 
framework for analyzing the efficacy of second-generation biofuel producer incentives, but 
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makes no claims about the efficiency, equity, administration or overall effect on economic 
growth. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This study separates and analyzes the effect that RFS and blender’s tax credit uncertainty has on 
firm investment decisions. Expiration and reinstatement of blender tax credits, along with annual 
delays, revisions and waivers issued by the EPA create uncertainty throughout the biofuels 
supply chain. This uncertainty leads to volatility in the price of RINs, which in turn increases the 
aggregate uncertainty faced by producers of second-generation biofuels.  
Using a two-stochastic-variable real option model, the effect of policy uncertainty is isolated 
from general market uncertainties. In this framework, the price, which triggers the firm to invest 
and enter the market, is identified. Numerical solutions also provide threshold curves, which 
represent all combinations of conventional fuel price and RIN price, which induce the firm into 
action. 
Investigating how the price volatility of both conventional fuel price, RIN price and their 
correlations effect the firm’s decision to enter the market, remain idle or to abandon the market if 
already active, provides important insights into an industry, which may be critical to long term 
energy independence and national security. Furthermore, results could have important policy 
implications. If high levels of price and policy uncertainty depress investment in second-
generation biofuels, then perhaps, the RFS would be more effective by preventing delays in 
annual announcements, limiting annual revisions, and setting the volume obligations over a 
longer horizon. Any effort in these areas would work to reduce policy uncertainty that has been 
characteristic of the RFS. 
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Results indicate the price, which triggers the firm to invest and enter the market, is significantly 
higher under the real options model with two stochastic variables. The underlying cause is price 
volatility and irreversible capital costs. In the market for second-generation biofuels, the price 
volatility faced by potential market entrants comes in the form of both conventional fuel price 
and RIN price. Conventional fuel prices have historically exhibited large volatilities, but biofuel 
policy uncertainty creates high volatility in RIN price adding to the aggregate uncertainty faced 
by potential market entrants. Clearly, the RIN program has successfully encouraged investment 
in biofuels. However, high levels of policy uncertainty lead to volatile RIN prices, which work to 
limit the effectiveness of the RIN program. 
The increased aggregate uncertainty creates additional headwinds for second-generation biofuel 
producers. Investment incentives such as bonus depreciation allowances and producer tax credits 
work to counteract uncertainty effects, but these policy incentives would be more effective in 
stimulating investment if the firm faced less aggregate uncertainty.  
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2. A. Appendix 
2. A.1 Tables 
Table 20: OLS results of D4 RIN price 
Ordinary Least Squares result for the equation: ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 +∈𝑅𝑡  
Dependent                       
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡  Coef.  Std. Err.  t   P > t  [95% Conf. Interval 
Independent                   
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−1  0.08366  0.0254  3.300  0.001  0.033927 0.1333873 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−2  0.01104  0.0254  0.430  0.664  -0.03886 0.060936 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡−3  0.07701  0.0253  3.040  0.002  0.027295 0.1267253 
𝑐  0.00099  0.0012  0.810  0.417  -0.00141 0.0033868 
Observations  1543          
F(3,1539)  7.16          
Prob > F  0.0001          
Root MSE   0.04793                   
 
 
Table 21: OLS results of conventional fuel price 
Ordinary Least Squares result for the equation: ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜑1∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1 +∈𝑃𝑡 
Dependent                       
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P > t  [95% Conf. Interval 
Independent                   
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1  -0.0209821  0.025505  -0.82  0.411  -0.07101 0.0290455 
𝑐  -0.0004234  0.000469  -0.90  0.367  -0.00134 0.0004969 
Observations  1,545          
F(1, 1543)  0.680          
Prob > F  0.41080          
Root MSE   0.01844                   
 
Table 22: Parameter estimation results 
Parameter Definition Value Scale 
𝛼𝑝 Drift Rate Conventional Fuel 0.0027 Per year 
𝛼𝑟 Drift Rate D4 RINs 0.0182 Per year 
𝜎𝑝 Standard Deviation Conventional Fuel 0.2927 Per year 
𝜎𝑟 Standard Deviation RINs 0.7609 Per year 
𝜌𝑝𝑟 Correlation of Fuel and RINs -0.0129 Per year 
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Table 23: Cost parameters sourced from prior literature 
Parameter Definition Value Scale Source 
𝛿 Discount Rate 0.1023 per year (Brown and Brown 2013) 
𝑤 Operating Cost 4.35 per gallon (English et al., 2016) 
𝑘 Capital Cost 3.93 per gallon of total capacity (English, Menard et al. 2016) 
𝑠 Salvage Value 0.98 per gallon of total capacity (Schmit, Luo et al. 2009) 
 
Table 24: Comparison of entry and exit prices 
Method  Entry  Exit 
Single Variable Break-Even  $4.6149  $4.3281 
Two Variable Break-Even  $3.7517  $3.5183 
Single Variable Real Option  $5.3141  $3.7921 
Two Variable Real Option  $6.4646  $3.4343 
 
Table 25: Comparison of production costs with tax incentives 
Pennycress fed Green Jet Fuel Production Pathway 
  Costs - with Tax Incentives  Costs-No incentives 
Name Plate Capacity (gallons)  13,000,000  13,000,000 
Capital Transportation ($)  $118,915  $118,915 
Capital Conversion ($)  $25,494,055  $50,988,111 
Total Capital Costs ($)  $25,612,970  $51,107,026 
Total Capital Costs ($/gallon)  $1.97  $3.93 
Operating cost Conversion ($)  $10,804,002  $12,508,503 
Operating Farmgate Cost of 
Feedstock ($)  $43,335,000  $43,335,000 
Operating Cost of Transportation 
($)  $666,396  $666,396 
Operating Credit ($)  -$13,130,000  $0 
Total Operating Cost  $41,675,398  $56,509,899 
Total Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $3.21   $4.35 
 
                                                 
 
23 A discount rate of 10% is a common assumption in Techno-Economic Analyses. It is chosen as the rate, which 
will make the present value of cash proceeds equal to the present value of cash outlay’s over the life of the plant. In 
other words, this is the break-even internal rate of return for the production pathway under study in the TEA. 
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Table 26: Comparison of entry and exit prices with current policy incentives 
Method Entry 
Subsidized 
Entry Exit 
Subsidized 
Exit 
Single Variable Break-Even $4.61  $3.32  $4.33  $3.17  
Two Variable Break-Even $3.75  $2.69  $3.52  $2.58  
Single Variable Real Option $5.31  $3.77  $3.79  $2.81  
Two Variable Real Option $6.46  $4.65  $3.43  $2.63  
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2. A.2 Figures 
 
Figure 16: Core Value of the RIN 
 
 
Figure 17: Outward demand shift causes decrease in RIN value 
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Figure 18: Effect of a blender tax credit on the core value of a RIN 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Effect of a shift in the RFS mandate on the core value of a RIN 
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Figure 20: Historical biodiesel RIN prices and biodiesel blend margin 
 
 
Figure 21: ACF and PACF of ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑡 
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Figure 22: ACF and PACF of⁡∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 
 
 
Figure 23: Historical Diesel Price 
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Figure 24: Two-variable entry and exit threshold curves 
 
 
Figure 25: Two-variable entry and exit threshold curves with fuel price and RIN price variance 
set to zero 
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Figure 26: Threshold curve sensitivity holding conventional fuel price volatility constant 
 
 
Figure 27: Threshold curve sensitivity holding RIN price volatility constant 
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Figure 28: Effect of changes in the firms per gallon capital cost on entry and exit thresholds 
 
 
Figure 29: Effect of changes in the firm’s operating cost on entry and exit thresholds 
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Figure 30: Entry and exit threshold curves while accounting for producer policy incentives 
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Chapter III: Potential for Pennycress to Support an Alternative Jet-Fuel 
Industry 
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Chapter III: Abstract 
This study examines the economic feasibility in pennycress production and its potential to supply 
a renewable aviation industry. Pennycress is an oilseed plant that is being considered as a 
second-generation biofuel feedstock. The plant produces an oilseed, which is of high quality and 
high oil content. The plant lifecycle fits with traditional crop rotations such as a corn and 
soybean rotation. Therefore, pennycress may provide soil and environmental benefits associated 
with cover crops while also providing a cash benefit to producers in the form of a valuable 
oilseed. Pennycress has never been produced at commercial scale. Therefore, this study provides 
an economic analysis at the producer level and simulates county level supply curves across the 
contiguous United States, using a using a partial equilibrium simulation model of the US 
agricultural sector. County level results are then aggregated to the National level to estimate the 
potential supply of alternative jet-fuel produced from pennycress oil. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The commercial aviation industry consumed over 16.2 billion gallons of jet fuel in 2014, 
accounting for approximately 25% of operating expenses (U.S. Department of Transportation 
BTS 2014). With such a large proportion of operating expenses coming directly from fuel 
consumption, fuel price uncertainty can have a substantial impact on airline operating strategies. 
Airlines use various strategies to manage fuel price uncertainty including adjustments in aircraft 
size and utilization, flight-route and destination offerings, vertical integration and financial 
hedges (Davidson, Newes et al. 2014). The use of renewable jet fuel has the potential to decrease 
fuel-price uncertainties, thereby decreasing fuel-hedging costs, and decreasing profit volatility. 
The United States Government is actively supporting the development of renewable jet fuels. 
Two examples of this are the Farm-to-Fly 2.0 program, which focuses on supply chain and 
infrastructure, and the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI), which 
supports research and development, environmental assessment, fuel testing, demonstration and 
commercialization. As of 2015, the standard setting organization, ASTM International has 
approved three renewable jet fuels for use in aviation (USDOT FAA 2015). 
This paper examines the potential for pennycress to support a renewable jet fuel industry in the 
United States. Pennycress (Thlaspi Arvense) is commonly referred to as “stinkweed” or “French-
weed” and found throughout the United States (CABI 2016). Pennycress is being evaluated as a 
potential feedstock for biodiesel and biojet fuels. The crop has the potential to supply both oil 
and biomass to the biofuels market. Following harvest, seed crushing and pre-processing; 
pennycress offers a suitable oil to allow conversion to a Hydro-processed Ester and Fatty Acid 
(HEFA) fuel. Pennycress provides the benefits of a winter cover crop while also supplying 
producers with direct economic benefits. As a winter cover in double crop rotations, pennycress 
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is established in the fall and harvested in mid-to-late-spring. Pennycress can offer the benefits of 
weed reduction, excess nutrient uptake and management, and hydrological regulation by aiding 
in the drying of excessive soil moisture. The plant is grown on fallow winter land, providing a 
valuable cash crop which avoids the pitfalls of the food-versus-fuel debate (Moser, Knothe et al. 
2009).  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently conducted an assessment of 
greenhouse gas emissions attributable to the production and transportation of pennycress oil, to 
be used in the making of biodiesel and biojet fuels. The EPA indicates that based on its analysis, 
pennycress could qualify as biomass-based diesel or advanced biofuel if typical fuel production 
process technologies are used (USEPA 2015). The EPA anticipates approval for the generation 
of renewable identification numbers, following existing rule making related to camelina 
feedstock production. Pennycress is in the brassica family, as is camelina, so while no new rule 
making is expected, pennycress producers will likely obtain approval through the EPA’s 
feedstock pathway petition process. Approval of production pathways for the generation of RINs 
is currently being conducted on a case-by-case basis. The approval will likely include adherence 
to invasiveness monitoring and reporting requirements, as the plant has some potential for 
invasiveness (USEPA 2015). Indeed, there are currently nine states with restrictions of 
pennycress cultivation due to the potential for invasiveness. These states include, IN, KS, MN, 
NE, NV, OH, SD, and WA. Previously Michigan had been included in this list until it was 
deregulated in 2015 (USDA-APHIS 2015). Despite having a high-risk classification, pennycress 
is not likely to have an impact when incorporated as a component of traditional row crop 
rotations. This is because herbicide applications that occur during the corn or soybean planting 
provide adequate control of any leftover pennycress seed (Sindelar, Schmer et al. 2015). 
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3.2. Farm-Gate Costs 
Large-scale cultivation has not yet been undertaken for pennycress, thus management practices 
and stand establishment practices are still in research and development. Variety trials have been 
undertaken throughout the Midwest, particularly in Western Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska. 
A variety of planting methods have been tested, including drill, broadcast and aerial seeding. 
Aerial seeding over standing corn canopy or a broadcast with light incorporation after corn 
harvest has been successful. Aerial or broadcast seeding rates of 5lbs/acre have generated yields 
ranging from approximately 1400lbs/acre to 2200lbs/acre with an average yield of1800lbs/acre. 
To establish a stand of pennycress ready for harvest in May-June and not interfere with soybean 
planting, aerial seeding over corn canopy may generate the best results. However, planting 
earlier than September 1 should be avoided, because if the plant flowers too early in winter 
months, survival rates are low. Phippen, John et al. (2010), conducted a study of five different 
September planting dates and found that seed oil content was not significantly different among 
the various planting dates. However, stand establishment declined as temperatures declined 
throughout the fall. 
Application of nitrogen and sulfur requirements are found to be minimal (Moser, Knothe et al. 
2009). Growth chamber experiments show, seed yield is not significantly influenced by the 
application of nitrogen above 50lbs per acre (Mason, Phippen et al. 2013). Some current field 
trials have not required the use potassium or phosphorus, but commercial scale operations may 
require the application of these fertilizers to replace loss nutrients (USEPA 2015). 
Plants of the brassica family are susceptible to the fungus following an unusually wet spring. 
Insects and pests however, are not likely to pose a risk. This is because the pennycress plant 
completes its life cycle in the spring when insects are emerging.  
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There is not yet an established market for pennycress and commercial scale production has not 
been widely established. However the Agricultural Marketing Resource Center provides an 
estimate of $0.15 per pound of seed (AGMRC 2015). Enterprise budgets are developed to 
estimate the per acre cost of production for pennycress, based on a yield of 1600 (Table 37). 
Based on numerous research trials a yield of 1600 pounds per acre seems reasonable and 
conservative (Fan, Shonnard et al. (2013), Sedbrook, Phippen et al. (2014), Agricultural 
Marketing Resource Center (AGMRC) (2015)).  
No insecticide or herbicide applications are required for a successful pennycress crop. As a 
member of the mustard family and a winter annual, insect pressure is insignificant due to its 
natural chemistry and the temperatures of the growing season thus limiting an insecticide 
requirement (Arvens Technology Inc 2010).  Crop insurance for Pennycress is not currently 
available and not included in variable costs. Therefore, variable costs include those costs for 
seed, nitrogen, repair and maintenance, fuel and lube, labor, operating interest, and machinery 
rental. Fixed costs include capital recovery costs for machinery and equipment, which are 
combine, with grain head, 215hp tractor with grain cart and semi-tractor trailer for hauling.  
Based on the production of 1600 pounds per acre and a market price of $0.15 per pound, 
estimated revenues are $240 per acre. Seed costs are also projected by the AGMRC and 
estimated to be $2.50/ 5lbs. Total variable expenses are estimated to be $67.47 per acre assuming 
aerial seeding of five pounds per acre. Total Fixed costs are estimated to be $18.24 per acre. 
Breakeven prices assuming a yield of 1600 pounds per acre is estimated to be $0.05 per pound, 
10 cents below the estimated market price provided by AGMRC. Break even yield for a market 
price of $0.15 per pound is estimated to be 571 pounds per acre. The break-even price for a yield 
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of 1600 pounds per acre does not account for the uncertainty and sunk costs in the decision to 
invest in pennycress production.  
3.3. A Model of Optimal Decisions in the Production of Pennycress 
Pennycress has never been commercially produced so there are significant risks involved the 
enterprise. Not surprisingly, a large portion of that risk stems from uncertainty in yields and 
price. There is currently no market for pennycress; so naturally, there are no prevailing prices, 
which producers can gauge, and no historic price data, which can be used to form expectations. 
Similarly, there are no historic yield data and it is quite possible that yield results from 
experimental plots will not translate to yield results under commercial conditions. Furthermore, 
there is considerable risk to the yields of the follow-on crop, such as soybeans. If the harvesting 
of pennycress is later than expected, it could delay the planting of soybeans, which could affect 
soybean yields (UIUC ACES 2013). Previous research has found mixed results in this area. 
Johnson, Kantar et al. (2015), found the effect of pennycress on soybean yields to be dependent 
upon location. Planted, following the corn harvest, pennycress can be harvested in late May to 
mid-June. Sindelar, Schmer et al. (2015), have conducted a review of 17 studies where soybean 
planting was delayed. The authors found that all but four locations resulted in a yield reduction, 
varying from -4% to -28%. 
Phippen and Phippen (2012), also note that planting soybean could be delayed due to poor field 
conditions and/or late pennycress harvest.  Furthermore, the authors find that a delayed planting 
of soybean until mid-June results in reduced oil content and a 20% reduction in soybean yields. 
However, the yield penalties associated with delayed planting may be offset by accrued soil 
benefits in subsequent years. The authors conducted a two-year study to examine the effect of 
pennycress residues on soybean yields. In the first year, soybean yields were only affected by 
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planting date. In the second year, soybean yields were significantly affected by pennycress 
residues, but the effect was positive. Two years of pennycress residue resulted in greater 
moisture levels and other benefits to the soil. This led to increased soybean yields in the second 
year. The fact that pennycress residue benefits did not materialize until year 2 is in line with a 
large body of cover crop research. Cover-crop benefits accrue gradually and are typically not 
observed in the first year (Clark 2012).  
Probabilistic yield penalties translate to an irreversible cost to investing in the production of 
pennycress. However, in years two and beyond, pennycress residue effects take hold. Soil 
benefits accrue, and year-two yield penalties are offset. Therefore, a producer who invests in the 
production of pennycress can expect to incur a one-time sunk cost, stemming from the first-year 
yield penalties. 
The irreversible nature of probabilistic yield penalties, coupled with uncertain pennycress 
revenues create an option value in delaying investment in pennycress production. Producers may 
wish to delay investment until uncertainties are resolved or until the expected gains from 
investing now, outweigh the value of delaying into the future. The producer can be in one of two 
states, either in traditional crop rotation where (i = 0) or in a pennycress double-cropping 
rotation where (i = 1).  The producer decides when, if ever, to switch states from traditional 
rotation to double-cropping rotation by choosing⁡𝑡1. If the producer is already double-cropping 
pennycress, they must decide when, if ever, to abandon pennycress production by choosing⁡𝑡0. 
When the producer is actively double-cropping pennycress, they earn an additional flow of 
payments⁡𝜋𝑖(𝑃, 𝑌) which is defined as 
 𝜋𝑖=0,1(𝑃, 𝑌) = {
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑛𝑜⁡𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠⁡𝑖𝑠⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑖 = 0
𝑃 ∙ 𝑌 − 𝑤 − 𝑐⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑡ℎ𝑒⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑖 = 1
 (4) 
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In (4),⁡𝑃 is the price of pennycress per pound of seed,⁡𝑌 is the quantity yielded per acre,⁡𝑤⁡is the 
per acre operating costs and⁡𝑐 is the per acre capital recovery costs of machinery used in the 
planting and harvesting of pennycress. As discussed above, the first-year yield penalties to 
soybean represent a sunk cost⁡(𝑘) that the farmer expects to incur when investing in pennycress. 
This is treated as a one-payment the farmer must make in order to invest in the production of 
pennycress. However, the decision to plant pennycress is an annual decision. Assuming the 
farmer is free of any binding contractual obligations, they may choose to forego subsequent 
pennycress production while incurring no costs to this decision to abandon. Therefore, the 
farmer’s investment cost is⁡𝑘⁡and the exit cost is zero.  
Given the discount rate⁡𝛿, the farmer’s optimal entry and exit decision satisfies  
 𝑉0(𝑃0, 𝑌0) = max
𝑡1
𝐸0 {∫ 𝜋0(𝑃(𝑡), 𝑌(𝑡))𝑒
−𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +⁡[(𝑉1(𝑃(𝑡1), 𝑌(𝑡1)) − 𝑘)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡1]
𝑡1
0
} (5) 
 
 𝑉1(𝑃0, 𝑌0) = max
𝑡0
𝐸0 {∫ 𝜋1(𝑃(𝑡), 𝑌(𝑡))𝑒
−𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +⁡[(𝑉0(𝑃(𝑡0), 𝑌(𝑡0)))𝑒
−𝛿𝑡0]
𝑡0
0
} (6) 
subject to⁡𝑑𝑃, 𝑑𝑌⁡and 𝑃(0) = 𝑃0, and⁡𝑌(0) = 𝑌0. 
3.3.1 Market Dynamics for Pennycress 
The price of pennycress seed, 𝑃,⁡follows a generalized Ito process such that the change in price 
 𝑑𝑃 =⁡𝛼𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝑑𝑧𝑝 (7) 
where 𝛼𝑝(𝑃)⁡is the deterministic trend in the price process and 𝜎𝑝(𝑃)⁡represents the 
instantaneous standard deviation.  The trend changes over the time increment⁡𝑑𝑡⁡. The change 
in⁡𝑧𝑝⁡, 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡, follows a Wiener process such that ⁡𝑑𝑧𝑝 =⁡𝜀𝑡√𝑑𝑡⁡ where, 𝜀𝑡⁡is a normally distributed 
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random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. Furthermore 𝜀𝑡⁡is serially 
uncorrelated so that 𝐸(𝜀𝑡, 𝜀𝑠) = 0⁡⁡∀⁡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠⁡and thus the values of 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡for any two different 
intervals of time are independent, following a Markov process with independent increments. It is 
also assumed that the discount rate ⁡𝛿⁡is greater than the drift rate⁡𝛼𝑝, which indeed must hold 
otherwise investment would never be optimal, as the growth rate would outpace the discount 
rate. Hence, it would always be possible to do better by waiting longer. 
Pennycress yields are also assumed to follow a generalized Ito process, just as is the case for the 
price of pennycress. 
 𝑑𝑌 = ⁡𝛼𝑦(𝑌)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑦(𝑌)𝑑𝑧𝑦⁡ (8) 
where 𝛼𝑦(𝑌)⁡is the deterministic trend in the price process, 𝜎𝑦(𝑌)⁡represents the standard 
deviation and the same assumptions of equation (7) apply. The two stochastic processes are 
potentially correlated in their Wiener processes such that⁡𝐸[𝑑𝑧𝑃𝑑𝑧𝑦] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑡𝑃, 𝜀𝑡𝑦]𝑑𝑡 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝑧𝑃, 𝑑𝑧𝑦)/√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑑𝑧𝑃)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑑𝑧𝑦) = 𝜌𝑝𝑦𝑑𝑡. 
3.3.2 The Farmer’s Decision to Produce Pennycress 
The farmer who remains in traditional crop rotations has expected net present value denoted 
as⁡𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌). Since the farm is in traditional crop rotation, ⁡𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌) represents the value of the 
option to produce pennycress. In this state, the only additional value stemming from pennycress 
is the expected gain in the value of retaining the option to invest denoted 
as⁡𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌)]𝑑𝑡
−1.This is also referred to as the capital appreciation of the farmer’s asset as 
prices and yields increase, where in this case, the asset is the farmer’s option to begin pennycress 
production.  
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The required return from the investment is represented by the function⁡𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌)and the no-
arbitrage condition of efficient markets sets these two returns equal. 
 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌) = 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌)]𝑑𝑡
−1 (9) 
Under the efficient markets theorem, equation (9) must hold and implicitly defines the price and 
yield combinations, which trigger entry and exit. Equation (9) essentially says that over an 
infinitesimal period⁡𝑑𝑡, the required return on the investment opportunity is equal to its expected 
rate of capital appreciation and facilitates the evaluation of the affect that changes in output price 
and yield have on the value of a farmer who has not yet adopted pennycress.  
Following Ito’s Lemma, 𝑑𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌)⁡is expanded using a Taylor series expansion. It is assumed 
that⁡𝑃⁡and 𝑌 are both continuous-time stochastic processes as represented by equation (7) and 
(8). Through Ito’s Lemma, equation (9) becomes the second-order partial differential equation 
 
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑌)𝜕
2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑌
(𝜌𝑝𝑦) +
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑃2
+
𝜎𝑦(𝑌)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉0
𝜕𝑌2
+
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃) +
𝜕𝑉0
𝜕𝑌
𝛼𝑦(𝑌)
− 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃, 𝑌) = 0 
(10) 
3.3.3 The Farmer’s Decision to Exit 
The value of the farmer who is actively producing pennycress is denoted as⁡𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑌), which is 
the expected discounted value of the net earnings plus their option to exit. Over the range of 
prices 𝑃⁡and yields⁡𝑌, where it is optimal to remain in production of pennycress, the project is 
earning⁡(𝑃 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝑤 − 𝑐). The farmer receives a dividend equal to the additional flow of profits 
earned from producing pennycress (𝑃 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝑤 − 𝑐)⁡and capital gains arise from the expected 
future appreciation of the farm operation. Similar to equation (9) efficiency in markets requires   
 𝛿𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑌) = (𝑃 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝑤 − 𝑐) + 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑌)]𝑑𝑡
−1. (11) 
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Applying Ito’s Lemma to expand⁡𝑑𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑌) equation (11) results in the second-order partial 
differential equation 
 
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)𝜎𝑟(𝑌)𝜕
2𝑉1
𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑌
(𝜌𝑝𝑦) +
𝜎𝑝(𝑃)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉1
𝜕𝑃2
+
𝜎𝑟(𝑌)
2
2
𝜕2𝑉1
𝜕𝑌2
+
𝜕𝑉1
𝜕𝑃
𝛼𝑝(𝑃) +
𝜕𝑉1
𝜕𝑌
𝛼𝑦(𝑌)
− 𝛿𝑉1(𝑃, 𝑌) = 𝑐 − 𝑤 − 𝑃 ∗ 𝑌. 
(12) 
Solving (10) and (12) will implicitly define the price/quantity combination, which induce the 
farmer to enter and exit production of pennycress. Partial differential equations such as (10) and 
(12) often require the use of numerical techniques to approximate a solution. The same 
numerical methods detailed in 2.4.3 are applied here to approximate the solution. Before this 
approach can be carried out, the model must be parameterized. 
3.3.4 Parameterization of the model 
To estimate the parameters of the Ito process, one must first determine which Ito process best fits 
the data. Geometric Brownian motions (GBM) in yield and price data are first considered. There 
is currently no market for pennycress, and thus no historical price or yield data. However, 
pennycress is similar to that of industrial rapeseed and there is a well-established global market 
for rapeseed. Therefore, historical rapeseed prices and yields are used to estimate drift and 
variance parameters. Rapeseed yields vary dramatically in different parts of the world. For 
example, German rapeseed yields have reached nearly 4000 pounds per acre in recent years. 
However, Canadian rapeseed yields recently reached an all-time high of 2000 pounds per acre. 
Agronomic research on pennycress places estimated yields to be in the range of 800 pounds per 
acre, up to 2200 pounds per acre. Therefore, historical Canadian yields are used here. Historical 
price data from global spot markets is utilized to represent a matured global market for 
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pennycress seed. Therefore, the historical spot price for rapeseed free on board (FOB) at 
Rotterdam is utilized.  
To determine if GBM is the appropriate process for the chosen data, unit root tests are carried 
out. In both cases, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 99% confidence level. 
Therefore, GBM is excluded from the analysis and geometric mean reversion (MR) processes are 
the next to be considered. The geometric MR process is written as 
 
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
= 𝜆𝑝(?̅? − 𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑝𝑑𝑧𝑝 (13) 
where⁡𝜆𝑝 is the rate of reversion, 𝜎𝑝 is the standard deviation,⁡?̅? is the long run average and the 
change in⁡𝑧𝑝⁡, 𝑑𝑧𝑝⁡. Recall that 𝑑𝑧𝑝 follows a Wiener process such that ⁡𝑑𝑧𝑝 =⁡𝜀𝑡√𝑑𝑡⁡ where, 
𝜀𝑡⁡is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
unity. To estimate the rate of reversion parameter, standard deviation and long run mean, one can 
rearrange (13) to current period form. 
 
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡
= 𝜆𝑝(?̅? − 𝑃𝑡) + 𝜎𝑝𝜀𝑡 (14) 
Ordinary least squares can be used to estimate (14) in the form of⁡𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑥 + 𝑒. In performing 
the regression, set 𝑦 =
𝑃𝑡−𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡
 and allow⁡𝑥 = 𝑃𝑡. From this, one can see that 
𝑎 + 𝑏𝑥 + 𝑒𝑡 = 𝜆𝑝?̅? − 𝜆𝑝𝑃𝑡 + 𝜎𝑝𝜀𝑡 
The parameters of interest are recovered such that  ?̂?𝑝 = −?̂?, ⁡?̅? =
?̂?
?̂?𝑝
 and ?̂?𝑝 = 𝑠𝑑(?̂?𝑡). The rate 
of reversion and the standard deviation are then annualized using the convention of converting 1-
day parameters to h-day parameters. This requires scaling by a factor of⁡√ℎ⁡ resulting in a 
reversion rate of ⁡?̂?𝑝 = 0.0101 ∗ √252 = 0.1603⁡and a standard deviation of⁡?̂?𝑝 = 0.0130 ∗
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√252 = 0.2064. This estimation procedure is the same for the historical rapeseed yields as well. 
The rapeseed data however, are already in annual terms so there is no need to scale by a factor 
of⁡√ℎ. Next, the correlation coefficient for yield and price are estimated after annualizing price.  
Doing so results in a weakly negative relationship between yield and price with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.2943. Estimation results of the model parameters are summarized in Table 27. 
3.3.5 Cost Parameters 
Costs of pennycress production include variable costs and fixed costs per acre. Fixed costs come 
in the form of machinery ownership and operating costs in the harvesting and transportation of 
pennycress. Specifically, these fixed costs are the capital recovery costs of a 215hp tractor with 
grain cart, combine-harvester with grain head and semi-tractor trailer. One of the primary 
determinants of capital recovery costs is the field capacity or the number of acres per hour that 
the machine can effectively cover. Since these costs are only incurred after the farmer has begun 
pennycress production, they are distinctly different from sunk investment costs. In this analysis, 
variable costs of $67.47 per acre are utilized for determining optimal trigger prices and in 
simulating pennycress supply (Table 37).   
Sunk investment costs result from expected yield reductions in soybean production. As discussed 
previously, yield reductions vary and are dependent on a number of factors. Therefore, a 
probabilistic yield reduction and expected cost is estimated by examining historic soybean 
yields. Data is gathered from the United States Department of Agriculture for the state of 
Illinois’ historic soybean yields. Illinois is used in this analysis because of its large and well-
established production of corn and soybeans, in addition to having favorable conditions for 
pennycress production. The data is annual and ranges from 1977 to 2016. Higher frequency data 
is unavailable as crop yields are annual in nature. The early 1970’s saw a boom in farm 
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production and yields. Agricultural exports surged and farm incomes jumped from $2.3 billion in 
1972 to $19.6 billion in 1973. Furthermore, congress had recently passed the Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 1971. The legislation allowed private firms to patent new hybrid seeds. 
Following this, corn and soybean hybrids were developed and the race to increased yield was on 
(Lawton 2016). During the growing season of 1974, soybean yields took an unexpected hit, 
despite the push to increase production. Spring rains delayed plantings, a summer drought 
affected growth and an early freeze damaged crops. As demand for seed grew, the 1975 soybean 
seed supplies were limited, which resulted in poor qualities and higher costs for producers. In 
response, the market saw an influx of new soybean varieties from both public sources and 
private. However, 1976 soybean production was still down over 18% compared to 1975. It was 
not until 1977 when producers had ample supply of quality seeds and inflated global prices had 
waned (FAO 1976, Lawton 2016).  From 1940 to 1976, Illinois soybean yields averaged 26.32 
bushels per acre. From 1977 to 2016, the average yield was 42.54 bushels per acre. Therefore, 
any yield data, prior to 1977 could be misleading and 1977 is chosen as the start date for the 
analysis of soybean yields. 
Previous literature finds that soybean yield reductions vary from -6.5% to -28%. Schnitkey 
(2017), assumes a soybean yield of 61 bushels per acre for Northern Illinois, and high-
productivity regions of Central Illinois. That figure is rounded down to 60 bushels per acre, 
resulting in probabilistic yield reductions ranging from -3.9 bushels to -16.8 bushels per acre, 
with a midpoint of -10.35. Using the historic distribution of Illinois soybean yields, the 
probability of occurrence is determined for the specified range and midpoint of yield reductions. 
Visually examining the distribution in a histogram does not provide clear evidence. Therefore, 
the theoretical distribution, which best fits the observed yield data is found by iteratively 
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performing a maximum likelihood estimation while specifying a number of candidate 
distributions. For each iteration, the distribution fit is scored by calculating the information 
criteria score. Each fit is scored using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), consistent AIC 
(CAIC), Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC), and Bozdogan’s Information complexity criterion 
(ICOMP). All criteria minimize the log-likelihood function while penalizing for the number of 
parameters. However, ICOMP also accounts for the covariance structure and thus, for 
collinearity between the factors and dependence among the parameter estimates. Therefore, 
ICOMP is used as the determining criteria while the others are carried out simply for comparison 
purposes. Candidate distributions include Normal, Lognormal, Exponential, Gamma, Weibull, 
Extreme Value and Generalized Extreme Value. Under the ICOMP criteria, the lognormal 
distribution is found to be the best fitting for historic soybean yields (Table 28).  
To examine the fit of the theoretical distribution over the observed data, the histogram of 
historical yield data is overlaid by the theoretical lognormal curve. This illustrates that the 
lognormal distribution appears to be a good fit as confirmed by the ICOMP criteria. The 
parameters are recovered from the maximum likelihood estimation while specifying a lognormal 
distribution. Next, the lognormal cumulative distribution function is calculated for each value of 
the yield reduction to calculate the probability that yield takes on a value less than or equal to 
56.1, 49.7 and 43.2 (Table 29). The expected yield penalty is then calculated and multiplied by 
the assumed price per bushel of $10.60 to obtain the expected cost of soybean yield reduction 
(Schnitkey 2017). 
The expected cost of soybean yield penalties is synonymous with the one-time investment 
payment⁡(𝑘) the farmer must make to enter pennycress production. With operating costs and 
investment costs defined, the discount rate must be determined to solve the farmer’s decision 
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problem. The discount rate is the opportunity cost of investing in pennycress production. If the 
project is funded by debt capital such as a farm loan, this rate reflects the cost of capital. If both 
equity and debt are used, the discount rate is the weighted average cost of equity funds and debt 
funds. This is also known as the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) and is formulated as 
𝛿 = 𝑘𝑒𝑊𝑒 + 𝑘𝑑𝑊𝑑(1 − 𝜏) 
where 𝑘𝑒 is the cost of equity capital, 𝑘𝑑 is the cost of debt capital, 𝑊𝑒 and 𝑊𝑑are the proportion 
of equity funds and proportion of debt funds in the business (Clark 2009). The parameter 𝜏 
represents the marginal tax rate. In terms of financial measures, the cost of equity is the rate of 
return on equity (ROE), and the cost of debt is the interest expense divided by the farm debt.  
The proportion of equity funds is the equity to asset ratio, and the proportion of debt funds is the 
debt to asset ratio. Therefore, these parameters can be calculated using historic data of farm 
financials in the United States. Following Clark (2009), data is gathered from the University of 
Minnesota’s Finnish Biodiversity Information Network (FINBIN), Farm Financial Database for 
all crop farms in all States, over the years 2009 to 2015. The average of all farms over this period 
is utilized to satisfy the equation for the discount rate or the WACC. (CFFM FINBIN 2015). The 
average ROE (𝑘𝑒) is found to be 9.80%, the average equity to asset ratio⁡(𝑊𝑒) is 62.08%, interest 
expense to debt ratio⁡(𝑘𝑑) is 4.15% and the average debt to asset ratio⁡(𝑊𝑑) is 38%. Based on 
the average net income of all crop farms from 2009 to 2015, the marginal tax rate⁡(𝜏) is 28% 
(The Tax Foundation 2013). Plugging these figures into the WACC equation results in a discount 
rate (𝛿) of 7.22%. The discount rate, operating costs and one-time investment costs are 
summarized in Table 30.  
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3.3.6 The Price of Pennycress Which Triggers Entry and Exit 
Using the parameter values estimated in the previous sub-section, numerical approximation is 
carried out to identify the combination of yield and price, which induce entry and exit into 
pennycress production. Estimation results in threshold curves, which represent an entry threshold 
of 𝑃 ∗ 𝑌 = $110.94⁡and an exit threshold of 𝑃 ∗ 𝑌 = $60.81 
Figure 30, shows the entry and exit threshold curves which represent all combinations of price 
and yield which induce the farmer to enter into pennycress production or exit pennycress 
production. At a yield level of 1600 pounds per acre, the price, which triggers the farmer to 
produce pennycress, is found to be approximately $0.08 per pound. A yield of 1200 pounds per 
acre results in a trigger price of approximately $0.10 per pound (Table 31). The Agricultural 
Marketing Resource Center has determined that $0.15 per pound would be a reasonable market 
price for pennycress. This analysis shows that, a price of $0.08 to $0.15 per pound of pennycress 
is a reasonable expectation for yields ranging from 800 pounds per acre to 1600 pounds per acre.  
Yields will not be constant across the United States and individual farm decisions will vary by 
region. The decision to adopt pennycress will be influenced by opportunity cost in regions that 
have historically held comparative advantages in the production of competing crops. Adopting a 
corn-pennycress-soybean rotation in some areas, may mean farmers would be forced to shift 
acreage away from other crops such as wheat, oats or other winter crops. Furthermore, there are 
certain regions across the United States where pennycress is not a suitable crop due to climate 
conditions. To address these considerations, an analysis of historical climate data is carried out 
and a partial equilibrium model is utilized which accounts for competitive land allocation 
decisions throughout the agricultural sector. 
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3.4. Geographic Suitability 
Pennycress is very cold tolerant and can grow in wide range of conditions. However, the plant is 
sensitive to high heat conditions. Pennycress has been known to survive very cold conditions 
with the ability to survive Canadian Prairie winters where temperatures can drop to negative 30 
degrees Celsius. Sharma, Cram et al. (2007), found that Pennycress exhibits a higher freezing 
tolerance than Arabidopsis thaliana and Brassica napus (Canola), both of which are closely 
related to pennycress. With a three-week cold acclimation period, pennycress was freeze tolerant 
at -16.8 degrees Celsius or less than 2 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperatures above 85 degrees 
Fahrenheit pose a risk to pennycress and are found to have an impact on pod and seed numbers 
(Parker and Phippen 2012). Higher temperatures of 92 degrees Fahrenheit and above cause the 
plant to abort flowering (Sedbrook, Phippen et al. 2014).  
Therefore, geographic regions across the United States, which poses a risk to pennycress 
production yield, are identified using a lower bound of 50F and upper bound of 880F.  Monthly 
climate data, including monthly average high and low temperatures, ranging from January 2000 
to December 2014 are obtained. The data consist of all climate divisions within the Continental 
United States (CONUS), representing 48 states and 344 climate divisions.  Next, the months of 
June, July and August are removed from the sample. Then the frequency of reaching the lower 
and upper bound temperature is calculated within each climate division and each year, for the 
months September through May.  The frequencies are then aggregated over the years 2000 
through 2014. Using the aggregated frequencies, the median number of times an upper or lower 
bound temperature is reached, is calculated for each of the 344 climate divisions. This 
information is then disaggregated to the county level using a spatial union. For those counties, 
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which fall under more than one climate division, the county-climate division pairing with the 
largest geometric area is retained.  
Median values range from zero to three over the sample. Therefore, it is assumed that a median 
of one will imply a 25% yield reduction, a median of two will imply a 50% yield reduction and a 
median of three will imply a 75% yield reduction. Using these assumptions, the potential yields 
for each county in the 48 contiguous states are estimated. For example, under the 1600 pound per 
acre assumption, a county with a median of one is expected to have a potential yield of 1200 
pounds per acre, a 25% reduction from the 1600-pound assumption. In a county with a median of 
two, the potential yield is expected to be 800 pounds per acre, a 50% reduction in the 1600-
pound assumption. Those counties with a median of three are expected to have a potential yield 
of 400 pounds per acre, a 75% reduction from the 1600-pound assumption (Figure 38). 
3.5. Land Allocation and Supply Simulation 
Estimated county level yields and variable costs are used to generate national and regional 
supply curves using a partial equilibrium model known as the Policy Analysis System 
(POLYSYS). The POLYSYS model simulates changes in land management, crop production, 
farm income, and commodity prices and estimates the resulting impacts on the U.S. Agricultural 
sector. The development of POLYSYS is a result of joint efforts among the University of 
Tennessee’s Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic 
Research Service and Oklahoma State University’s Great Plains Agricultural Policy Analysis 
Center (Ray, Ugarte et al. 1998). The model has theoretical underpinnings to an equilibrium 
displacement model (Appell, Fu et al.). EDM’s are used to evaluate exogenous shocks to the 
equilibrium market, which result in proportional changes to variables, which are endogenously 
determined by the system. The equilibrium market is represented by a published baseline of 
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current and projected agricultural sector characteristics. The published baseline is provided by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The data and assumptions used in 
establishing the published baselines are updated regularly and available to the public. 
Each simulation of POLYSYS imposes one or more changes to the baseline scenario, acting as 
an exogenous shock on the equilibrium, which results in proportional adjustments to the 
endogenous variables, agricultural supply, demand, prices, and income. Thus, each simulation 
can be thought of as a series of multi-period, annual adjustments to the EDM. 
While POLYSYS is conceptually an EDM, the system of equations is organized of four 
interdependent modules, which make up its core. The four core modules include national 
livestock supply and demand, regional crop supply, national crop demand and a national 
agricultural income module.  Key inputs into the model include a baseline agricultural outlook, 
national land use, agricultural management practices (i.e. crop inputs and yields), livestock sector 
data (i.e. forage requirements), agricultural sector policy data such as government payments, and 
economic indicators such as demand elasticities and land use shift coefficients. 
The crop supply component of POLYSYS is constructed at the conterminous United States 
county level.  The crop supply module is thus composed of 3110 independent linear 
programming models (LP) which represent land allocation decisions in each county. First, 
estimates of the available acreage, which may be used to enter into crop production, switch 
production among competing crops, or move out of crop production are determined for nine 
model crops including corn, grain sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, soybean, cotton, hay, and rice, 
once the available acreage is determined, it is allocated among competing crops based on the 
maximization of expected returns. Enterprise budgets for each crop are used in the determination 
of expected returns for that crop and region. Since land allocation is based on maximizing 
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expected returns, POLYSYS incorporates a price expectations function. The function can take 
the form of a simple naïve price expectations, a weighted 3-year lagged price, or utilize a rational 
expectations function. In this case, the naïve price expectation is used, meaning each year’s 
planting decision is based on previous year prices. The national prices are adjusted to county 
prices using a historic national-regional price relationship. 
Each regional LP model is solved independently and aggregated up to obtain national crop 
supply estimates. Crop supply estimates are utilized by the crop demand module in the 
determination of crop prices. It also estimates crop usage by food, feed, industrial, exports and 
stock carryover. The summation of food, feed and industrial use represents domestic demand. In 
this module, demand is a function of price shifters, cross-price shifters and other variable non-
price shifters. The simulation procedure is simplified by anchoring the analysis to the baseline 
and utilizing demand elasticities and price flexibilities. While the crop supplies are estimated at 
each county, crop demands and prices are found at the national level. Given a fixed supply curve, 
the demand module simultaneously solves for price and demand where price is the intersection 
of supply and demand. 
The third core module, the livestock module, incorporates information from the crop demand and 
supply modules to estimate supply, demand and prices for cattle, hogs, sheep, broilers, turkeys, 
eggs and milk at the national level. This module estimates production at a national level to 
generate percent changes in livestock quantities, which are then combined with direct and cross-
price flexibilities to estimate expected livestock prices. 
The national agricultural income module estimates cash receipts, production expenses, 
government outlays, net returns, and net realized incomes. A set of identity equations and 
econometric models are used to estimate the crop and livestock receipts and expenses accruing to 
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producers. Simultaneously receipts and expenses accruing to government programs are also 
estimated. These are then combined to arrive at the net realized income.  
Results of the national agricultural income module can be fed into another auxiliary module 
known as the community economic impacts module. This is particularly useful in estimating 
impacts to local communities by using the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) model to 
measure direct, indirect, and induced economic activities. 24 
In this study, POLYSYS is used to estimate crop supply, including the supply of pennycress, at 
the county level for the 48 continental United States. As with all crop supply decisions in the 
framework, the simulation is based on a one-year enterprise budget. Pennycress is introduced to 
the POLYSYS framework as a double-crop enterprise of corn-pennycress-soybean, which 
competes for land allocation. Furthermore, soybean yields are modeled to have a 6.5% reduction 
in yield when preceded by pennycress. These restrictions are imposed to reflect the estimated 
decrease in yields resulting from later planting times. The decision to adopt pennycress 
production is an additional net return to the corn or soybean producer, and the total planted 
acreage for the pennycress/corn/soybean enterprise is evenly split among pennycress and 
corn/soybean 
Regional supply results are then aggregated to the national level to examine the supply potential 
of pennycress and resulting impacts on price and acreage of corn, soybeans, grain sorghum, oats, 
barley, wheat, cotton and rice. Based on simulation results, the supply of renewable jet fuel can 
be calculated by assuming a usage rate of supplied pennycress oil. The simulation is carried out 
                                                 
 
24Interested readers should refer to (Ray, Ugarte et al. 1998) for a more detailed explanation of the POLYSYS 
modules. 
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for years 2016-2039, where 2016 is the baseline year. A range of possible pennycress prices are 
utilized to draw out pennycress supply curves of this period. 
3.5.1 Results of Land Allocation and Supply Simulation 
In the baseline scenario market price for pennycress is $0.00 and there is no production. 
Pennycress comes into production with a market price of just $0.05 per pound of pennycress 
seed. Over the simulation period of 2016-2039, with a market price of $0.05, an average of 6.7 
million acres are planted with a National average per acre yield of 1222 lbs, resulting in an 
estimated 7,774 million pounds of pennycress seed supplied to the market.  This translates to an 
estimated 2,721 million pounds of vegetable oil and 197 million gallons of jet fuel produced.25 If 
the long run average price of pennycress were $0.15 per pound through years 2039, average total 
acres planted are estimated to be 19.60 million acres for a total supply of 23,611 million pounds 
of seed and an average of 597 million gallons of fuel, over the years 2016-2039. However, as the 
market matures and demand for pennycress oil increases, prices may increase. Therefore, 
POLYSYS is used to simulate price driven supply curves ranging up to $0.50 per pound of seed 
produced.  
Table 32 illustrates the simulated supply of pennycress seed and resulting supply of renewable 
aviation fuel in millions of gallons for the years 2020 and 2039. Simulation results indicate a 
slight decline moving from years 2020 to 2039. This is indicative of a decline in projected 
commodity prices that is a key design feature of POLYSYS.  
                                                 
 
25 With an oil content of 35%, 7,774,000,000*0.35=2,721,000,000 pounds of oil. There are estimated to be 49.4 
pounds of jet fuel in every 100 pounds of vegetable oil (Pearlson, Wollersheim et al. 2013). Therefore, 
2,686,000,000*0.494=1,344,000,000 pounds of jet fuel. A pound of renewable jet fuel weighs 6.84 pounds, so 1.344 
million pounds is converted to gallons by dividing by 6.84, which results in 197 million gallons of renewable jet 
fuel.  
129 
 
Pennycress has the potential to supply a large contribution of renewable aviation fuel to the 
market, particularly above the $0.15 threshold. However, increases in price have a diminishing 
effect on supply.  The representative supply curves under 1600 pound scenario are presented in 
Figure 34, for the years 2020 and 2039.  
Supply of renewable fuel sharply turns upward for pennycress prices above $0.20, indicating a 
production capacity in the corn and soybean rotation, for the regions identified. As pennycress 
production becomes more profitable, acreage is shifted away from other crops while corn and 
soybean acreage increases (Figure 35 & Table 38). 
Table 38 presents the simulated results for eight primary crops including corn, grain sorghum, 
oats, barley, wheat, soybeans, cotton and rice. These results belong to the scenario with an 
assumed yield potential of 1600 pounds per acre and a market price of $0.15 per pound of 
pennycress seed. The baseline figures represent the case where there is no market for pennycress. 
With an existing market price of $0.15, an annual average of 18.6 million acres of pennycress are 
harvested. With the addition of pennycress acreage, comes a slight increase in harvest corn and 
soybean acreage. In this scenario, harvested acreage of corn and soybean includes single-crop 
and double-cropping methods. Therefore, total harvested acreage increases by 3.2% and 5% over 
the baseline scenario for corn and soybean respectively. This leads to an increase in production 
and total supply of corn, increasing from 14.89 billion bushels to 15.25 billion bushels. Soybean 
production increases from 40.4 billion bushels to 41.3 billion bushels.  
Corn prices subsequently fall by approximately -8% to an average price of $3.40 per bushel, 
down from $3.70 per bushel. The price of soybean remains relatively flat with an average price 
of $8.90 per bushel in the base case and $8.80 per bushel in the alternate case. 
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Despite the estimated decrease in corn prices, corn producers experience a 25.3% increase in net 
returns. This result is driven by decreasing variable expenses in corn production of -8.24% and a 
slight increase in the value of production of 2.63%. Soybean producers experience a 10.3% 
increase in net returns, driven primarily by flat prices and increased production. 
Significant changes also occur in other commodities. Grain sorghum, wheat and cotton are 
estimated to decline in total supply by -5%, -6.2% and -12% respectively. The decreased total 
supplies coincide with a subsequent increase in average prices of 9.9%, 11.0% and 21.4% 
respectively. The net return effects on sorghum, wheat and cotton are mixed. Sorghum net 
returns decrease by -66.6%, and cotton net returns decrease by -9.4%. However, the net returns 
for wheat increase by 30.5%. Barley and oat producers also experience a decline in net returns of 
-33.4% and -20.1% respectively. 
The loss in net returns to barley, oats, sorghum and cotton are offset by increased net returns in 
corn, wheat, soybean, rice and the addition of pennycress. The production of pennycress is 
estimated to provide an additional $3.541 billion in new farm revenues and net returns of 
approximately $2.219 billion. Therefore, total net returns are estimated to increase by 23.3% 
over the baseline.  
Increases in the price of pennycress will continue the trend of increased acreage in corn and 
soybean while sorghum, oat, barley, wheat, cotton and rice decline. At $0.50 per pound, 
pennycress production adds $15.243 billion to farm revenues and $13.502 billion in additional 
net returns. Therefore, total net returns across all crops in Table 38 increase from $38.795 billion 
to $60.797.1 billion, an increase of 56.7% (Table 39). 
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3.5.2 Regions of Pennycress Production 
Figure 40 illustrates those counties where pennycress comes into production by year 2039. Of 
the 3109 counties in the contiguous states, 72.2% are expected to plant pennycress acreage for a 
total of 24.432 billion pounds of pennycress seed by year 2039.  The minimum production is 
found to be in Keweenaw County, Michigan; however, the production is economically 
insignificant with only roughly .1026 acres planted and approximately 54.8 pounds of 
pennycress produced.  The maximum production level is found in McLean County, Illinois, with 
123,253 acres planted and 87.82 million pounds of pennycress produced. This production level is 
quite large in comparison to the median production of pennycress is 1.22 million pounds per 
county.  McLean County Illinois has 653,874 cropland acres and the average farm size is 465 
acres. This translates to an average, of approximately 265 farms in McLean County producing 
pennycress.   
McLean County is located in an ideal pennycress-growing region according to historical climate 
data and pennycress characteristics. As seen in Figure 37, McLean County is located in an area, 
which is modeled as having no risk to pennycress yields, and potential yields are assumed 1600 
pounds per acre. 
Regions where pennycress is most economically feasible are densely located throughout the 
Midwest Corn Belt. Corn and soybean are the predominant crop rotations in this region, and 
incorporating pennycress into the rotation of corn-pennycress-soybean requires little change in 
comparison to areas that traditionally grow other crops. The median pennycress production 
across all states is 469.3 million pounds. However, for the Corn Belt States of Iowa, Illinois, 
Nebraska, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Kansas and Indiana, the median pennycress production 
per county is 1,935.2 million pounds. In fact, these eight Corn Belt States account for 13.996 
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billion pounds of pennycress collectively, or 57.3% of the estimated total 24.432 billion pounds 
of pennycress production in 2039. 
Conversion facilities would likely benefit from being located throughout the Corn Belt, 
particularly in the early years of pennycress market establishment. Technology for the 
conversion of pennycress to advanced biofuel is under development and there is an increasing 
demand by the aviation industry for renewable jet fuels. Based on techno-economic literature, 
plant-gate costs for the production of green-jet fuel can be estimated.  
3.6. Plant-Gate Costs 
Production of renewable fuel can occur through a number of technological processes. One such 
technological process, which shows considerable promise, is a Green Fuel Technology capable 
of producing three different types of alternative fuel through the conversion of eight or more 
different feedstocks. This technology can produce green-gasoline, green-diesel or a drop-in green 
jet fuel. Furthermore, co-products such as propane and naphtha are a result of the process. 
Green-jet fuel is a second-generation alternative fuel that can be blended at 50/50 ratio with 
conventional jet fuels. This fuel can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 65-85% compared with 
conventional jet fuels and has shown higher energy density in flight, allowing aircraft to fly 
further on less fuel. It is also a drop-in replacement fuel which requires no changes to aircraft 
technology or fuel infrastructure (UOP 2016). Plant-gate costs are therefore based on the 
production of a green-jet fuel using purchased pennycress oil. Typically, a techno-economic 
analysis is required to estimate cost parameters of a production pathway. Techno-economic 
analysis (TEA) is a method used to assess the technical and economic performance of a 
particular production pathway  (Brown and Brown 2013).  TEA’s represent a simplified version 
of commercial scale projects, that allows the biorefinery’s production pathway to be evaluated 
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for feasibility. The primary method of developing a TEA is through a detailed process model.  
Performance information is collected on the technologies under consideration. Appropriate 
production scenarios are identified and the process model is designed using process-engineering 
software. Based on the process design, capital investments are determined and a discounted cash 
flow analysis is performed. This allows the investment and production cost of a biorefinery to be 
determined. 
Due to the detailed and specialized information required to conduct a TEA, cost parameters are 
sourced from previous literature. Two primary cost parameters utilized in this study are operating 
costs and capital costs (initial investment cost). English, Menard et al. (2016), provide a thorough 
review of operating and capital costs for a variety of production pathways. For green fuel 
production pathways, the authors examine four different conversion processes: 1) hydro-
processing of purchased oil, 2) pyrolysis to hydro-processing, 3) gasification and 4) pyrolysis of 
biomass. Since pennycress is the chosen feedstock under consideration for this study, cost 
parameters represent the hydro processing of purchased pennycress seed.  
A fully integrated facility which performs the crushing, extraction and hydroprocessing of 
pennycress oil is modeled. Table 33 summarizes the plant-gate costs of the representative facility 
which produces green-jet fuel. The facility produces 4000 barrels per day which translates to 
61,320,000 gallons per day of product. This requires the crushing and extraction of 742.6 mil 
pounds of seed. Therefore, the facility is modeled as having two crushing and extraction units 
which each have a maximum capacity to process 900 tons per day. 
Assuming the plant maximizes jet production, 33 million gallons of jet fuel are produced along 
with co-products of 4.46 mil gallons of naphtha, 15.7 mil gallons of diesel and 4.04 mil gallons 
of propane. Capital costs per gallon of jet fuel are $0.86 and operating costs per gallon of jet fuel 
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are $3.50, including a per gallon feedstock cost of $2.71. Total capital and operating costs per 
gallon is $4.36.26  
Therefore, absent of any policy incentives, a single conversion facility which produces 33 
million gallons of jet fuel would require $4.36 per gallon to cover operating expenses. Utilizing 
the operating cost and capital cost required to produce an advanced biofuel at this representative 
conversion facility, a cash flow analysis can be conducted to determine breakeven prices and the 
economic feasibility of producing a second-generation biofuel from pennycress feedstock. 
However, much like the pennycress producer, the biofuel producer faces uncertainty and 
irreversibility in their decision to invest in such a project. Therefore, the price, which induces the 
firm to invest in the production of renewable aviation fuels, or other second-generation biofuels, 
is likely to be significantly higher than a traditional breakeven price. Applying the model of 
chapter two indicates this price to be approximately $3.86, for a firm not reliant on the RIN 
subsidy. However, firms reliant on the RIN subsidy might require an even higher price to trigger 
investment. As was illustrated in chapter two, the high volatility in RIN price may have 
counteracting effects and actually delay investment with potential entrants requiring 
approximately $4.44 per gallon. Producer tax incentives such as the producer tax-credit and 
bonus depreciation work to offset the headwinds of the RIN market. When accounting for these 
incentives, the price that triggers investment is estimated to be $3.63 per gallon.27 
                                                 
 
26 Capital and operating costs in the production of green-diesel, naphtha and propane are presented in Table 34, 
Table 35 and Table 36.  
27 See section 2.5.3 for a detailed explanation 
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3.7. Conclusion 
This study uses enterprise budgeting, real-option modeling and partial equilibrium simulations to 
examine the potential for pennycress to supply a renewable aviation industry. Pennycress is 
modeled as a winter cover crop, which also provides a cash benefit while fitting into the 
traditional corn and soybean rotation. Enterprise budgets are developed to estimate net returns of 
pennycress, based on a yield of 1600 pounds per acre. Suitable regions of growth are identified 
based on agronomic characteristics. Regions that pose climatic risk to pennycress are penalized 
in the form of yield reductions, based on the median number of times an extreme temperature is 
reached during the pennycress growth season. Temperatures of 5 degrees Fahrenheit or less and 
88 degrees Fahrenheit or more are deemed extreme for pennycress. Yield reductions reduce net 
return yet still allow these areas to come into production, particularly where corn and soybean 
have comparative advantages.  
A real option analysis is developed to model the decision of adding pennycress to the corn and 
soybean rotation. In this framework, both yield and price are modeled as a stochastic mean 
reverting process. Historic yield of Canadian rapeseed and rapeseed spot price (Rotterdam FOB) 
is used parameterize the model. This analysis identifies the optimal price, which triggers 
investment into pennycress production while accounting for the yield and price uncertainty, as 
well as irreversible sunk costs. Yields ranging from 800 to 1600 pounds per acre coincide with 
an entry trigger price of $0.15 to $0.08 per pound. Previous research places the potential market 
price within this range at $0.15 per pound.  
Using a partial equilibrium model known as POLYSYS, supply curves are simulated using a 
range of prices from $0.00 to $0.50 per pound. Supplies are estimated at the county level and 
aggregated to the national level to estimate the total amount of pennycress and renewable 
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aviation fuel supplied. Price is allowed to increase at five-cent increments. Pennycress first 
comes into production at $0.05 with 6.65 million acres planted. As the simulated price increases, 
the market quickly responds by doubling planted acres at $0.10 per pound. The simulation is run 
for over a 25-year period with the terminal year occurring in 2039.  
Assuming a market price of $0.15 per pound of pennycress seed, planted-acreage is estimated to 
reach 20.17 million acres, producing 24,245 million pounds of pennycress seed and 8,486 
million pounds of pennycress oil by 2020. This amount of pennycress oil would feed 88 
conversion facilities with a nameplate capacity of 13 million gallons of drop-in green fuel, which 
each demand 96.3 million pounds of pennycress oil. With 24,245 million pounds of pennycress 
seed, approximately 613 million gallons of renewable aviation fuel is produced.  
By the year 2039, 20.30 million acres would be planted while assuming a market price of $0.15 
per pound of pennycress seed. This would generate approximately 24,432 million pounds of 
pennycress or 8,551 pounds of pennycress oil, enough to supply roughly 89 conversion facilities 
with a nameplate capacity of 13 million gallons. These results are flat compared to the year 2020, 
which is due to the projections of commodity price embedded in the simulation model 
POLYSYS. These projections are regularly updated by United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).  
Based on the estimates it appears that pennycress has the potential to supply approximately 600 
to 800 million gallons to an alternative aviation fuel industry. The results are believed to be 
conservative based on current projections of corn and soybean price, conservative yield 
assumptions and an imposed 6.5% soybean reduction. However, previous research has shown 
that subsequent years of pennycress production can actually improve soybean yields as the soil 
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benefits of a cover crop accrue. The model does not account for soil or other environmental 
benefits through the adoption of a cover crop in corn and soybean rotations. This limitation is 
acknowledged and left for future research. Another limitation is the use of current projections of 
commodity price. As projections are updated, the effect of rising or falling prices in corn, grain 
sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, soybean, cotton and rice will alter the results. If future prices of 
corn and soybean rise, the supply of pennycress would rise as producers look to meet market 
demands of corn and soybean. Furthermore, the maximum yield potential is assumed 1600 
pounds per acre for pennycress. Over the regions, which come into production, average yields 
are approximately 1,267 pounds per acre. However, previous agronomic research has found yield 
to be as high as 2200 pounds per acre. Genetic research into this crop is also ongoing. 
Pennycress shares a similar genetic structure with Arabidopsis. The large body of research 
around Arabidopsis may allow for rapid advances in pennycress genetic varieties with improved 
yield and other desirable characteristics, making pennycress an even more viable option than 
what is found here. 
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3. A. Appendix 
3. A.1 Tables 
 
Table 27: Stochastic yield and price parameter estimations 
Parameter Definition Value Scale 
⁡?̂?𝑝 Reversion Rate Rapeseed Price 0.1603 Per year 
⁡?̂?𝑦 Reversion Rate Rapeseed Yield 0.0182 Per year 
?̂?𝑝 Standard Deviation Rapeseed Price 0.2064 Per year 
?̂?𝑦 Standard Deviation Rapeseed Yield 0.1123 Per year 
𝜌𝑝𝑟 Correlation of Yield and Price -0.2943 Per year 
 
 
Table 28: Best of fit distribution for historical soybean yield 
 Historical Soybean Yield Best of Fit (1977-2016) 
ICOMP 
EV EXPO GAMMA GEV LOGNORM NORM WEIBUL 
280.69 380.03 269.27 269.59 268.74* 268.92 273.43 
* Minimum score 
 
 
Table 29: Probability of occurrence for yield reductions and expected cost 
Percent Reduction  Probability of Occurring Probabilistic Yield Penalty 
6.50% 3.9 0.9601 3.74 
17.25% 10.35 0.8464 8.76 
28.00% 16.8 0.5693 9.57 
Expected Yield Penalty 22.07 Expected cost of yield penalty $233.95 per acre 
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Table 30: Summary of pennycress cost of production parameters 
Parameter Definition Value Scale 
𝛿 Discount Rate 0.0722 per year 
𝑤 Operating Cost $67.47 per acre 
𝑘 One-time Sunk Cost $233.95 per acre 
 
 
Table 31: Entry and exit trigger prices for pennycress production 
 Yield and Price Combinations   
Yield 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 
Entry Trigger Price $0.15 $0.12 $0.10 $0.09 $0.08 $0.07 
Exit Trigger Price $0.05 $0.04 $0.04 $0.04 $0.03 $0.03 
 
 
Table 32: Simulated pennycress production (figures in millions) 
  1600 pound per acre yield scenario  
 2020 2039 
Price Supply(lbs) Planted Acres Fuel (gal.) Supply(lbs) Planted Acres Fuel (gal.) 
$0.00  0 0 0 0 0 0 
$0.05  7674 6.65 194.0 8146 6.94 205.9 
$0.10  17728 14.67 448.1 17736 14.54 448.3 
$0.15  24245 20.17 612.9 24432 20.30 617.6 
$0.20  27352 22.98 691.4 26905 22.49 680.1 
$0.25  28936 24.36 731.4 28367 23.82 717.1 
$0.30  29897 25.18 755.7 29215 24.53 738.5 
$0.40  31103 26.26 786.2 30737 25.89 777.0 
$0.50  32010 27.15 809.1 31559 26.66 797.7 
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Table 33: Summary of plant-gate costs in the conversion of pennycress oil to green-jet 
Pennycress fed Green Jet Fuel Production Pathway 
  Costs - fully integrated 
   
Facility demand (pounds of seed)  595,645,419 
Price ($/pound)  $0.15 
Yield (pounds/acre)  1,600 
Production (Gallons)  32,999,746 
Name Plate Capacity (gallons)  61,320,000 
Capital Feedstock to bio-oil ($)  $21,328,404 
Capital Transportation ($)  $118,915 
Capital Cost of Hydroprocessing ($)  $9,805,686 
Total Capital Costs ($)  $31,253,005 
Total Capital Costs ($/gallon)  $0.95 
Operating cost Conversion ($)  $6,614,435 
Cost of Feedstock ($/gallon)  $2.71 
Operating Cost of Transportation ($)  $666,396 
Operating Cost of Hydro-Processing  $36,011,556 
Brownfield or other operating Credit ($)  ($1,293,184) 
Total Operating Cost  $41,999,203 
Total Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $3.98 
   
Total Capital and Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $4.93 
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Table 34: Summary of plant-gate costs in the conversion of pennycress oil to green-diesel 
Pennycress fed Green Diesel Production Pathway 
  Costs - full integrated 
   
Facility demand (pounds of seed)  124,118,177 
Price ($/pound)  $0.15 
Yield (pounds/acre)  1,600 
Production (Gallons)  15,703,879 
Name Plate Capacity (gallons)  61,320,000 
Capital Feedstock to bio-oil ($)  $42,656,808 
Capital Transportation ($)  $118,915 
Capital Cost of Hydroprocessing ($)  $9,805,686 
Total Capital Costs ($)  $52,581,409 
Total Capital Costs ($/gallon)  $0.86 
Operating cost Conversion ($)  $13,228,870 
Cost of Feedstock ($/gallon)  $1.19 
Operating Cost of Transportation ($)  $666,396 
Operating Cost of Hydro-Processing  $36,011,556 
Brownfield or other operating Credit ($)  ($1,293,184) 
Total Operating Cost  $48,613,638 
Total Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $1.98 
   
Total Capital and Operating Costs ($/gallon) $2.84 
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Table 35: Summary of plant-gate costs in the conversion of pennycress oil to green-propane 
Pennycress fed Green Propane Production Pathway 
  Costs - full integrated 
   
Facility demand (pounds of seed)  8,736,970 
Price ($/pound)  $0.15 
Yield (pounds/acre)  1,600 
Production (Gallons)  4,043,969 
Name Plate Capacity (gallons)  61,320,000 
Capital Feedstock to bio-oil ($)  $42,656,808 
Capital Transportation ($)  $118,915 
Capital Cost of Hydroprocessing ($)  $9,805,686 
Total Capital Costs ($)  $52,581,409 
Total Capital Costs ($/gallon)  $0.86 
Operating cost Conversion ($)  $13,228,870 
Cost of Feedstock ($/gallon)  $0.32 
Operating Cost of Transportation ($)  $666,396 
Operating Cost of Hydro-Processing  $36,011,556 
Brownfield or other operating Credit ($)  ($1,293,184) 
Total Operating Cost  $48,613,638 
Total Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $1.12 
   
Total Capital and Operating Costs ($/gallon) $1.97 
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Table 36: Summary of plant-gate costs in the conversion of pennycress oil to green-naphtha 
Pennycress fed Green Naphtha Production Pathway 
  Costs - full integrated 
   
Facility demand (pounds of seed)  14,100,975 
Price ($/pound)  $0.15 
Yield (pounds/acre)  1,600 
Production (Gallons)  4,463,966 
Name Plate Capacity (gallons)  61,320,000 
Capital Feedstock to bio-oil ($)  $42,656,808 
Capital Transportation ($)  $118,915 
Capital Cost of Hydroprocessing ($)  $9,805,686 
Total Capital Costs ($)  $52,581,409 
Total Capital Costs ($/gallon)  $0.86 
Operating cost Conversion ($)  $13,228,870 
Cost of Feedstock ($/gallon)  $0.47 
Operating Cost of Transportation ($)  $666,396 
Operating Cost of Hydro-Processing  $36,011,556 
Brownfield or other operating Credit ($)  ($1,293,184) 
Total Operating Cost  $48,613,638 
Total Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $1.27 
   
Total Capital and Operating Costs ($/gallon)   $2.12 
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Table 37: Pennycress enterprise budget assuming 1600lbs per acre 
2017 Field Pennycress (Thlaspi Arvense) 
   
Unit  Quantity  Price Total 
Revenue Pennycress 1 
 
lbs 1600 $0.15 $240.00 
Total Revenue $240.00 
Variable Expenses Seed 2 
 
lbs 5 $2.50 $12.50 
 
Fertilizer & Lime (Table 1.) Acre 1 $26.50 $26.50 
 
Chemical (Table 2.) 3 Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
 
Repair & Maintenance (Table 3.) 4 Acre 1 $6.52 $6.52 
 
Fuel, Oil & Filter (Table 3.) 4 Acre 1 $6.93 $6.93 
 
Operator Labor (Table 3.) 4 Acre 1 $3.05 $3.05 
 
Machinery Rental 8 Acre 1 $10.00 $10.00 
 
Crop Insurance 5 Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
 
Operating Interest 6 % $65.50  6.00% $1.97 
 
Other Variable Costs Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Variable Expenses $67.47 
Fixed Expenses Machinery 4 
    
 
 
Capital Recovery (Table 3.) Acre 1 $18.24 $18.24 
 
Other Fixed Machinery Costs Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
 
Property Taxes Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
 
Insurance (Non-Machinery) Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
 
Other Fixed Costs 7 Acre 1 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Fixed Expenses $18.24 
Return Above All Specified Expenses $154.29 
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Table 38: Changes from base case to alternate scenario with pennycress price of $0.15 per pound 
 
Harvested Acres (Mil Ac) Total Supply (Mils) PRICE ($/unit) Net Returns 
 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Corn (bu) 79.58 82.12 3.2% 14884 15252 2.5% 3.7 3.4 -8.1% 16145 20230 25.3% 
Grain 
Sorghum 
(bu) 
5.11 4.86 -5.0% 337.0 320.0 -5.0% 3.6 4.0 9.9% 
798.0 266.8 -67% 
Oats (bu) 0.90 0.86 -5.1% 62.3 59.3 -4.7% 2.2 2.1 -3.5% -185.0 -222.2 20.1% 
Barley (bu) 2.60 2.49 -4.2% 198.0 191.2 -3.4% 5.2 4.9 -5.2% 362.0 240.9 -33% 
Wheat (bu) 44.11 40.19 -8.9% 2178.8 2044.1 -6.2% 5.0 5.5 11.0% 2742.0 3577.2 30.5% 
Soybeans 
(bu) 
80.06 84.07 5.0% 4044.6 4129.2 2.1% 8.9 8.8 -0.7% 
19106.0 21078.9 10.3% 
Cotton 
(bale) 
8.40 7.30 -13% 14.8 13.0 -
12.0% 
0.6 0.7 21.4% 
-1106.0 -1210.0 -9.4% 
Rice (cwt) 2.89 2.74 -5.0% 234.0 223.3 -4.6% 13.8 16.8 21.9% 933.0 1663.2 78.3% 
Hay (Tons) 56.77 56.73 -0.1% 136.0 135.5 -0.4% 144.7 154.5 6.8% - - - 
Pennycress 
(lbs) 
0.00 18.62 - 0.0 23610.8 - 0 0.15 - 
0.0 2219.0 - 
Total All 
Crops 
280.4 281.36 0.3% 
      
38795.0 47843.8 23.3% 
Note: Some figures rounded to reduce space requirements 
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Table 39: Changes from base case to alternate scenario with pennycress price of $0.50 per pound 
 
Harvested Acres (Mil Ac) Total Supply (Mils) PRICE ($/unit) Net Returns 
 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Base 
case 
Alternate % 
Change 
Corn (bu) 79.58 84.45 6.1% 14884 15497 4.1% 3.7 3.2 -12.8% 16145 19936 23.5% 
Grain 
Sorghum 
(bu) 
5.11 4.63 -9.4% 337.0 301.3 -11% 3.6 4.5 25.6% 798.0 405.6 -49% 
Oats (bu) 0.90 0.83 -8.6% 62.3 57.7 -7.3% 2.2 2.1 -4.8% -185.0 -209.4 13.2% 
Barley (bu) 2.60 2.37 -8.8% 198.0 182.5 -7.8% 5.2 5.4 3.8% 362.0 309.5 -15% 
Wheat (bu) 44.11 36.90 -16% 2178.8 1871.9 -14% 5.0 6.4 27.5% 2742.0 4732.5 72.6% 
Soybeans 
(bu) 
80.06 86.86 8.5% 4044.6 4152.5 2.7% 8.9 8.8 -1.6% 19106.0 21285.8 11.4% 
Cotton 
(bale) 
8.40 6.91 -18% 14.8 12.5 -16% 0.6 0.7 23.9% -1106.0 -1029.3 6.9% 
Rice (cwt) 2.89 2.51 -13% 234.0 205.5 -12% 13.8 18.5 34.3% 933.0 1864.5 99.8% 
Hay (Tons) 56.77 56.52 -0.4% 136.0 135.3 -0.5% 144.7 154.5 6.8% 0.0 0.0 0.0% 
Pennycress 
(lbs) 
0.00 24.51 - 0.0 30486.8 - 0.0 0.5 - 0.0 13502.5 0.0% 
Total All 
Crops 
280.4 281.98 0.6%             38795.0 60797.1 56.7% 
Note: Some figures rounded to reduce space requirements 
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3. A.2 Figures 
 
 
Figure 31: Distribution of Illinois soybean yields 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Observed data overlaid by best of fit theoretical distribution 
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Figure 33: Entry and Exit Thresholds for all combinations of price and yield 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Supply curves under the assumption of 1600 pounds per acre yield 
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Figure 35: Pennycress disruption effects on commodity production and price 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Pennycress disruption effects on commodity net returns 
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Figure 37: Simulated top pennycress producing county 
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Figure 38: Regions that pose a risk to pennycress based on historical climate data 
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Figure 39: Regions and their expected yields based on climate risk regions 
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Figure 40: Simulated pennycress production in year 2039
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Conclusion 
This research is aligned with identifying barriers throughout the alternative jet-fuel supply chain. 
Barriers include complex markets for tradable credits, policy uncertainty and insufficient 
supplies of feedstock and fuel. 
Production of second-generation biofuel such as alternative jet-fuel is supported by public policy 
efforts, such as the program for a tradable credit known as the renewable identification number 
(RIN). The RIN market is complex and uncertain. This research aids in disembroiling these 
complexities by examining past RIN price behavior and drivers of RIN price regime change. The 
renewable fuel standard is often uncertain year to year, forcing market participants, obligated 
parties and other agents to adapt their behaviors to the changing regulations. This leads to 
volatile RIN price which is found to delay optimal investment decisions for the producer for 
alternative jet-fuels and other second-generation biofuels. Producer tax incentives work to 
counteract the effects of policy uncertainty, but these incentives would be more effective if 
coupled with reductions in policy uncertainty. 
To identify opportunities of supply, an experimental crop known as pennycress is evaluated for 
its potential to support a renewable aviation industry. To do so, an enterprise budget is developed 
and partial equilibrium simulations are carried out. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the 
optimal price, which triggers investment into pennycress production while accounting for the 
yield and price uncertainty, as well as irreversible sunk costs. Yields ranging from 800 to 1600 
pounds per acre coincide with an entry trigger price of $0.15 to $0.08 per pound. Based on the 
estimates it appears that pennycress has the potential to supply approximately 600 to 800 million 
gallons to an alternative aviation fuel industry.   
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